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The role of Serbia's allies on the path to independence (1870s – 1880s)

Nikityuk Vladimir Aleksandrovich

PhD in History

Associate Professor; Department of Modern and Contemporary History of Asian and African Countries; Moscow State Pedagogical University

88 Vernadsky str., Moscow, 119571, Russia

vanikityuk@bk.ru
Other publications by this author
 

 

DOI:

10.7256/2454-0609.2024.6.72341

EDN:

LWSPIE

Received:

15-11-2024


Published:

28-11-2024


Abstract: In this article, the author examines the national liberation struggle of Serbia within the framework of the Eastern Question, as well as the role of the European powers and the Russian Empire in these events. Not only military conflicts are analyzed, but also diplomatic relations between the parties. The subject of the study is the national liberation struggle of Serbia in the 1870s–1880s. The object of the study is the role of Serbia's allies (Montenegro, the Russian Empire, the Austro–Hungarian Empire) in the resistance of the Serbs to the Ottoman Empire. Special attention is paid to the role of Serbia and other Christian peoples of the Balkan Peninsula in the Herzegovina uprising; Russian-Serbian relations during the military conflicts of 1876–1878; to consider the influence of Austria-Hungary on political and economic life. The article uses general research methods – analysis, synthesis, concretization, as well as special historical research methods – narrative, historical-genetic, chronological. The scientific novelty of the work is determined by the formulation of a scientific problem; by the involvement of publications (including in a foreign language) published over the past 5 years; by the involvement of historical sources that have not been translated into Russian. After the research, the author came to the following conclusions: the national liberation movement of Serbia was closely linked to its foreign policy course, and in its struggle it relied on Montenegro, the Russian Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire; significant support in this struggle (not only financial, but also military) was provided by the Russian Empire, however, after the Berlin However, relations between states are deteriorating; the Austro-Hungarian Empire has a significant impact on the internal and external political course, as well as economic development. The choice of an ally later led the country to a crisis.


Keywords:

Milan I of Serbia, Jovan Ristić, Herzegovina uprising, Eastern question, first Serbian–Ottoman War, russo-turkish war, Congress of Berlin, Austro-Serbian Alliance, Treaty of San Stefano, Treaty of Constantinople

This article is automatically translated.

Introduction

The national liberation struggle of the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula against the Omani Empire is one of the most significant pages not only of local but also of European history. This process has already received its own definition from contemporaries – the Eastern question.

Serbia was an active participant in these events, which was one of the first to join the struggle for its own interests and independence. Obviously, centuries of dependence did not contribute to the economic and political development of the lands, respectively, Serbia turned to the allies for forces (as well as finances) for resistance. Thus, the Eastern question included several problems, and one of them was the intervention of European powers in the events on the Balkan Peninsula.

Neighboring lands played a significant role in Serbia's struggle for its own liberation. Territorial proximity, common language, religion and culture dictated the need for rapprochement. At many stages of the struggle, Serbia found support in the Montenegrin and Herzegovina lands. Moreover, it was the uprising in Herzegovina that became the beginning of the solution of the Eastern question.

Serbia's other ally was the Russian Empire, which was a kind of patroness of the Christian peoples of the Balkan Peninsula, their "elder sister". It should be said that the period under consideration, the intervention of St. Petersburg was not limited to pathetic speeches and promises: the independence of Serbia was won, including by Russian weapons. Special attention is paid to these events in the article.

Nevertheless, Serbia at a certain political stage was looking for allies among the European powers. Austria-Hungary became one of them. Despite the fact that the public majority did not maintain such close relations with Vienna, the Serbian government tried to use them to solve certain economic and political problems.

Serbia officially gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, but in our study we will expand the chronological framework and consider the events of the 1880s. This is due to the fact that the rapprochement with European states took place at the junction of the 1870s – 1880s and had distant but extremely important consequences for Serbian history.

The subject of the study is the national liberation struggle of Serbia in the 1870s - 1880s. The object of the study is the role of Serbia's allies (Montenegro, the Russian Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire) in the resistance of the Serbs to the Ottoman Empire.

The purpose of the study is to identify the role of the allies in Serbia's struggle for independence from the Ottoman Empire.

Research objectives: 1) to determine the role of Serbia and other Christian peoples of the Balkan Peninsula in the Herzegovina uprising; 2) to analyze Russian-Serbian relations during the military conflicts of 1876-1878; 3) to consider the influence of Austria-Hungary on political and economic life.

