The Polish Uprising of 1863-1864 and the Rebels through the Eyes of Russian Military and Officials.

Starikova Elena Vital'evna Postgraduate at the Department of the History of Russia of the 19th – early 20th century, Lomonosov Moscow State University 119991, Russia, Moscow region, Moscow, Lomonosovsky Prospekt str., 27, building 4 e.starikova1403@list.ru

Russian Russian-Polish Uprising of 1863-1864 is the most important milestone in the history of Russian-Polish relations and the formation of the image of a Pole in Russian society. The uprising, which began suddenly for many, immediately stirred up Russian society and caused a strong wave of indignation towards other people. The image of a merciless enemy was superimposed on the already existing idea of the Poles.

But there were also those among the Russians who were in the thick of things during the uprising. These were Russian military and officials sent to suppress the uprising and reform the local administrative apparatus. If for those who were in the rear and learned about the events in the Kingdom of Poland and the Western Region, the rebels seemed to be cruel enemies, then for the officers themselves-participants in the events, everything was far from so unambiguous. On the one hand, the uprising was perceived by the Russian military as an evil that needed to be fought. But, on the other hand, face-to-face clashes with the rebels sometimes forced them to rethink their already formed ideas about the uprising.

The topic of mutual perception of Poles and Russians has been of scientific interest to domestic and Polish researchers for many years. An important work devoted to this problem is A. Kempinski's monograph "Lyakh and Moskal: From the History of the stereotype" ^[1]. On the basis of fiction and documentary sources, the author studies the mechanisms of the formation of stereotypes in the culture of the two peoples.

Russian Russian-Polish scientific conferences, which were held in the late 1990s – early 2000s, made a great contribution to the study of images and mutual stereotypes of Poles and Russians. The result of their activity was the appearance of collections of articles devoted to various aspects of mutual perception of Poles and Russians throughout the history of their interaction. Among them is the collection of reports "Poles and Russians: mutual understanding and mutual understanding" ^[2], "Russia – Poland. Images and stereotypes in literature and culture" ^[3], "Poles and Russians in each other's eyes" ^[4]. The topic has not lost its relevance to this day, there are still many aspects that require further consideration to create a deep understanding of the two cultures.

The idea of Poles in Russia was not unambiguous. On the one hand, as shown in the work of L. E. Horizontov, even at the end of the XVIII – first half of the XIX century in Russia there were ideas about Poles as adherents of revolutionary ideas and actions ^{[5, pp. 144-145]}. This was influenced by the constant struggle of the Poles for independence and their actions directed against Russia ^{[6, pp. 117-118]}. On the other hand, the fate of the Polish people, who lost their independence, caused a part of Russian society to sympathize with the national liberation aspirations of the Poles ^{[7, p. 192.]}.

The Polish uprising that broke out in 1863-1864 led to a cardinal deterioration in the attitude towards Poles in Russian society. These feelings were fueled by information about the brutality of the rebels, which were massively replicated by the means of the periodical press. While most people could only be content with information from newspapers, the Russian military could see with their own eyes what was happening at that time in the Kingdom of Poland and the Western Region. Some of them left memories in which they told about what they saw and what part they took in these events.

In the course of the study, memoir sources were studied. They are definitely subjective, but at the same time they help to understand what ideas and images existed at the time when the memoirists lived. The authors of the memoirs were not only eyewitnesses of the events they described. During their stay in the Kingdom of Poland and the Western Region and after the uprising, they exchanged views with other participants in the events. In the process of communication, they shared their observations, listened to their interlocutors, discussed important issues for them. As noted by A. G. Tartakovsky in relation to memoiristics in general, in the process of this communication, personal memories dissolve into an "average" opinion, which can be assimilated as one's own ^{[8, p. 29]}. In this regard, the notes compiled by individual authors to a certain extent reflect the general ideas peculiar to a wide range of people. On the other hand, any judgment that differs from general ideas is valuable precisely as an individual one.

The work examines the memoirs of 11 authors who described the events that took place in the Kingdom of Poland and the Western Region during the uprising. Most of the authors during the uprising served as officers in various regiments of the Kingdom of Poland and the Western Region. Among them it is worth mentioning L. L. Drake, an officer of the 6th Libava Infantry Regiment ^[9], A. N. Vitmer, an officer of the Grodno Hussar Regiment ^[10], A. Vyazmitinov, an officer of the Alexandria Hussar Regiment ^[11], I. N. Ponomarev, an officer of the 5th Lithuanian Uhlan Regiment ^[12], V. A. Potto – officer of the 3rd Novorossiysk Dragoon Regiment ^[13], D. G. Anuchin – adjutant of the commander-in–chief of the troops in the Kingdom of Poland ^[14], V. Shcherbovich-Vechora - officer of the 23rd Nizovsky Infantry Regiment, orderly of Lieutenant General S. G. Veselitsky ^[15], M. P. Mezhetsky – regimental adjutant of the Narva Infantry Regiment ^[16]. The work also investigated the memories of I. G. Nostitsa, who already had the rank of major general during the uprising and commanded troops operating against the rebels ^[17].

