The Problem of Internal Security of Interwar European Empires in the US Expert Discourse

Nesterov Dmitrii Aleksandrovich PhD in History candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor of the Chair of World History, Law and Teaching Methods, Samara State University of Social Sciences and Education 65/67 Maxim Gorky str., Samara, Samara region, 443099, Russia dmitriynesterov1994@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Introduction

Global empires in the interwar period faced a number of challenges to their internal security – the rapid spread of ideas of nationalism, pan-Islamism and communism, which were the ideological basis of anti-colonial protests and national liberation movements in colonial possessions and mandated territories ^[5]. All this was accompanied by a comprehensive reduction in the budget expenditures of the metropolises after the Great War ^{[9] [30]}.

The problems of ensuring the internal security of global empires, their position in the Versailles-Washington system of international relations, the prospects for the development of colonial possessions and mandate territories, as well as the specifics of the empires' relations with each other and with the United States (which for the first time actively intervened in the conflict on European territory and in the construction of a new configuration of international relations) became the subject of research and discussion on a wide scale the circle of official and semi-official institutions, political, military, public and scientific figures, both within the global empires themselves and in the United States ^{[2] [7] [8] [11] [14] [36]}.

At the same time, during the interwar period, there was a steady increase in the number and degree of influence on the foreign policy of leading states of expert institutions, traditionally called analytical centers. At the same time, influential political and government figures took an active part in the process of their creation, attracting experts in various fields and specialties to discuss issues of ensuring international security.

Features of the development of U.S. foreign policy expertise in the interwar period

The activities of American foundations in Europe, which funded expert organizations, were often interpreted as a manifestation of "Americanization", the spread of American practices and ideas on the continent and an increase in the soft power of the United States, while simultaneously opening new markets for the country's growing economy ^{[26] [38] [41, p. 56] [46, p. 118-119]}.

On the other hand, there is literature presenting American foundations as the "basis for internationalism", working tirelessly to overcome the traditional "isolationism" of the United States, in fact Europeanizing the concept of American foreign policy ^{[13] [16] [25] [39]}.

Both approaches differed from each other in many ways in their interpretations of the concept of "national framework" and metaphors of interpenetration and resistance, which were at the same time products of the debates of the interwar period they studied. In particular, the understanding of isolationism as the US turning its back on the world was actively promoted in the interwar period by organizations such as the Carnegie Endowment to present foreign policy decisions as a choice between backwardness and modernity, between fear and reason, between participation in history and denial of its laws.

At the same time, the concept of "Americanization" in a non-American context, understood as a form of cultural imperialism, was coined by those on the other side of the debate in order to delegitimize undesirable cultural and social phenomena as alien, essentially violent imposition ^[17].

Instead of constituting binary opposites – like "internationalists" versus "nationalists" or "isolationists" – many participants in the expert debates of the interwar period advocated a variety of models of the international system based on competing norms and interests.

Thus, American Senator William Bora, one of the representatives of the country's "isolationist" faction, formulated an alternative narrative in his speech at the Council on Foreign Relations. While liberal internationalists saw in the new "closeness" to the peoples of Europe and Asia the beginning of mutual understanding and cooperation, in fact, in his opinion, the opposite was true. Just as proximity made residents of densely populated cities suspicious of their neighbors and lock the doors of their apartments, the increased interdependence between nations has intensified, rather than weakened, interethnic hostility. Meanwhile, on his father's farm, where there was not a single neighbor within a few miles, the door was always open ^{[28, p. vi]}.

Obviously, Bora meant that the rural model of society was more applicable to international relations and would make it possible to solve a whole series of problems related to international security, but on the other hand, his model did not imply satisfying the nationalist ambitions of peoples on the outskirts of global empires.

The increase in the number of expert organizations in the United States during the interwar period is explained by the fact that due to the American trend towards isolationism, certain groups connected by close business and academic contacts with European partners wanted to convince political elites and the American public that it was in the interests of the United States to play a more active role in international politics.