The scientific novelty of the work is determined by the formulation of a scientific problem; by the involvement of publications (including in a foreign language) published over the past 5 years; by the involvement of historical sources that have not been translated into Russian.

Literature review

The source base of the study.Official documents: diplomatic documents, official government resolutions, speeches by government representatives, periodicals, correspondence of statesmen. Personal sources were also used: memoirs, memoirs, letters and diaries. The key documents for these events are the texts of the San Stefano Peace Treaty and the Berlin Treaty. In addition, the author used personal documents as sources to characterize the personality and activities of the participants in the events. An extensive layer of sources in Russian and Serbian allows us to consider the picture more fully and come to objective conclusions.

The historiography of the study.The Serbian history of the 1870s – 1880s has been studied in detail by both Russian and Serbian experts. A great contribution was made by the Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in the collections of which the relationship between Russia and Serbia is considered. Monographs by Russian researchers and joint collections of documents on Russian-Serbian relations are also devoted to this issue. The works of L. V. Kuzmicheva, D. I. Nikiforov, M. Stanich, S. I. Danchenko, D. Gorchevich and others were used in the work.

The Herzegovina Uprising and the role of the Balkan neighbors in the Serbian national liberation struggle

The second half of the 19th century became a century of international contradictions, wars and diplomatic games, a kind of preparation of the European powers for the First World War. One of the unresolved issues, the "Gordian knot", was the Eastern question. By the early 1870s, the degradation of the Ottoman Empire became apparent, its disintegration progressed, and European states faced the question not only of dividing the dying empire, but also of the role of semi–independent Balkan states in the international arena.

The beginning of the bloody denouement of the Eastern question was the uprising in Herzegovina that broke out in 1875. Initially, the reasons were socio-economic in nature – lean years, famine, increased tax oppression – the rebels refused to pay taxes, demanded the abolition of some taxes. However, these demands were not satisfied by the authorities, and punitive detachments were sent to resolve the situation. The latter forced the local population to give a decisive rebuff, moreover, the Bosnians joined the discontented Herzegovinians, and the unrest turned into an uprising. This event attracted the attention of the Balkan neighbors, primarily Serbia.

This event divided the Serbian public into two camps. The first one was formed around Prince Milan Obrenovich, whose position was limited to non-interference in the affairs of neighbors. This was due to the pressure of Austria-Hungary on the Serbian government, because Serbia's entry into the war against Turkey was extremely unprofitable.

Another part of society (including statesmen) supported the Herzegovina uprising, moreover, they demanded active intervention in the affairs of their neighbors. Financial assistance was collected for the rebels, the state position was condemned from the pages of publications. Jovan Ristic, one of the prominent opposition figures, believed that the government of Danila Stefanovic "was not capable of a policy of action" [15, p. 60].

Of course, such actions could not stir up Serbian society: there were objective prerequisites for supporting the uprising. The decision of the authorities regarding Herzegovina has been changed. First of all, this was due to the fact that the lack of popular support for the prince would turn into a new inter-dynastic conflict, and this is identical to political suicide. Based on this, Prince Milan changed his rhetoric and began to seek support from his closest ally, the Russian Empire, hoping that it would "give them a chance, guaranteeing them from Austrian intervention in case Turkey was defeated" [5, p. 39].

Officially, Serbia remained neutral, but "the committees and printed proclamations in favor of the Herzegovina movement, which have been banned here so far, are now allowed" [9, p. 31], it was also noted that the mood in favor of the uprising swept the broad masses, "that not only the ministry, but also the prince himself will not be able to resist if they do not enter the the people's movement" [9, p. 31].

Such a position was quite acceptable to Moscow, therefore, at the initial stage, still in a secretive struggle, it supported a neutral position.

Prince Milan turned to his neighbors, Montenegro, for help and, having secured support, convened a national assembly. It was decided to support the uprising. In many ways, this was facilitated by the change of government: Y. became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ristic, who fought his way to power "on calls to fight against the Ottoman Empire" [15, p. 61].

The European powers were concerned about the current situation, and Prince Milan was made to understand that "if the peaceful policy does not prevail against him, then Europe no longer guarantees the existence of Serbia by virtue of the Treaty of Paris" [7, p. 147]. The Serbian government reassured its Western neighbors of its peacefulness, but in reality it was in search of allies who could act with it against the Ottoman Empire.

