The evolution of the mentality of the military estates in the era of late feudalism

Kutishchev Aleksandr Vasil'evich ORCID: 0000-0001-6921-3344 PhD in History Associate Professor, Department of Management in Social and Economic Systems, Philosophy and History, Ural State University of Railway Transport 66 Kolmogorova str., Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk region, 620000, Russia akutishev@usurt.ru

Introduction

The total hybrid war of the West against Russia is noticeably exacerbating the interest of Russian society in our past, which contains answers to modern challenges to peace and stability. The origins of the systemic Russian-European confrontation are rooted in the depths of the history of cultures and civilizations, an integral part of which is a complex turbulent society. One of its multifaceted aspects, the mentality of the military estates of the late feudal period, is at the center of this study.

Of course, the direct analogies between the cultural and social meanings of that era and modernity are very relative. At the same time, ethnic mentality, cultural and behavioral archetype are recognized by researchers as rather stable psychological formations. Inherited from their ancestors, they still form an integral part of the modern national mentality, socio-psychological states and moods that have a noticeable impact on the geopolitical reality.

The purpose of this study is to identify trends in the moral and psychological evolution of the European and Russian nobility of the late feudalism era and the eve of the New Age on the basis of domestic as well as foreign sources. At the same time, the class mentality is considered as a product of different, sometimes opposing cultures. The class values of the nobility: honor, pride, generosity, the pursuit of glory are analyzed through the prism of individualism of the European cultural environment and the communal psychology of the Russian world. Among the factors of evolution, special attention is paid to economic and economic development, as well as the influence of advanced foreign experience. A subjective factor is also taken into account, for example, the personality of Peter the Great, whose transformative activity literally shook up all spheres of life in Old Moscow society.

The research methodology is based on a world-historical approach to explaining history, focusing on the material and economic priorities of the historical process. In the course of the research, historical-systemic, comparative-analytical and other methods of scientific research were used. The military estates of Western Europe and Russia were considered based on the principles formulated by such prominent researchers of medieval culture as A.Ya Gurevich, N. Elias and others ^{[1, 2]}.

The evolution of the mentality of the Western European nobility in the XVI-XVIII centuries.

The mentality of the Western European nobility on the eve of the New Age was the result of the natural evolution of the medieval estate code of honor and was based on chivalrous moral and ethical qualities. The noble corporate culture continued to cultivate honor, glory, generosity, generosity – these and other values that determined the dignity of both the noble aristocracy and the provincial poor nobility ^{[1, 2, 3]}. Most of the estate remained faithful to ancestral traditions, linking their lives with military affairs, which remained a hereditary family occupation. The culture of war and military ethics most corresponded to the class mentality of the nobility. His morale remained extremely high, as evidenced by many eyewitnesses and researchers ^{[2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]}.

In the XVII-XVIII centuries. There are noticeable transformations in the image and character of the European military class under the influence of Baroque culture. The mentality in which masculine qualities prevailed earlier is beginning to noticeably drift towards sophistication and mannerism. The emphasized muscularity is somewhat softened under the influence of gallantry and even some effeminacy. This is strongly condemned by the military command. Thus, Marshal De la Nu complained about the officers of the French army: "... like courtesans, they seek luxury in their manners and excess in jewelry" ^{[4, p. 170]}. The craving for luxury and refined manners, unnatural for military life, reached its peak by the middle of the XVIII century. The Louis XV officer, powdered and rouged, constantly preening and fixing his hair, looked more like a doll than a soldier. The belligerence of the European officer of the XVIII century acquired bizarre Baroque features. However, gallant manners not only did not detract from issues of honor and personal courage, but on the contrary, inflamed the ambition of a nobleman with their deliberate mannerism and decorativeness.

