Stages of formation of ideas about cognition (from the Ancient world to the New Time)

Rozin Vadim Markovich Doctor of Philosophy Chief Scientific Associate, Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences  109240, Russia, Moskovskaya oblast', g. Moscow, ul. Goncharnaya, 12 str.1, kab. 310 rozinvm@gmail.com Other publications by this author

It will be a question of cultural and historical reconstruction of the genesis of ideas about cognition, therefore, consideration of not all, but only selected historical events. I limit the ancient world to antiquity and pre-antiquity cultures (the latter will include the very first "archaic culture", which is about 30 to 6-5 thousand years BC, and the next culture of the "Ancient Kingdoms"). Modern science explains the acquisition of knowledge either through knowledge of the world or within the framework of experience, which also boils down to a kind of knowledge, but adjusted by practice. Historians of science explain the acquisition of knowledge in the Ancient World in much the same way; as a result, many of them believe that science originated three thousand years ago, in Sumer and Ancient Egypt. For example, A.A. Vayman, one of the largest Russian researchers of Sumerian-Babylonian mathematics (his book is called "Sumerian-Babylonian mathematics of the III‒I millennia BC"), believes beyond doubt "that ancient mathematicians were quite familiar with the method of logical proof of mathematical truths" ^{[6, p. 209]}. And he is not alone in giving the Babylonians such a high rating. A similar opinion is shared by one of the patriarchs in this field of knowledge, Otto Neugebauer, who writes that "in historical research, the word "prove" can only have the meaning that new mathematical dependencies are derived from certain mathematical data and dependencies using logical inferences. <.."It is difficult to admit anything else," he continues, "except the following: the Babylonians led a more complex case to simpler ones by a series of successive conclusions" ^{[10, p. 227]}.

There is no unity about the mythological concepts widespread in the Ancient World: some researchers do not classify them as knowledge, while others consider them to be knowledge. Igor Ozhiganov writes that "there are different approaches to the question of the relationship between knowledge and myth in Russian and foreign literature. According to A. Chanyshev, “knowledge... as such, it originates outside of myth, although in close connection with it.” E.Solopov interprets this question in a different way, who believes that “a myth is knowledge directly related to an experience, this knowledge is an experience.” B. Malinovsky has a completely different approach, pointing out ... that there was no theoretical knowledge in primitive society" ^[9].

What does the modern understanding of cognition imply? What is important for our topic is a picture that juxtaposes the unknown world as a source of latent knowledge and patterns, and man as a cognizer who seeks to discover this knowledge. At one time, one of the fathers of modern science, Francis Bacon, wrote: "The building of this World of ours and its structure represent a kind of labyrinth for the human mind contemplating it, which encounters so many intricate roads everywhere, such deceptive similarities of things and signs, such winding and complex loops and knots of nature.<...> We need to guide our steps and, according to a certain rule, secure the entire road, starting from the first perceptions of feelings ..." ^{[4, pp. 68-69]}. And Martin Heidegger interpreted cognition as "leading from secrecy into openness" ^[23]. In both cases, the world is given to a person as unknown, and cognition (gaining knowledge) is the way to its disclosure and recognition. This picture, so familiar to modern people, did not take place in the Ancient World. The man of that time knew how the world worked, but he did not realize that he was getting knowledge. The truth is similar, let's call it "archaic", the picture did not take shape immediately. Here are the main stages of its formation.

Gaining knowledge in the Ancient World

Knowledge in the Ancient world was obtained not within the framework of cognition, but as a way of solving problems ("problem situations") in language, consciousness and action, faced by a person who did not separate himself at that time from the primary collective (family, clan, tribe). One typical example is the understanding of a solar eclipse. Undoubtedly, the eclipse presented a problematic situation for humans: night falls during the day, the sun disappears, it is unclear what to do, and fear grips everyone. This situation was resolved when it was possible to imagine the eclipse as an attack on the sun by a terrible beast. "In the language of Tupi," writes the classic culturologist Edward Taylor, ‒a solar eclipse is expressed in the words: "the jaguar ate the sun." The full meaning of this phrase is still revealed by some tribes by the fact that they shoot burning arrows to drive a ferocious beast away from its prey. On the northern mainland, some savages also believed in a huge sun-devouring dog, while others shot arrows into the sky to protect their luminaries from imaginary enemies attacking them. But next to these prevailing concepts, there are others. The Caribs, for example, imagined the eclipsed moon to be hungry, sick, or dying... The Hurons considered the moon to be sick and performed their usual sharivari with shooting and howling dogs to heal her" ^{[21, p. 228]}.