For the support of Montenegro, it was necessary to pay: Prince Milan and J. Ristic was considered "the only means for a peaceful outcome <...> the return of Bosnia to Serbia, and Herzegovina to Montenegro, with tribute to the Sultan for them" [10, p. 281]. However, such plans did not fit into the European strategy: Austria-Hungary also sought to obtain these lands.

Negotiations with Montenegro did not stop, and in June 1876 an alliance was concluded in Belgrade on a joint war against Turkey: however, the parties limited themselves to jointly developing a plan of military action, largely due to the refusal of the Montenegrin Prince Nikola I Petrovich from concluding a military convention.

10 days after the signing of the treaty, Serbia declared war on Turkey. It should be said that this conflict could not be considered as a local problem: the European powers had to choose a side, and the Russian Empire stood up for Serbia.

Thus, the Herzegovina uprising became a trigger, a trigger, not only for solving the Eastern question, but also the starting point of the national liberation struggle of the Balkan peoples, which resulted in the acquisition of independence by some states. The Russian Empire played a huge role in the Serbo-Turkish war, and the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 was a decisive step and changed the political map of the Balkan Peninsula.

The role of the Russian Empire in the Serbo-Ottoman military conflict of 1876-1877. The Russo–Turkish War of 1877-1878.

The Russian Empire did not stand aside, actively supported the resistance, sending volunteers to the "Serbian front". M. G. Chernyaev was appointed Commander-in-chief. Assessments of his activities are contradictory, and the reviews of his contemporaries regarding his military activities are not always flattering. Many, including A. N. Kravtsov, noted that M. G. Chernyaev is "a brave combat general, but a weak commander-in-chief." Thus, from the point of view of the organization, the assistance from the Russian Empire was, to put it mildly, weak at the initial stage.

The Serbian army, despite the reorganization, was not a "professional army". M. G. Chernyaev noted that "the Serbs did as much as can be demanded of a peasant who was given a gun instead of a shovel" [11, p. 44].

Russian Russian and Serbian contemporaries also noted the contradiction between the Serbian and Russian sides: "There are two administrations here – Serbian and Russian. <...> [Prince] Milan is telling the truth, noting that the Russians fought well and showed their superiority over the Serbian troops, but as for the administrative order, it was completely ruined by them... Yes, I assure you that M.G. [Chernyaev] dissolved the Serbian administration (whether it was good or bad), but he did not create a Russian one. <Russian Russians attribute everything bad to the Serbs, the Serbs to the Russians [8, p. 65].

That is why, despite the active assistance of Montenegro and Russia, the reorganization of the Serbian army, Serbia was defeated by the Ottoman troops. The country's situation was desperate. In October 1876, Serbian troops were defeated near Junis, and it became obvious that the country would be defeated.

Serbia was saved from the final collapse by the intervention of the Russian Empire, which declared war on the Ottoman Empire in 1877. Subsequently, this event entered Russian history as a feat of the Russian army, as the liberation of the Christian peoples of the Balkan Peninsula from the Turkish yoke.

Of course, St. Petersburg's intervention in this conflict was justified by the need to control, at least partially, the political situation on the Balkan Peninsula. It was impossible to imagine the victory of the Ottoman Empire or to allow the European powers to intervene. Moreover, the ideas of pan-Russianism flourished in some circles. Among other things, they were promoted by M. G. Chernyaev, who emphasized the intervention of the Russian Empire, as well as its role in the liberation of fraternal Slavic peoples.

In June 1877, Alexander II received Prince Milan and J. Ristic, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The proposal that St. Petersburg limited itself to was further military assistance from Serbia. J. Ristic accepted it very positively: "on the one hand, Russia did not turn away from his country, and on the other, since there are no official obligations, Serbia may be able to avoid participating in the war" [14, p. 69 – 70].

This position was also supported by Serbian nationalists. For example, Philip Khristich expressed concern that the liberation of the Slavic peoples by Russian weapons could lead to the strengthening of Bulgaria, and in the future there was a risk of its absorption of Serbia.