The duality that helped shape the nature and character of these early think tanks was noted by George Foriol, who stated that "the apparent strength of the American economic system and the potential application of its ideals on a global basis gave rise to a certain sense of mission, reinforced by disillusionment with traditional international behavior (an example is the disaster of the First World War). But these same frustrations underscored a national sense of insecurity about any deep U.S. involvement in world affairs" ^{[32, p. 12]}.

Despite this, as P.A. Zueva rightly notes, "although the United States itself did not join the League of Nations, and the Treaty of Versailles was not adopted by the U.S. Senate, W. Wilson's program became the basis for the formation of a new worldview among the U.S. population" ^{[4, p. 94]}. In fact, the political forces of the United States focused on aligning national interests with international norms, strengthening and deepening economic expansion in Europe, developing and consolidating military power in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, as well as increasing their international influence ^{[3, p. 110]}.

This was manifested in the fact that during the interwar period, a number of experts on the pages of the magazine "Foreign Affairs", published by the Council, published their assessments of relations between Great Britain and the United States ^{[34] [47]}. On the one hand, they noted that it was necessary to establish "special relations" between the two states based on common cultural and ideological attitudes, economic and geopolitical interests. On the other hand, experts noted that both the United States and Great Britain were competitors to each other during the interwar period. In their opinion, the US government needs to use the UK's debt burden and the rebellions on the outskirts of the empire in order to take its place in familiar markets, especially in the field of oil production. Thus, the Council's experts understood "special relations" as an opportunity to consolidate the geopolitical and economic positions of the United States.

A peculiar result of these transformations was the concept of "continentalism" formulated by Charles Beard, who argued that the doctrine of Americanism does not imply isolationism, but on the contrary requires the establishment of ties with the states of Europe and Asia ^{[15, p. 87]}. And foreign policy expertise in the interwar period in relation to global empires was primarily aimed at achieving this goal. Hence their close connection with representatives of the imperial political and financial elites, as well as with the institutions of the League of Nations. At the same time, the lack of a clear hierarchy of the expert community sometimes led to intense competition between organizations that duplicate each other in terms of functions and goals.

Although expert organizations shared the ideas of Wilsonianism to one degree or another, this did not make them monolithic in ideological terms. Firstly, these ideas themselves determined only the general conceptual outline of approaches, and not ideological dogmatics. Thus, the famous principle of self-determination was spelled out by the American president rather vaguely, suggested various options for its institutionalization and, in relation to colonies, proposed to take into account the rights of local peoples together with the interests of the metropolises ^{[10, p. 125]}.

This allowed experts to maneuver in issues of national liberation movements on the outskirts of global empires from the slow reform of the colonial system to the violent suppression of insurgent movements. Moreover, Woodrow Wilson himself initiated numerous armed interventions, including the long-term occupation of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the border war with Mexico, the use of marines to protect American citizens during riots in Chinese cities and, finally, an armed intervention in revolution-ridden Russia ^{[1, p. 376]}.

Moreover, many of the foreign policy experts changed their ideological orientation depending on their own political interests. For example, in 1919-1920, many of the most prominent officials and trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, including Nicholas Murray Butler, James Brown Scott and Elihu Root, who had previously supported the ideas of President Woodrow Wilson and advocated the spread of liberal internationalism, sided with the "reservist" camp, openly opposing U.S. membership in the League of Nations in its current form ^{[31, p. 439-455] [37, p. 59] [48, p. 824-825] [50, p. 55]}.

The detailed transformation is explained by the fact that being loyal Republicans, they were concerned that President Wilson could use the peace treaty to drive a wedge between representatives of the American political elite in the run-up to the 1920 elections, thereby preventing the Republican Party, which experts at the Carnegie Endowment considered the most representative for the "smart" elements of American society, to regain the presidency ^{[21, p. 460]}.