Military progress has become an important factor in the evolution of the mentality of the military estates. By the period under review, feudal militias were hopelessly outdated, becoming an obvious anachronism in military affairs. The knight, as an individual warrior, is forced out of the battlefield by disciplined trained infantry armed with a musket or arquebus ^{[8, p. 73-110; 9, p. 28-32;]}. Accordingly, by the 17th century, the nobility from medieval knighthood was reclassified into professional officers of permanent regular armies. In parallel, there is a transformation in the social sphere, as a result of which the nobility turns from vassals of influential sovereigns into government officials and employees. These metamorphoses could not but affect the qualities required of a warrior. Personal individuality, manifested in indomitable courage, belligerence, devotion and generosity receded into the background. The requirements for a regular army officer shifted towards organization, discipline, professionalism, managerial qualities, and demands on oneself and subordinates ^{[10, p. 105-109]}. Military progress played a noticeable, but by no means fatal role in the fate of the European nobility, which, in the end, managed to adapt to modern requirements. It was more difficult to resist the new bourgeois-economic relations. The capitalist market with its ruthless laws was inexorably advancing on patriarchal Europe. The "old" nobility becomes one of its first victims. The archaic feudal economy was hardly integrated into the new bourgeois system. The masses of feudal lords went bankrupt, falling into debt and losing their ancestral possessions. Contemporaries illustrate the depressing pictures of the degradation of old noble families: "Among the 3,000 surnames whose roots are lost in the depths of past eras, it is difficult to count 2-3 hundred who escaped poverty and decline… The rest eke out a sad existence, resembling a powerful oak, decrepit from time, whose trunk was split by adversity" ^{[5, p. 50-52]}. In order to somehow make ends meet, many parted with their ancestral estates, in fact, forever breaking away from their class-class soil. All that remained of the family nobility was the memory of a glorious past, traditions of former greatness and decent manners. For the French and English nobility in the XVII century, the treasury became the main source of life. Almost a third of the Prussian nobility of this era did not have land plots, existing solely at the expense of the state. A quarter of the income of the French aristocracy was also provided by the royal treasury. As for the small provincial nobility, it almost completely existed at the expense of state maintenance ^{[6, p. 98]}.

On the ruins of the familiar patriarchal world, the nobleman found himself in a difficult dilemma: either a courtier's place with the monarch, or military service. Only a select few from among the well-born aristocrats were allowed to the royal court, so the usual military service remained the lot of the provincial nobility. Only the army could provide relative stability and prosperity, which was where the masses of the minor nobility were heading. So, at the turn of the XVII-XVIII centuries, from a third to half of the young nobles of France were in military service. The prominent military historian A. Corvissier called this social phenomenon "unprecedented aristocratic mobilization" ^{[11, p. 341-343]}. The German lands did not lag behind France, in which "... the level of militarization of the population was extremely high. In the XVIII century in Hanover, Hesse – Kassel, Braunschweig and Prussia, at least one in four men from 18 to 45 served in one army or another" ^{[12, p. 57]}. "In Hesse–Kassel alone, with a population of 0.5 million, the army numbered 14 thousand, i.e. every 19 inhabitants served in the army" ^{[12, p. 61]}.

But even military service did not guarantee a comfortable existence. On the one hand, the maintenance of officers was small and was paid extremely irregularly. On the other hand, the desire for luxury inherent in the nobility often brought him to the brink of bankruptcy, forcing him to get deeper into debt. So, at the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), General D'Artagnan advised the Minister of War to pay officers an advance payment for winter quarters: "Otherwise, everything will turn into a real disaster, in which our officers will vegetate. I think that the lack of funds ... will simply force the captains to leave their companies, as it was in the last war" ^{[13, p. 11]}.

The services of a nobleman were sorely needed in case of war, and were often denied to him – at the onset of peace. With the reduction of the army, the officer could simply be put out on the street with a minimum monetary allowance. Thus, after the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), 7,530 officers were dismissed from the army of Louis XIV. By 1724, there were 6,700 more. ^{[13, p. 17]}. Barbier's magazine cites similar episodes from Parisian life in the middle of the XVIII century: "There were a great many young people on the street who had served for several years in the rank of lieutenant, sub-lieutenant and even captain, who are now in complete despair. Having lost their posts in the army, they were left without salaries, without position, and even without property" ^{[13, p. 17]}.