In the author's works, this method of resolving a problematic situation is considered as the construction of "schemes" (for example, the expression "the jaguar ate the sun"), setting a new "reality" (phenomenon, object ‒ "jaguar") and suggesting how to "act" (chase the jaguar away) ^{[16, pp. 20-21, 57-70]}.

In this case, knowledge is the expression "the jaguar ate the sun", referring a person to the phenomenon of a jaguar in the sky, and the same expression, but solving a problematic situation and suggesting how to act, is already a scheme. In other words, the schema is a structure that needs to be reconstructed; the result of such reconstruction is presented in the table.

In the book "Theoretical and Applied Cultural Studies" I outlined the main stages of the formation of archaic culture ^{[17, pp. 82-85]}. At the first stage, in parallel with "local schemes" such as the eclipse scheme (they are called local because they solved individual situations), a "fundamental scheme" of the soul is emerging, resolving, as we would say today, anthropological problems (understanding death, illness, dreams, rock paintings of humans and animals). The soul was understood as life itself (whoever had a soul was alive), had a house from which it could leave and return to, like a bird to a nest (for the human soul, such a house is a body), and finally, the soul lived forever. In the reality defined by the soul scheme, death was understood as the departure of the soul from the body forever, without return; illness – as a temporary departure of the soul, i.e., if conditions are created (warm, offer food, etc.), it will return; dreams – as a journey of the soul during sleep; finally, rock carvings of people and animals were understood as evoking the soul, then it can be seen and asked for something (sacrifice was born from this) ^{[16, pp. 166-168]}.

At the second stage, the soul schema begins to be transferred to situations of natural elements (rivers, earth, sky, wind, moon, etc.), as well as to the initial social phenomena, for example, it was used to explain family and tribal ties. As a result, these elements and phenomena become animated (a soul and corresponding properties are attributed to them – the souls of these phenomena can be invoked, asked for help, considered to be able to get sick and recover, etc.) ^{[16, p. 168]}.

In parallel, the fundamental scheme "arche" (translated as "the beginning") was invented. This scheme solved certain social problems, for example, understanding family and tribal ties, explaining what childbirth is, education, conflict resolution, assistance from the ancestors of the tribe, and others ^{[17, pp. 108-111]}. According to E. Meletinsky, the archaic reality "corresponds in archaic mythologies to the heroes who lived and acted in mythical times, who can be called p e r v o p r e d k a m i – d e m I u r g a m i – k u l t u r n s m I g e r o I m I The concepts of these three categories are intertwined, or rather, syncretically undifferentiated. In this complex, the basic principle is gender– phratry, and tribal. The latter can sometimes be thought of as universal, since the tribal boundaries in the minds of members of a primitive community coincide with universal ones. The first ancestor-demiurge – cultural hero, in fact, models the primitive community as a whole, identified with “real people.” Among the tribes of Central Australia and the Paleoafrican peoples (Bushmen), partly among the Papuans and some groups of American Indians, mythical heroes are totemic ancestors, that is, the progenitors or creators of both a certain group of animals (less often plants) and a human ancestral group that considers this animal breed as its “flesh”. that is, their relatives, totems... totemic ancestors commit creative and cultural acts, although the type of cultural hero in Australia is still poorly constituted. For example, totemic ancestors– wildcats and flycatcher lizards, used a stone knife to complete the creation of human larvae lying helplessly on rocks protruding from the water, circumcised them (the initiation ceremony is completed by humans), taught them how to make fire by friction, cook food, gave them a spear and boomerangs, divided people into phratries, provided each a personal churinga as a container of his soul" ^{[8, p. 179-180]}.

Collectively, local and fundamental patterns defined the world of archaic culture, it was understandable and epistemologically transparent, and in this respect did not require knowledge. Man lived in a world of souls and spirits, he created this world himself, resolving problematic situations. But man perceived this world as having always existed.