Butler himself began the ill-fated race for the Republican nomination in the same year, and therefore could not openly advocate for the League of Nations ^{[43, p. 276-296]}. Such conditions showed that foreign policy had ceased to be the prerogative of liberal elites, but had become the object of mass democracy, exerting a direct influence on internal political processes in the United States.

Secondly, expert organizations of the interwar period were based on the concept of using academic experience and scientific knowledge to find solutions to all problems existing in the world ^{[42, p. 540]}. Typologically, they represented institutions where academic experts, official and unofficial actors of international politics and others with their own interests in this field could come together, focus on short-term or long-term international problems, propose potential ways to solve them and try to influence important government decisions, as well as shape public opinion through Media or publication of reports.

The problem of security and conflict resolution of European Empires in expert discourse

It is not surprising that already in the very first issue of the magazine Foreign Affairs (it became the direct successor to the magazine International Relations and was also published by the Council on Foreign Relations), an article was published on the war in Ireland ^[20]. This publication by Ernst Boyd was not analytical in nature, but aimed, firstly, to form an opinion about the senselessness of the uprising, and, secondly, to show that the rebels were not fighting in the interests of the Irish people. Thus, in a sarcastic form, the author ridicules the attempt of a widespread transition to the Irish language and excessive bureaucratization of local government ^{[20, p. 87-88]}.

In addition, E. Boyd scoffs at the purpose of the rebels, which, in his opinion, consists only in "forcing people to work for them" ^{[20, p. 89]}. The only reason why the uprising was not suppressed for a long time, E. Boyd calls the indecision of the authorities. In his opinion, it was necessary to physically destroy all the rebels immediately ^{[20, p. 90]}.

It should be noted that E. Boyd does not mention the actions of the British army to suppress the insurgency in Ireland, but fully supports the Anglo-Irish treaty concluded on December 6, 1921, according to which Southern Ireland became a dominion called the Irish Free State. Moreover, according to the author, if it had not been for the rebels, this event would have happened much earlier ^{[20, p 95]}.

It can be stated that E. Boyd's publication was addressed mainly to the Irish population of the United States, aiming to form a negative attitude towards the Irish insurgency among them. This explains the disregard for the activities of the British army, since the description of their actions could cause Irish emigrants to sympathize with the rebels.

This topic was continued by the famous Spanish journalist, writer and philosopher Ramiro de Maesta in his article "International Politics of Spain". In it, using the example of Spain, he showed that the defeat of empires in anti-insurgency operations leads to destabilization of the situation not only in the colonies, but also in the metropolis itself ^{[29, p. 136-143]}. In addition, the expert noted the need for international mutual assistance.

So, he wrote: "It would be a great relief for us to work in Morocco under an agreement with France, provided that the latter respects our zone. With such an agreement, the Spanish government would probably count on France's help in suppressing separatist elements and Catalan nationalism" ^{[29, p. 143]}.

In the article "Italian colonial Policy in North Africa", K. Schanzer continued the ideas of previous authors that ensuring imperial security in colonies is a boon for the peoples inhabiting them. The author especially emphasized the commitment of the Italian authorities to the principle of minimum force in carrying out anti-insurgency activities. The author saw its essence in the fact that the colonial troops struck only at the partisans, trying to minimize the damage to the civilian population, who remained loyal to the imperial authorities ^{[44, p. 449]}.

In general, it should be noted that foreign policy experts of the interwar period most often analyzed not general issues of international relations and security, interaction between metropolises and colonies, but analyzed specific problems and events, often focusing on specific regions.

For this reason, some experts mainly concentrated on those aspects in which they were professionals, while others correlated their conclusions with changes in political ideas, theories, and doctrines.

Thus, following the development of the ideas of utilitarianism by I. Bentham and J. S. Mill in relation to further colonial rule in India and the position of the Labor Party on colonial issues with criticism of the militarization of international relations ^{[6, pp. 145-146]}, many experts also adjusted their attitude to national liberation movements, however, very selectively – mainly in relation to India.