One of the eyewitnesses of those events, the Marquis of Montaignard, recalled: "These are mainly infantry officers, the poorest nobility, who, if they lose their positions in the royal army, will be left without any means of livelihood. ... Many, especially in the garrisons, only dine in the tavern, saving on breakfasts and lunches" ^{[13, p. 20]}.

The next war meant an increase in the size of the army, the recruitment of new regiments, and the expansion of officer staff and official lists. Naturally, this significantly increased the chances of the military nobility for career growth and advancement in the class hierarchy. There was a prospect of improving their financial affairs, getting out of the hands of creditors, paying off debts. Conversely, the conclusion of peace doomed him to financial difficulties and put him on the verge of ruin. In search of work, crowds of dismissed officers scoured from edge to edge of Europe, looking forward to a new war. An experienced "soldier of fortune" Patrick Gordon describes a similar situation after the Peace of Oliva in 1656, concluded between Poland and Sweden ^{[14, p. 95]}. A veteran of the wars of Louis XIV, De la Colonie, recalls how after the war of 1688-1697 the French military rushed in droves to serve yesterday's opponents, the imperial and Brandenburg armies, who continued to fight with Turkey ^{[15, p. 81]}.

The war was an "hour of revelation" for the noble youth. She pleasantly turned my head with the romance of future exploits, inspired dreams of honor and valor. Conversely, reconciliation returned from the battlefields of glory to the routine world of barracks routine and greedy creditors. Militancy was fueled by youthful maximalism and a thirst for fame. The Duke of Saint-Simon recalled the unprecedented rise among French youth before the military campaign: "I would have died of shame if my company had not been ready for the start of the campaign" ^{[16, p.113]}. Old Marshal Vauban enthusiastically echoes him: "... The whole nation loves war, and easily takes up arms with the sole purpose of exalting the honor of the noble name and increasing the glory of the family..." ^{[17, p. 269]}. This was also noted by the opponents of the French, the Spaniards: "Among the French aristocracy there are plenty of idle, violent youth who are ready to prove their own courage and honor at any cost" ^{[18, p. 22-23]}. The propensity of the Swedish nobility to war was noted by General Loewenhaupt: "In the war and abroad, he (the nobleman – A. K.) is even a little more pleased than the so-called joys, which he kills time with shame and vanity at home in his homeland" ^{[19, p. 28]}.

The evolution of the mentality of the Russian "military" estates in the XVI-XVIII centuries.

The romantic motivation associated with the war was completely absent in the Russian realities of the era under consideration. The feudal and serfdom economy of Russia has not yet been threatened by any crises. Rather, on the contrary, it strengthened and developed. While noble estates in Europe are being ruined and sold for debts, the conditional official property of Russian landlords is being transferred to hereditary ownership. Feudal land ownership is spreading in breadth, capturing more and more new areas of the country. Until the end of the XVIII century, it will act as a significant factor in the growth of the Russian economy. For all its archaism, agriculture remains the main source of existence for the military estates of Moscow Russia. The "serviceman", first of all, remains an agriculturist, "... fussing more about daily bread, about the household, about feeding himself and his family than about military service; the carbine and saber quietly hung on the wall for months, becoming covered with rust, and the landowner soldier tinkered with a plough, ground flour or I went to fairs and traded what I could" ^{[20, p. 187]}. Nothing overshadowed the life of a landowner so much as the expectation of a military campaign, which tore him out of his usual economic way and threw him into the whirl of the deadly elements. If the European nobility associated rosy hopes with the war, then it brought only ruin to the Russian nobility. If for a European soldier military service is the meaning of his existence, then for the Moscow "serviceman" class it became a threat to his well–being and stability.

I. Pososhkov commented on the life credo of the Russian "serving people": "God grant the Great Sovereign to serve, but not to take sabers out of their scabbards" ^{[21, p. 268]}. The impartial P. Gordon directly pointed out "the lack of propensity for war among most of your people, especially among the grandees and advisers" ^{[22, p. 7]}. Russian Russian diplomat Weber, who is arrogant towards everything, is more harsh, noting "the natural aversion of the Russian common people to war ..." ^{[23, p. 1105]}. Archdeacon Pavel of Aleppo, who visited Moscow in the middle of the XVII century, echoes the military and diplomats: "War was considered in Russia ... one of the severe disasters and trials sent by God to man" ^{[24, p. 141]}.