The following culture of the Ancient Kingdoms was influenced, firstly, by the new sociality of large communities living on the same territory, united by the power of the king, and secondly, by the division of labor and management (army, slaves, peasants). Another fundamental scheme was needed to explain why one should obey not one's spirit, the protector of the tribe (totem), but a new entity called "god", as well as give a significant part of the product produced to others. There were two circumstances here. Firstly, the unification of different tribes (clans) in a new social community, and secondly, the experience of collective, joint actions, which turned out to be more effective than animistic ones ^{[18, pp. 61-67]}.

Two characteristics of the gods, defined in the new fundamental scheme, are important for our topic: the gods were understood as demiurges who created the world and people, and it was believed that, unlike the gods, people did not know the structure of the world. The exceptions concerned priests, to whom the gods could impart certain knowledge. And within the framework of such a picture, an idea of knowledge begins to form – this is what captures the structure of the world (including its individual objects and events), something that is unknown to man, but can be communicated to him through priests, and thus the structure of the world is revealed. So far, knowledge is a sacred thing, it was believed that its source was the gods who created the world. But in the next ancient culture, knowledge will be acquired and created by man himself. It is worth paying attention to the fact that, on the one hand, the man of culture of the Ancient kingdoms knew how the world worked, because he understood it and mastered it with the help of fundamental (gods and their subordinate souls of people) and local schemes, on the other hand, he was sure that the real, in fact, sacred, structure of the world he He doesn't know.

Plato and Aristotle: The Epistemological Revolution

Ancient culture begins with the formation of a new anthropological type of man, the "personality." An ancient personality is a person who has partially freed himself from divine guardianship (management) and, within the framework of this partial freedom, begins to act independently, focusing not so much on "coherent" (generally accepted) schemes as on "private" schemes built for himself. An example of such a personality is Socrates in Plato's dialogues. His inner voice ("daimony") It can be understood as a zone free from the control of the gods, as a basis for independent action. Socrates believes that it is necessary to comply with the laws of the policy (therefore he obeys the court's decision), but at the same time claims that his ideas (based on private schemes) are more correct than the generally accepted ones.

The second innovation that determined the formation of ancient culture was the invention around the 7th–6th centuries BC of a new way of obtaining knowledge, not on diagrams, but in the course of reasoning, when new knowledge was obtained on the basis of other already known knowledge in the activity of the individual. For example, at the trial, Socrates, convincing his judges and listeners that "death is rather good" (for them this is new knowledge), first offers them two well-known knowledge ("death resembles a dream" and "waking up from a dream is like birth"), then makes the conclusion that "death is rather good". At the same time, it is clear that new knowledge is created by an individual (personality), and not by God. But surely man is not God?

The second problem with the new way of obtaining knowledge, which the Greeks liked very much, was that it was possible to obtain knowledge ("aporias") that contradicted observations or other knowledge. For example, Zeno showed, arguing that there is no movement, because to walk any distance, you need to walk an infinite number of segments into which the distance is divided, resulting in an infinite time of movement. Socrates, following the Pythagoreans, resolves this difficulty by proposing to define the subjects discussed and adhere to these definitions. So if, as Stagirit later proposed, we represent the time of movement as a segment and divide it to infinity (that is, define time as a continuum, meaning continuity consisting of many elements by the latter), then infinity of time segments will correspond to infinity of time segments and Zeno's paradox will disappear.

However, the question arose as to what objects are defined by definitions, to which reality they belong, because their properties differ from those of ordinary objects ("things") and are fixed. For example, ordinary empirical motion and motion as a continuum are very different (following the philosophers of science, we will call objects defined by definitions and other rules of logic "ideal"). Plato gave a detailed answer to the question about the essence of ideal objects. In the "Feast" dialog, he shows how such objects are created. It turns out to be based on schemas: first, love is defined on schemas, and then these schemas allow us to define love.

For example, first, the hero of the Feast, Aristophanes, tells a story, which I reconstruct as a diagram. A problematic situation for her was the desire of the ancient personality to choose his lover independently; the fact is that, in accordance with the beliefs accepted in culture at that time, love was caused by the gods, Aphrodite and Eros, and not by people (that is, they were not independent in love). "Before," says Aristophanes, "people had three sexes, and not two, as now, male and female, because there was still a third sex that combined the signs of both; he himself disappeared, and only the name remained from him, which became abusive ‒ androgynes.…Terrifying in their strength and power, they harbored great designs and even encroached on the power of the gods.…So Zeus and the other gods began to discuss what to do with them.…Finally, Zeus, having come up with something, says:…I will cut each of them in half, and then, firstly, they will become weaker, and secondly, more useful to us.…So, each of us is a half of a man, divided into two flounder‒like parts, and therefore everyone is always looking for the corresponding half. Men, who represent one of the parts of that previously androgynous being called androgynous, hunt for women, and fornicators mostly belong to this breed, and women of this origin are greedy for men and lecherous. Women, who are half of the former woman (androgynous female ‒ V.P.), are not very well disposed towards men, they are more attracted to women, and lesbians belong to this particular breed. But men, who are half of the former man, are attracted to everything masculine: already in childhood, being slices of a male being, they love men, and they like to lie and cuddle with men. These are the best of boys and young men, because they are naturally the most courageous" ^{[12, p. 100]}.