J. Ristic acted as a skilled diplomat and in every possible way avoided Serbia's involvement directly in military operations. In his opinion, Serbia should not have followed Russia, but expressed its own national interest and not allow others to become a hegemon in the Balkans using Serbian weapons. Naturally, the Serbian government saw no obstacles to using Russian money and making promises about Serbia's entry into the war. Thus, D. A. Milyutin wrote in his diary: "Serbia, having received a million rubles from us, promised to launch offensive actions in accordance with the instructions given by our commander-in-chief" [3, p. 203].

The war dragged on, and Prince Milan also delayed Serbia's entry into the war, hoping to "delay the matter until the situation near Plevna was clarified" [2, p. 61]. The Russian side responded by stopping subsidies, promising to support Serbia financially only if mobilization begins.

The goal of the Serbian government was simple – to get out of the war with the least human and material losses, and with the help of Russian weapons to expand its own territory. J. Ristic planned to do this, including through the annexation of Bosnian territories. Only an ultimatum from Russia and the Western European powers deterred the Serbian administration from such actions.

In December 1877, Serbia had to enter the war. In a fairly short period of time, just over two weeks, she achieved serious military results and acquisitions. A month after these events, Russia and Turkey concluded a truce in Andriapol, followed by the conclusion of the San Stefano Peace Treaty and the Berlin Congress.

The result of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 was the Berlin Congress. In accordance with article XXXIV, "the High Contracting Parties recognize the independence of the Serbian Principality" [1], moreover, in accordance with article XXXVI, Serbia expanded its borders. This was done at the expense of the lands claimed by Bulgaria, which could later cause a conflict between the principalities.

In August 1878, Prince Milan declared the independence of the Serbian Principality. The centuries-old Turkish yoke was defeated not without the help of Russian weapons, but in his proclamation, Prince Milan did not mention this. Serbia fiercely guarded its national interests, believing that Russia had sacrificed them "to the interests of Bulgaria and its own" [13, p. 121]. Sometimes thoughts were expressed about the negative influence of the Russian side in the conflict: "Magdalenich, an officer who graduated from our Engineering Academy, claims that Chernyaev and our volunteers are to blame for the loss of the first campaign by the Serbs. The Serbs, he said, would have coped alone with the Turks. Everything is forgotten! The labor money of a Russian peasant, donated from the bottom of his heart to a Serbian brother, has been forgotten" [4, p. 70]. He called the fraternal relations between Russians and Serbs a "fiction" at all.

Thus, Prince Milan maintained relations with Russia when it was beneficial for Serbia, when Russian weapons could serve its national interests. However, later, dissatisfied with the decisions of the San Stefano Peace Treaty and the Berlin Treaty (primarily, the solution of the territorial issue), he withdrew from Russia. Parts of the government and officers of Serbia seemed to be a toy in the hands of the Russians, entered the war with the Turks on their tip, and were subsequently abandoned by Russia. In this regard, the words of General Kosta Portic are indicative: "The Russians take away the redeemed and liberated Serbian lands from the Serbs with Serbian blood, give them to the Bulgarians" [19, p. 100]. This reinforced Austrophile sentiments in the government.

Relations with European Powers: the rapprochement of Serbia and Austria-Hungary

Strangely enough, the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78 and the Berlin Congress, which expressed, among other things, Serbian national interests, became the events that marked the beginning of hidden hostility between Serbia and Russia.

Prince Milan gradually drew closer to Austria-Hungary and assured other European powers that a new alliance with Russia was impossible for Serbia. Gradually, Serbia's dependence on Austria-Hungary increased, which called into question its economic and political independence, which it barely gained after centuries of dependence on the Ottoman Empire.

It should be said that the political life of Serbia developed according to its own scenario, different from the Western and eastern types. Due to its own dependent position, Serbia, on the one hand, was deprived of its own nobility and political elite; on the other, due to the lack of economic development, the majority of the population was employed in agricultural work.

In this regard, there was a special economic and social system in the state: the land was almost equally divided among the members of society, and the local government was elected from the peasant population. A contemporary, Emile de Lavelle, believed that democracy in Serbia "exists as an ancient institution and an inherited custom" [6, p. 27]. Naturally, such a community-friendly society had a negative attitude towards the centralization of power, especially according to the European model.

However, Prince Milan sought support in the European states, deciding to link "the fate of the country with the Habsburg monarchy" [12, p. 43]. Serbia was going through a political leap: in a few years it had to go the way that the Western powers had been going for decades. Westernization of the country and adherence to liberal ideas even in Serbian historiography received the definition of "Balkan "aping" [17, p. 55]. However, without him, the help of new allies was unthinkable.