Several authors did not take an active part in the fighting, but participated in the reform of the administration of the Western Region. Among them was Ya. N. Butkovsky ^[18]. I. V. Lyubarsky should be singled out separately, since he was a regimental doctor and did not take direct part in the battles ^[19]. In his memoirs about his service in the Western Region in the period from 1860 to 1864, the author gives a vivid description of the rebel detachments, and also describes the mood in this region during the uprising.

Another important characteristic of the sources is that most of the memoirs studied were created after a considerable period of time after the uprising. But some authors, during the creation of their memoirs, used their letters written during the uprising ^{[9, No. 8, p. 340]}. The closest to the time of the uprising – the story of D. G. Anuchin, published in 1863, as well as the notes of P. A. Potto, published in the period from 1867 to 1870. Some authors, for example, I. N. Ponomarev, I. V. Lyubarsky, Ya. N. Butkovsky and others, included in their notes not only what they saw with their own eyes, but also interwoven into their narrative information received from other participants in the events.

It is hardly possible to determine the motives of each author. By the time the memoirs were created, most of the authors were already retired and for them the Polish uprising was a thing of the past. It is hardly possible to reproach the authors either in an effort to show their loyalty to the authorities, or, on the contrary, to show a more positive attitude towards the rebels in connection with the social processes that took place in the country during the period under study. The memoirs, which were discussed in the article, were published in the period from 1863 to 1909, and during this period there were no cardinal changes in the attitude towards the Poles.  In this regard, we can make a cautious assumption that any judgment bearing a positive attitude on the part of both the memoirist and, in particular, other participants in the events, deserves special attention.

This article will attempt to show the Polish rebels as they were seen by the Russian military and officials, direct participants in the events. In addition, their perception of such aspects of the uprising as the degree of its preparedness, the reasons for the victories and defeats of the rebels is also of interest. It is also important to study what this or that perception of the rebels depended on.

Cruelty The uprising began on the night of January 10-11, 1863, when rebel detachments attacked several Russian garrisons.

To describe these events, the authors of the memoirs use the phrases "treacherously attacked", "carried out a massacre" ^{[19, No. 4, p. 159]}, "St. Bartholomew's Night" ^{[14, p. 506]}, in order to emphasize their surprise and ruthlessness. From the very beginning of the uprising, information appeared about numerous brutal murders of Russian soldiers by rebel detachments. Not only Russians became victims, but also representatives of the local population who did not want to support the rebels.

Information about the massacres gave rise to the Russian idea of the extreme brutality of the rebels, which is reflected in the memoirs of many authors. In most of the memoirs, the authors give vivid descriptions of the murders committed by the rebels, thereby emphasizing their unjustified cruelty towards Russian soldiers and the local population. So V. A. Potto tells about the movement of Russian troops in the direction of Krasnik in April 1863 and the scenes that they had to observe: "The traces of the rebels passing here were marked by the corpses of peasants hung from trees by several people together." The author writes that according to the position of the corpses, it was possible to judge that the "insurgents" mocked the dead ^{[13, 1868, No. 3, p. 129]}.

On the one hand, the brutality of the "insurgents" caused the military to punish the perpetrators as soon as possible. V. A. Potto writes that seeing the murdered peasants with their own eyes, the soldiers themselves became bitter: "... there was a murmur of indignation in their close-knit ranks, and the menacing cry, "that there will be no prisoners," repeatedly swept from end to end of the detachment" ^{[13, 1868, No. 3, p. 129]}. I. N. Ponomarev also mentioned the reaction of the military to the actions of the rebels in his memoirs: "We have more and more often received information about the atrocities committed by outraged Poles over prisoners. The bitterness in the troops was growing and everyone was looking forward to meeting the enemy" ^{[12, No. 9, p. 738]}.

On the other hand, the future struggle against the rebels seemed to be more difficult than an ordinary war. I. N. Ponomarev described the expectations of the officers from the upcoming partisan struggle: "... an attack from around the corner, ambushes, brutal massacre of the rebels with prisoners, poison - all this together was part of the plan of the Polish chiefs" ^{[12, No. 9, p. 733]}.

The intimidating actions of the rebels had a severe psychological impact on some officers, which they could not cope with. One of them was Lieutenant Bauman, who served in the 4th squadron of the Lithuanian Uhlan Regiment. After learning about the brutality of the rebels, Bauman became obsessed with fear of them. He constantly told his colleagues, "... that he would definitely be captured and subjected to the most terrible tortures" ^{[12, No. 10, p. 140]}. In the end, unable to withstand the psychological pressure, Lieutenant Bauman shot himself. This was a real tragedy for the regiment ^{[12, No. 10, p. 141]}.

Among the revolutionary forces there was a special category of rebels whose main task was to fight the opponents of the uprising. Among them were daggers, named after the weapon they used, as well as gendarmes-hangers. This category, known for its cruelty, is described separately by many authors. From the point of view of I. N. Ponomarev, the gendarmes-hangers were well organized and distinguished by their dedication to their hard work: "Once a jond sentenced someone to death, then, no matter what precautions he took, the execution was carried out" ^{[12, No. 10, p. 149]}. Ya. N. Butkovsky believed that the "hangers" and "daggers" were not fighters for the independence of Poland, but were only executioners who followed all the instructions of the "jond". He pointed out that sometimes innocent people became victims just because they were Russians ^{[18, No. 11, p. 335]}.