Then, based on this scheme, Aristophanes defines love: "Thus, love is called the thirst for wholeness and the pursuit of it. Before, I repeat, we were something united, and now, because of our injustice, we are set apart by God... having reconciled and made friends with this god (Eros - V.R.), we will meet and find those we love, our half, which few people can do now" ^{[12, p. 101]}.

In Phaedra, Plato explains this method, saying that by defining love, a person gets the opportunity to receive consistent knowledge, and the necessary condition for this is the construction of an ideal object ("idea"). This is the ability, says Plato through the mouth of Socrates, "to grasp everything with a general view, to bring to a single idea what is scattered everywhere, in order to define each one and make the subject of instruction clear. This is what we did just now when talking about the Erotic: first we determined what it was, and then, for better or worse, we began to reason; therefore, our reasoning came out clear and did not contradict itself" ^{[13, p. 176]}.

The world in which Plato places ideas is interesting. It is located not on earth, but in heaven, where the gods are. But how do people who receive knowledge get there, because they are not gods? Plato's clue was probably given by the Pythagoreans, whose community he is known to have visited. According to legend, Pythagoras taught that there are three types of beings: mortal men, gods, and beings "like Pythagoras." The latter, having performed feats like heroes (Hercules, Theseus), can become deified, i.e. become immortal. Plato was not so naive as to identify people with gods, but why not send their souls to heaven instead of people, considering them immortal? That's what he does. But in this case, what is meant by gaining knowledge? Plato comes up with a stroke of genius: the home of immortal souls is heaven, where they contemplate gods and ideas. But periodically, souls are forced to inhabit human bodies on earth in order to complete another cycle of life, while they forget both heaven and ideas, which is why they fall into contradictions. However, beings like Pythagoras and Socrates tend to go to heaven during their lifetime, to recall ideas. To do this, they live correctly and think "dialectically". The latter includes the construction of diagrams and definitions, as well as a number of other actions.

In the Seventh Letter, Plato writes: "For each of the existing objects, there are three stages by which its cognition must be formed; the fourth stage is ‒ this is knowledge itself, and the fifth should be considered what is known in itself and is true being: so, the first is a name, the second is a definition, the third is an image, and the fourth is knowledge.…All this must be considered as something unified, since it does not exist in sounds or in bodily forms, but in souls... Only with great difficulty, through mutual verification of names by definition, visible images by sensations, and moreover, if it is done in the form of benevolent research, with the help of harmless questions and answers, the mind can shine and an understanding of each subject can be born to the extent that it is accessible to humans" ^{[14, pp. 493-494, 496]}.

In this case, the expression "to enlighten the mind and give birth to an understanding of the subject" is the soul's recollection of the idea, which, according to Plato, is the condition for the salvation and bliss of people like Pythagoras and Socrates. "Such a person," Plato writes in the Post–Law, "even after completing the lot of his life with death, on his deathbed he will not have as many sensations as he does now, but will achieve a single lot, become unity from multiplicity, will be happy, extremely wise and at the same time blessed" ^{[15, p. 458]}. Let's note that Plato constructed a picture of cognition in which knowledge is hidden from an ordinary person, but if he seeks to be saved, he must think dialectically, revealing the structure of the world, which is expressed in ideas. Here, cognition and knowledge are also set in a hybrid way, both sacral and rational. Although knowledge is obtained within the framework of human dialectical thinking, it is located in heaven, where only gods and immortal souls are allowed access. Philosophers who know the world can also get there.