In 1881, another important political event took place in Serbia – the conclusion of the Austro-Serbian Convention, according to which the country's foreign policy was subordinated to Vienna. Serbia has renounced its claims to the Novopazar Sanjak and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, from that moment on, Serbia was under the protectorate of Austria-Hungary, which in return for economic and political subordination promised support to the Obrenovich dynasty. The Serbian principality became a kingdom.

These events, as well as the economic and political programs of the government, did not find a response either among the opposition or among society. The response was the Timok uprising of 1883, which was brutally suppressed by the authorities. King Milan was not recognized by society anyway, and after this event he completely became a national traitor in the eyes of his own people.

The result of the alliance with Austria-Hungary and imaginary freedom was the war with Bulgaria, which King Milan declared in 1885. Moreover, he planned to seek military assistance from the Ottoman Empire, and only diplomatic intervention by European powers prevented this event. The conflict with Bulgaria ended only two years later, and Serbia did not receive the territory promised by Austria-Hungary. Many eyewitnesses of those events later recalled the "cowardly, non–military and even cowardly behavior of King Milan", who, despite contradictory decisions, "imagined himself a great voivode and made many decisions without the knowledge of the Supreme Commander" [18, pp. 92-93].

After that, the prestige of the king fell completely.

To save his own situation, King Milan issued a decree pardoning the radicals (the party that took part in the Timok uprising), and after a few months the former opposition force agreed to support the king and help him find a way out of the current foreign policy crisis.

However, this union did not bring positive changes: an economic and political crisis was brewing in the country, which resulted in the abdication of King Milan from the throne in 1889 in favor of his son Alexander. The government, which now consisted of radicals, was again looking for an ally in the face of the Russian Empire.

Conclusion

The national liberation movement of Serbia was closely linked to its foreign policy course. Serbia was looking for allies among its neighbors, European powers, and also used its proximity to the Russian Empire. In an attempt to achieve her own goals, she changed allies, was cautious and achieved her goals through political intrigue. Actually, such methods were dictated by economic and political weakness. That is why we had to adjust our own line to the desires of stronger players on the European stage.

Serbia took its chance and expressed its own national interest when, after supporting the Herzegovina uprising, it declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The weakness of the army forced her to seek help from her neighboring allies (primarily Montenegro), as well as the Russian Empire. Russia supported the Slavic brothers not only financially, but also with its own weapons. The Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 brought long–awaited independence, but not all the goals of the Serbian government were satisfied. First of all, this concerned the territories that never became Serbian lands.

Disappointment in Russia forced the Serbian side to turn its gaze to the European powers. Prince (later King) Milan successfully maneuvered between St. Petersburg and Vienna, but eventually took the side of Austria-Hungary. Despite the fact that the Austro-Hungarian government did not provide the necessary support, the construction of economic and domestic political life, as well as the new foreign policy course in Serbia, were based on the instructions of Vienna. Subsequently, the choice of this ally, as well as the ambiguous decisions of King Milan and his successor, led the country to a crisis.