For example, in a review of L. Rai's book "The Political Future of India", Professor Harry Karman of Columbia University noted that the Indian people have achieved such civilizational, economic and political development that they deserve to receive the status of a dominion, like Canada and Australia. If the authorities of the British Empire refuse such a decision, it will lead to the final loss of India and to serious economic and geopolitical losses ^{[22, p. 156-158]}.

In turn, Taraknath Das, considering the problem of India's struggle for independence, summed up: "Mahatma Gandhi is not only leading a political revolution in India, but is also working on a social revolution in India, and at the same time gives a new ideal to the civilized world. He spiritualizes the revolution, he relies on nonviolence" ^{[27, p. 214]}. Thus, the Council on Foreign Relations called on the authorities of the British Empire to agree to M. Gandhi's terms, because otherwise more revolutionary-minded leaders might take his place.

However, there was another opinion about the possible sovereignty of India. In particular, Basil Blackett, the financial adviser to the Viceroy of India, completely denied India's ability to be an independent state. In his opinion, its presence under the colonial rule of Britain contributed to the economic development of the colony. Therefore, the roots of the national liberation movement are civilizational, not economic in nature. This includes racial antagonism within India, the struggle between East and West, and the confrontation between Hinduism and Islam. And according to B. Blackett, the British cannot solve these problems ^{[19, p. 49-50]}. The expert did not give any proposals of his own to the colonial authorities, except for the continuation of the "divide and rule" policy.

One of the serious skeptics of Indian sovereignty was the famous British journalist and diplomat, member of the delegation to the Paris Conference, one of the first members of the British Institute of International Relations Valentin Chirol. However, his criticism of the national liberation movement in India and other imperial territories was closely linked to Islamophobia.

In his article "Islam and Britain" published by the Council on Foreign Relations, V. Chirol emphasized that Britain, by coincidence, turned into a great Asian empire, which includes a quarter of the entire Muslim population of the world. This, in turn, led to a serious challenge for the metropolis, since most of the rebels on the periphery of the empire acted precisely under the flag of Islam ^{[24, p. 48]}. However, the expert for some reason forgot to mention that in the First World War, the Arabs sided with the British Empire in the fight against Turkey.

Thus, V. Chirol deliberately demonized Islam, presenting it as a militant religion, bringing together all the stereotypes that existed at that time. He also noted with particular criticism the opening of the Indian Legislative Assembly in February 1921, which included Muslim deputies. At the same time, V. Chirol noted that such a decision in the future would lead to the separation of the Islamic territories of India and their confrontation with the Hindu lands ^{[24, p. 52-53]}.

The author also believed that it was the Islamic factor that would become one of the reasons for the destabilization of the situation in the Near and Middle East, since the Muslim population is easily susceptible to anti-Western propaganda, which is further facilitated by the fact that, with ethnic fragmentation, the peoples of these regions are united not only religiously, but also linguistically ^{[24, p. 57-58]}. And here the emotional Islamophobic attacks are quite understandable, since in V. Chirol's perception it was pan-Islamism that threatened the colonial system of the British Empire in the East, which was familiar to him.

However, David Hogarth, an expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, fundamentally disagreed with the above position about the danger of Islam as a political force. He claimed that "there are no signs that now or in the future, as during the last war, Muslims will join forces in a common desire to win again, as their first caliphs did" ^{[35, p. 414]}.

D. Hogarth urged not to succumb to Islamophobia, because, firstly, there were no signs of the possibility of real realization of the ideas of pan-Arabism, since intertribal hostility is stronger than hatred of European empires, and, secondly, any possible uprising can easily be suppressed by armored vehicles and aircraft ^{[35, p. 413]}.

Thus, the expert supported the "divide and rule" policy of the colonial authorities, and believed that superiority in military equipment was the best means of countering rebellions on the outskirts of empires. In addition, D. Hogarth imposed a civilizational duty on empires, since "Wahhabi fanaticism, generated by primitive living conditions, has reached the limits of higher civilizations, where new contacts will change it as quickly as it happened after its first rise more than a hundred years ago" ^{[35, p. 413]}.