But it was not only economic identity that determined the anti–war sentiments of the Moscow "military" estates. In Russian culture, an ethos similar to the European military estate code has not developed. Healthy careerism, thirst for fame, and ambition were alien to her. The Russian cultural tradition rejected militancy and cultivated an aversion to war. This could not but affect the morale of the Moscow army. N. M. Karamzin noted with regret how "... the courage fueled by national ambition has weakened. ... Our ancient generals, inflaming the courage in our soldiers, told them about shame and glory, the hero of the Don battle – about the crowns of martyrdom" ^{[25, p. 425]}.

Moral qualities that emphasize personal individuality: courage, dignity, pride, honor – are ridiculed and despised in Russia. This is noted by the imperial ambassador Joseph Korb: "... They (Russians – A. K.) accuse some Germans of insanity, distinguished by more exalted valor, for trying with increased requests ... to expose themselves to the undoubted dangers of military service" ^{[26, pp. 210-211]}. P. Gordon recalls: "... foreigners are looked at as a bunch of mercenaries, and ... you should not expect any honors or promotions, except for the military, and even then to a limited extent..." ^{[14, p. 105]}.

It should be noted that foreigners did not open the Russians' eyes to the low combat capability of their armies. Back in the middle of the XVI century, Ivan Peresvetov complained about the Orthodox army: "What if there are many of them, since they do not have a faithful heart, and they are afraid of death and do not want to die, ... they stand weakly for the Christian faith and play a mortal game with the enemy without courage" ^{[27, p. 607]}. Voivode Shein in 1632 reported on the mass flight of "serving people" from near Smolensk: "... they are fleeing ... I do not need ... they do not want to serve you, the Sovereign" (Acts of the Moscow state. St. Petersburg: Type. Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1889. T. I. S. 516). According to the testimony of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich himself, the army marched in 1654 with a painful mood: "They do not come with us at all with unanimity, especially with doubleness, as there are clouds: sometimes they will appear with good air and trustworthy and hopeful; sometimes they will appear with desperate heat and fury and bad weather with all sorts of malicious and Moscow custom; sometimes with evil despair and they prophesy destruction; sometimes they depart with an evil heart by the quietness and pallor of their face..." ^{[28, p. 81]}.

The mental contrast of the Russian and European military estates reflected the cultural and civilizational gap between East and West, which reached its apogee in the XVI-XVII centuries. Opposing, sometimes hostile cultures formed different spiritual and moral codes, motivational and behavioral archetypes. Russian Russian nobility's "laziness", "cucumbers", and "lack of dignity" were conditioned by passivity, servile obedience, which make up the stable archetype of the Russian man of that era. Social activity, the desire to prove himself, healthy careerism, and energy were alien to his nature. The "peasant" psychology of the "service classes", with its low entrepreneurial spirit, generated "... an indifferent attitude to the business itself, which was originally perceived by their vocation, concluded the meaning of existence." ^{[29, p. 120]}