Aristotle solves the question of the essence of ideal objects in a completely different way: as the "first essence" they coincide with individual things. In other words, Stagyrite moves ideal objects from heaven to earth, which is why, in particular, he rejects Plato's ideas, saying in the "Second Analysis" that these are empty sounds. This is not to say that Aristotle ignores the sacred character of heaven, no, it is there that he places Reason, understanding it as the divine principle. "And life, without a doubt," he writes in Metaphysics, "is inherent in it: for the activity of reason is life."<...> and his activity, as it is in itself, is the best and eternal life" ^{[1, p. 211]}. However, according to Aristotle, there are uniform laws in heaven and on earth. So, if on earth the reason for a person's movement is his thought, then in heaven the reason for the movement of the planets is the thought of Reason ("But the object of desire and the object of thought move in this way: they move without themselves being in motion<...> At the same time, the mind, by virtue of its involvement in the object of thought, thinks of itself: it becomes thinkable by coming into contact with its object and thinking it, so that the mind and what it thinks are one and the same thing.") [Ibid.].

By explaining in this way the movements to which all other changes are reduced, the Stagirite gets the opportunity to understand the essence of the structure of things and the whole world. He believes that these are also movements inherent in things, the reason for which is the activity of the Mind, but since they are carried out on earth, they are invisible to humans, hidden. However, having a mind, a philosopher, if he reasons correctly, using the rules of thought formulated by Aristotle (here not only definitions, but also categories, and the rules themselves), in this case he can reveal and describe these movements. By the way, then he will be able to act effectively in practice: for this, his own actions must adapt to the hidden movements that the philosopher revealed in cognition. Aristotle discusses the scheme of similarly effective action in Metaphysics using the example of treatment.

"At the same time, a healthy body is obtained as a result of the following series of thoughts from the doctor: since health consists in this, then it is necessary, if the body is to be healthy, that this be given, for example, uniformity, and if this is needed, then warmth (warming) is required; and so he thinks all the time until he leads to the last link, to the fact that he He can do it himself. The movement that begins from this moment, which is aimed at keeping the body healthy, is then called creation. <...> Where the process proceeds from the beginning and the form (of causes – V.R.), it is thinking, and where it begins from the last link to which thought comes, it is creation" ^{[1, p. 122]}.

"Natural (physis),– writes H.Frank, – and the artificial (techne) coincide, according to Aristotle, in that they are essentially directed towards a certain goal, towards a certain “for what.” And to make the conclusion more convincing by analogy, Aristotle adds that physis and techne are one for the other: “In general, art in some cases completes what nature is unable to produce, while in others it imitates it.” <...> If the teleological process reaches its completion (teleiosis), then Aristotle calls it the dignity (arete) of nature. The disadvantage (kakiai) is a violation of the ordered process or, as Aristotle says, an exit from the natural (ekstasis) and thus from the teleological order. Aristotle connects an unambiguous assessment and hierarchy with the teleological structure of his concept of nature: the perfect (teleion) is more primary than the imperfect (atelous) both in nature (physis), and by definition (logos) and in time (chronos). Nature, as Aristotle would later say, "does everything in the best possible way"^[22].

In this case, thinking is no longer Plato's dialectic, like remembering ideas that the soul once contemplated in heaven, but the knowledge of things and the world on earth, which, according to Aristotle, involves finding out the causes of hidden movements, for which, in turn, it is necessary to think correctly, following Aristotelian categories and rules. Stagirit called such movements "nature", arguing that obtaining the right knowledge ("epistemology") is the knowledge of nature. "By defining physics as the science of nature," writes P. Gaidenko, "and nature as the beginning of movement, Aristotle, in fact, laid the foundation for what we still call natural science. And it is characteristic that, more than two thousand years later, the quoted words of the Greek thinker were almost literally reproduced by Kant. “"Natural science," he says, "generally happens to be either pure or an applied study of motion" ^{[7, p. 192]}.