No less important issues considered by experts of the interwar period were Zionism, Wahhabism and the future of mandated and colonial territories in the Middle East. At the same time, a number of experts noted the creative role of Zionism in the region, since the Jewish population should "become an intermediary between Europe and Asia" ^{[45, p. 432]}. But for this, in their opinion, it was necessary to get rid of Islamophobia, to begin to perceive the Arabs as independent actors in the region, since "in the long term there can be no stable settlement unless the Arabs are convinced that they will benefit from the presence of Jews" ^{[45, p. 432]}.

All this, according to L. Stein, did not exclude financial and military support for Transjordan from the British authorities, since the presence of a contingent of colonial troops (mainly the Air Force and armored vehicles) is a guarantee of security in the region and can prevent attempts by the Wahhabis to stage an uprising and "plunge Palestine into chaos" ^{[45, p. 416]}.

If we talk about the situation of France in this region, the expert of the Council on Foreign Relations L. Martin noted that the political situation on the Arabian Peninsula after the end of the First World War was characterized by pax Britannica, since France "has too many concerns of its own to pursue an aggressive policy in the region" ^{[40, p. 681]}. In addition, the expert noted that it is Britain that plays a stabilizing role in the region, while simultaneously supporting the Wahhabi Sultan of Nejd and Ibn Saud.

Considering the wars for the unification of Arabia led by Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud in the context of their danger to the national security of Britain, the expert of the Council on Foreign Relations A. Musil noted that these events are difficult to designate as traditional rebellions on the outskirts of the empire, since we are talking only about the unification of disparate nomadic tribes connected only by a common religion.

In the same vein, the article by J. A. Chamier "England and air power" was sustained, in which the author pointed out that although England maintains an army mainly as a garrison for overseas possessions, the task of the army becomes more difficult as potential opponents improve in military education and armament. He suggested that increasing the assistance provided by the air force could eliminate the need for a significant increase in military power, emphasizing the growing importance of the air force in Britain's defense strategy ^{[23, p. 315]}.

The author also addresses the need for compensatory adjustments to defense spending, pointing to the recognition of the changing dynamics of warfare and the importance of reallocating resources to adapt to the growing importance of the air force in military operations.

However, another expert F. Frankfurter believed that militarization would not solve the problem, but only increase the degree of confrontation. In his opinion, the British authorities need to "stop agitation, raise the level of education of all classes, expand social and economic contacts and focus on the common interests of all segments of the population" ^{[33, p. 434]}.

The same opinion was held by A. Wilson, who believed that the British Empire should raise the economic and cultural standard of living of the population of the Middle East, create jobs and industrial enterprises. According to the expert, this will require less expenses than the maintenance of troops in the region, since it will represent a profitable investment in the local economy and will remove discontent among the local population ^{[49, p. 110]}.

Conclusions

Thus, the attitude of foreign policy experts towards global empires was clearly distinguished by dualism. On the one hand, the colonial systems were in a clear crisis due to the deteriorating financial situation of the metropolises after the Great War, and the growth of national liberation movements on the outskirts of empires. On the other hand, experts believed that global empires continued to be certain guarantors of international security in various regions of the world.

There was also no unity regarding the future of the colonial systems. The evidence of the collapse of the "old order" in the relations between the metropolis and the colony forced experts to look for possible ways to minimize this process. The concepts of the "civilizational mission" of empires were expressed here, which were characterized by undoubted racism towards colonial peoples, the purpose of which was the "Europeanization" of local elites with their subsequent transfer of authority to manage former colonies.

An equally important issue was the nature of the United States' future relations with global empires. And here analytical centers and expert organizations played a leading role in the formation of the so-called "special relations" between the United States and Great Britain, in justifying their special role in modern international relations, despite the obvious struggle in the domestic policy of the United States itself along the ideological coordinates of "isolationism VS internationalism".