To maintain order in the army, the authorities had to rely on a proven administrative and power resource. Throughout the entire historical stage, Moscow mercilessly fought against the noble "deviance". The government threatened the "netchiks" with "cruel ruin", then disgrace, then confiscation of estates. (The Complete collection of laws of the Russian Empire. St. Petersburg: Type II of the Department of the Russian Federation. His Imperial Chancellery, 1830. Vol. IV, pp. 352, 648, 776; vol. V, pp.3, pp. 22-23, pp. 35-36, pp. 125, pp. 195). In this regard, Peter the Great was the first who did not limit himself to draconian measures. He tried to "reforge" Russian "service people" in the image and likeness of the noble European nobility. He countered the natural mental transformation with indefatigable energy and an iron will. The usual measures of cruelty and the threat of reprisals were complemented by an unknown curiosity – a personal example and inexhaustible energy of the tsar. He menacingly and categorically inspired the Russian "serving" nobility with ideas of nobility, dignity, honor, duty, discipline. The winged maxims "honor in service", "honor of the uniform", "officer duty" were the basis for the self-consciousness of the Russian nobility. A solid legislative base was put under educational measures. The decree on the succession to the throne in 1714, the Table of Ranks in 1722, and others – formalized social status, introduced a professional career, and ensured the vertical mobility of the nobility. But the ideas of nobility, honor and pride hardly took root in an atmosphere of despotism and servile submission. Not all advanced borrowings were able to overcome the age–old cultural and mental layers. Thus, the European "entail", imposed by the Decree of 1714, barely survived the emperor himself and was abolished in 1730. The nobility left the hated service at the slightest provocation. So, in 1719, the officers who, by the will of Peter the Great, found themselves in the Mecklenburg service, taking advantage of the reformation, petitioned Duke Karl Leopold to resign. Having received permission, they left en masse for their homeland. The vacant vacancies were immediately occupied by the Germans ^[30]. The contrast in the attitude of the European and Russian nobility towards military service was truly striking. Thoughts about the hated service and the desire to leave it permeate through the notes of A. T. Bolotov. He is openly jealous of his son-in-law, who: "... was released from the colonel from the very beginning of winter and then found a way to completely fight off retirement from service." ^{[31, p. 4]}. After the death of the harsh reformer tsar, the nobility began to seek a reduction in military service, which was done by Anna Ioanovna in 1736. The Senate met this event with undisguised wariness – "they were afraid of the idea that many nobles would retire" ^{[32, p. 14]}. Indeed, after the Russian-Turkish war of 1735-1739, almost half of the officers who served a mandatory 25–year term resigned. It is noteworthy that the vacant vacancies were quickly filled by the Ostsee nobility and foreigners ^{[33, p. 177]}. A significant part of the nobility enthusiastically accepted the Manifesto of Liberty of 1762. The St. Petersburg nobleman Count I. G. Chernyshov wrote that with this the emperor managed to "make 100 thousand people happy – and moreover 100 thousand nobles!" ^{[7, p. 18]}. A. T. Bolotov did not hide his glee either: "I cannot depict what an indescribable pleasure this piece of paper produced in the hearts of all the nobles of our dear fatherland. Everyone jumped up almost with joy and, thanking the emperor, blessed the minute at which it pleased him to sign this decree" ^{[31, p. 62]}. He himself, who had reached the rank of lieutenant by that time, "had long hated the noisy and restless military life and wanted nothing more in his heart than to retire to the countryside, devote himself to a peaceful and peaceful village life ^{[31, p. 63]}. Subsequently, the nobility will write into the history of Russia many examples of faithful service to the Fatherland. It will leave to posterity examples of selfless fulfillment of duty, outstanding monuments of art, personal courage, self-sacrifice, but it will never become an exact tracing paper from the European nobility. Next to high moral and combat qualities, there will always be an undying flame of alienation and rejection of the glorification of war.

Courage and loyalty will not prevent the nobility from burdening themselves with public service. It will persistently oppose its obligation, oppose the "Prussianism" of Paul I, release caustic epigrams over Arakcheevism, go into the world of poetic dreams and philosophical searches. State absenteeism, political alienation and everyday "oblomovism" will become a stable sign of the Russian historical archetype, an original mentality and a manifestation of social cultural tradition.

Conclusions:

Thus, glorious family traditions, military service as a choice of life path, bizarre military-baroque cultural atmosphere, constant search for livelihood formed the life paradigm of the Western European nobility – social interest in war. It was motivated for war, mentally ready for war and, by and large, sympathized with the war.

Other economic, cultural and civilizational trends were typical for Eastern Europe, in particular, for Russia. The mentality of the Russian noble class represented a bizarre symbiosis of the borrowed and the traditional original. Outstanding feats of arms, examples of personal courage and self-sacrifice were combined with class absenteeism towards military service and internal detachment from the state. Natural peacefulness became the main distinguishing feature of the Russian nobility, which distinguished it from the Western European, which preserved the militancy and military traditions of the Middle Ages.