The concept of nature as a hidden movement turned out to be convenient for determining the conditions for building effective practical action: the goals of nature and practical action should coincide. "And finally," writes Gaidenko, "the main thing is that movement, according to this formula, is a purposeful, expedient process: it is not for nothing that the root of the word entelecheia is telos, the goal. Movement is always made towards a goal, a completely objective goal, which for every being is its actual state, i.e., simply put, the realization of what it is intended for by its nature." "As A.P.Ogurtsov emphasizes, "Aristotle's goal turns out to be a form of reality, a principle of the organization of nature" ^{[11, p. 115]}" ^{[7, p. 194]}

Another thing is that analyzing the causes and following Aristotelian logic proved insufficient to determine the structure of nature as inherent in the phenomenon of latent motion being studied. Although Aristotle already argued that knowledge of the nature of a phenomenon requires not only knowledge of the "material" cause, but also of the "formal" one, defined by definitions and mathematics, he did not put this hypothesis at the forefront. "After we have determined," writes Stagirit, "in how many meanings the word "nature" is used, we should consider how a mathematician differs from a physicist. For natural bodies have surfaces, volumes, and lengths, and points that a mathematician studies... he produces abstraction, because mentally figures can be separated from movement... Without even noticing it, philosophers who teach about ideas do the same.: they abstract away physical properties that are less separable than mathematical ones. It is the odd and the even, the straight line, the curve, then the number, the line and the figure that will exist without movement, but meat, bone and man – in no case... For geometry considers a physical line, but not because it exists physically, and optics considers a mathematical line, but not as mathematical, but as physical. And since nature is twofold, it is form and matter, then... such objects cannot be taken without matter or from any material side... since there are two natures, which of the two should a physicist deal with, or perhaps with what is made up of them? But if art imitates nature, then the knowledge of form and matter within certain limits belongs to the same science... Therefore, it is the business of physics to know both natures..." ^{[2, pp. 25-26]}.

From Roger Bacon to Galileo

It was only in the 13th century that R. Bacon put on a mathematical description of nature, understood not only by Aristotle, but also by John Chrysostom (as "created" and "creative" nature ^{[19, pp. 75-77]}), who wrote that "fire by its nature tends upward, breaks and flies to heights... But God did the exact opposite to the sun: he turned its rays to the earth and made the light aim downward, as if telling him by this position, look down and shine on people: you were created for them" ^{[20, p. 394]}.

"The second most important gate," Roger Bacon explains in Opus Tertium, "which we naturally lack, is the knowledge of mathematics... it is closest to innate knowledge... but not so with regard to natural sciences, metaphysics and others... it is clear that it is a simple science and, as it were, innate or close to innate knowledge. It follows from this that it is the first of the sciences, without which others cannot be known.…Adam and his sons received it from God... it is clear that most and the best part of mathematics tells about heavenly things, like astrology, speculative and practical... thanks to these [two sciences of heaven], knowledge of this sublunary world is prepared, however... knowledge of all sublunary things depends on the possibilities of mathematics… Next, I turned to the spread of forms from the place of their origin, and there is a lot of significant and beautiful things here. But this spread can be expressed and recognized only through lines, angles, and shapes" ^{[3, pp. 103-109]}.

One of the last steps in understanding the knowledge of nature is taken by Galileo. He shows that the mathematical description of natural processes is effective in cases where it is possible to construct a "mathematical model" of the phenomena under study, and the necessary condition for this is an experiment in which the phenomenon under study is technically brought into line (isomorphism) with mathematical construction ^{[19, pp. 121-135]}. At the same time, Galileo showed how a mathematical description, which was originally a mathematical scheme, could be transformed by experiment into a mathematical model. The solution to the inverse problem – determining the characteristics of an engineering device corresponding to the desired mathematical model, was demonstrated by Christian Huygens ^{[19, pp. 135-148]}.

Mathematical scheme → experiment → mathematical model → engineering → real mechanism (machine)

So, it turned out that nature is not only movements hidden from human eyes, but those that, firstly, are "written in the language of mathematics", and secondly, "constrained", as Francis Bacon wrote, by human art. "As for the content," Bacon writes, "we are making up the History not only of nature free and left to itself (when it spontaneously flows and does its work), such as the history of celestial bodies, meteorites, earth and sea, minerals, plants, animals; but, to a much greater extent, of nature bound and constrained. when a person's art and service takes her out of her usual state, influences her and shapes her... the nature of Things is reflected more in constraint through art than in one's own freedom" ^{[5, pp. 95, 96]} (my italics – V.R.). Human art, if we keep in mind the further development of natural science, is a Galilean experiment. Accordingly, "history" is a natural science knowledge that assumes a picture of nature, the structure (laws) of which must be revealed through mathematization and experiment, as well as confirmed by creating working engineering products.

It seems that the evolution of understanding cognition is complete. No, it starts again after a century and a half in relation to the study of humanitarian and social phenomena. But this, of course, is a topic for another study.