References
1Berlin Treaty of 1 (13) July 1878. Retrieved from http://www.hist.msu.ru/ER/Etext/FOREIGN/berlin.htm
2. Bobrikov, G. I. (1891). In Serbia. From the memoirs of the war of 1877–1878. Saint Petersburg. Type. Headquarters of the Guards and St. Petersburg military district.
3. Milyutin, D. A. (1949) Diary 1876–1877. Volume II. Moscow: State Order of Lenin Library of the USSR named after V. I. Lenin. Manuscript Department.
4. Kulakovsky, P. A. (2014). Diary. Russians about Serbia and the Serbs. Volume II (archival evidence) (pp. 70-111). Moscow: "Indrik"..
5. Report of A. G. Jomini to Alexander II on the need to coordinate Russia's position with Austria-Hungary in the event of the defeat of the uprising of August 5, 1875. Nikiforov K.V. (ed.). (2008). Russia and the Uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 1875–1878. Documents (pp. 38-40). Moscow: Indrik.
6. Lavele, E. (1889). The Balkan Peninsula. Travel Notes. Moscow: PH K. T. Soldatenkov.
7. Letter from A. S. Ionin to N. P. Ignatiev with a description of the actions of European diplomacy in the Herzegovinian issue dated October 13 (25), 1875. Nikiforov K.V. (ed.). (2008). Russia and the Uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 1875–1878. Documents (pp. 142-150). Moscow: Indrik.
8. Letter from P. A. Viskovatov to I. S. Askakov dated November 4, 1876. (2014). Russians about Serbia and the Serbs. Volume II (archival evidence). Moscow: "Indrik".
9. Telegram from the Russian consul in Belgrade A. N. Kartsov to N. P. Ignatiev about the political mood in Serbia in connection with the uprising that had begun in Herzegovina dated July 21, 1875. (2014). Russians about Serbia and the Serbs. Volume II (archival evidence). Moscow: "Indrik".
10. Telegram of A. N. Kravtsov to A. M. Gorchakov on the request of Serbian Prince Milan Obrenovic regarding the possibility of transferring Bosnia to the control of Serbia, and Herzegovina to Montenegro, dated May 27, 1876. (2014). Russians about Serbia and the Serbs. Volume II (archival evidence). Moscow: "Indrik".
11. Vlasova, Yu. V., & Zayats, V. A. (2018). Participation of Russian Volunteers in the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876 In: Modern Technologies for Ensuring Civil Defense and Elimination of Consequences of Emergencies (pp. 200-204).
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Alexander III's words are known that Russia has two allies - the army and the navy, but at the same time, the history of the last two centuries provides examples of strong interstate allied relations, moreover, relations at the mental level. One of the clearest examples of this is the Russian-Serbian relations. In this regard, it is important to determine the role of the allies in the struggle for Serbia's independence from the Ottoman Empire. These circumstances determine the relevance of the article submitted for review, the subject of which is the national liberation struggle of Serbia in the 1870s - 1880s. The author sets out to determine the role of Serbia and other Christian peoples of the Balkan Peninsula in the Herzegovina uprising; analyze Russian-Serbian relations during the military conflicts of 1876-1878; consider the influence of Austria-Hungary for political and economic life. The scientific novelty of the article lies in the very formulation of the topic: the author, based on various sources, seeks to identify the role of the allies in Serbia's struggle for independence from the Ottoman Empire. Scientific novelty, as the author himself notes, is also determined by the involvement of materials that have not been translated into Russian before. Considering the bibliographic list of the article as a positive point, its scale and versatility should be noted: in total, the list of references includes 20 different sources and studies. The undoubted advantage of the reviewed article is the involvement of foreign literature in the Serbo-Croatian language, which is determined by the very formulation of the topic. From the sources attracted by the author, we will point to letters, diaries, memoirs, telegrams of participants in the events. From the research used, we will point to the works of S.I. Danchenko, D.I. Nikiforov, L.V. Kuzmicheva and other specialists, whose focus is on various aspects of studying the struggle for independence of Serbia. Note that the bibliography is important both from a scientific and educational point of view: after reading the text of the article, readers can turn to other materials on its topic. In general, in our opinion, the integrated use of various sources and research contributed to the solution of the tasks facing the author. The style of writing the article can be attributed to a scientific one, with elements of descriptive, at the same time understandable not only to specialists, but also to a wide readership, to anyone interested in both the history of the Balkan region in general and Serbia in particular. The appeal to the opponents is presented at the level of the collected information received by the author during the work on the topic of the article. The structure of the work is characterized by a certain logic and consistency, it can be distinguished by an introduction, the main part, and conclusion. At the beginning, the author defines the relevance of the topic, shows that "the half of the XIX century became the century of international contradictions, wars and diplomatic games, a kind of preparation of the European powers for the First World War." The author draws attention to the fact that "The Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 brought long–awaited independence, but not all the goals of the Serbian government were satisfied," in connection with which the Serbian government turned its attention to Austria-Hungary." It was the choice of Vienna as an ally, as the author of the reviewed article notes, that led Serbia to a crisis. The main conclusion of the article is that although "the Austro-Hungarian government did not provide the necessary support, the construction of economic and domestic political life, as well as the new foreign policy course in Serbia, were based on the instructions of Vienna." The article submitted for review is devoted to an urgent topic, will arouse readers' interest, and its materials can be used both in lecture courses on the new and modern history of Europe and America, and in various special courses. In general, in our opinion, the article can be recommended for publication in the journal "Historical Journal: Scientific research".