From the point of view of I. N. Ponomarev, largely due to the existence of this separate category of murderers, the Polish revolutionary movement managed to suppress attempts of cooperation of the local population with the authorities, thereby reducing the risks of disclosure of revolutionary organizations. As the author pointed out: "The common people trembled at their very name and at their first request gave their last penny of labor" ^{[12, No. 10, p. 151]}. D. G. Anuchin also wrote that the villagers were afraid to even think about denouncing the rebels "... because everything will be found out, and if not the informer, then his family or fellow villagers will suffer cruelly" ^{[14, p. 513]}.

The atrocities of the "rebels" generated cruel feelings in the Russians themselves. During a trip to the Western Edge in one of the towns, Ya. N. Butkovsky learned that the rebels had whipped the son of a local German baker almost to death. After much questioning, it was found out that the local bell ringer-nobleman received the rebels at home, and the execution of the young German took place in front of the windows of his house. A local priest came to the interrogation together with the bell ringer. They both refused to admit or tell anything. The author writes: "The whole story worried me, the blood was beating in my temples, and under the influence of these brutal scenes I felt like a beast myself" ^{[18, No. 11, p. 350]}. Ya. N. Butkovsky ordered to interrogate the bell ringer, using whips in the same way as the rebels did with the German. No admonitions of the nobleman and even threats of the priest to complain to the minister did not stop the author. Ya. N. Butkovsky wrote that he hardened to such an extent that he did not even listen to the requests of the wife and children of the nobleman. This terrible interrogation was imprinted on the author's memory for the rest of his life. He's writing: "And to this day I cannot recall this scene without horror, for which I received the personal gratitude of the Minister, the Governor-General, and the approval of all local figures; but I was also severely censured by my Petersburg acquaintances. I feel a blush of shame when I remember that I could have turned into a beast, and I myself cannot decide whether I did what I should have done in these critical moments" ^{[18, No. 11, p. 351]}.

The authors were deeply impressed by the death at the hands of the rebels of those people who assisted the Russian troops. L. L. Drake writes that during the expeditions to search for the rebels, they found "hanged on forest roads and at manors, with a piece of paper attached to the chest and the inscription on it "zdraitsa oychizny" (i.e. traitor to the fatherland); so the rebels brutally took revenge for the slightest service to our expeditionary detachments" ^{[9, No. 9, p. 540]}.

What the Russians considered to be right and noble actions was considered by the Polish revolutionary organization as a betrayal of national interests. People who were only suspected of having ties with the authorities were subjected to reprisals by the revolutionary organization. I. N. Ponomarev tells about a nobleman from Grubeshov who reported poisoned soup. This man was found hanged in his house for thwarting the plans of the Polish revolutionaries ^{[12, No. 9, p. 739]}. The girl Marusya, who warned the Russian officer not to sleep at night before the upcoming rebel attack, was hanged by a detachment that included her stepfather ^{[12, No. 9, p. 750]}. Both situations are hardly comprehensible for the author. He sees it as the duty of the Russians to help the families of the victims or to avenge their deaths.

The authors also pointed out that as the insurgency weakened, the brutality of the rebels only intensified and took more and more terrible forms. V. A. Potto wrote: "The more hopeless the rebellion became, the more monstrous the terror became, and over towns and villages, over landlords and peasants, over everything that somehow concerned the fatal Polish cause, the sword of Damocles hung and threatened disobedient with death and ruin" ^{[13, 1868, No. 12, p. 421]}.

Thus, from the very beginning of the uprising, Russians have an idea of the brutality of the rebels. This phenomenon caused different feelings in the authors: some of the actions of the rebels inspired fear, while others generated a desire to take revenge on the enemy. Separately, it is worth noting what the Russian authors understood by cruelty. The actions of Poles in battle are not perceived as something wrong or harsh.  On the contrary, many authors emphasize the courage of the rebels or their good command of weapons. Cruelty for Russians is precisely the actions of the rebels directed against the unarmed and weak.

Elusiveness and awarenessThe difficulty of fighting the rebels, according to many authors, was the way they organized their actions.

The uprising of 1863-1864 took on the character of a partisan struggle, therefore there was no single army, the rebels were united into detachments that operated in different regions of the Kingdom of Poland and the Western Region. The rebels spent a significant part of their time in the forests.

The problem for the Russian troops was also the high speed of movement of rebel "gangs". Anuchin writes that the search for "insurgents" was complicated by the fact that they rarely stayed in one place for a long time ^{[14, p. 514]}. The elusiveness of the rebels is evidenced by the fact that the military spent a significant part of their time searching for the rebels, and not in direct clashes with them. L. L. Drake says that "detachments often wandered, especially along forest roads, as if blindfolded and, after wandering sometimes for several days, returned to their parking lots without meeting a single insurgent" ^{[9, No. 8, p. 342]}. A similar description of unsuccessful searches is found in most memories.

The search for the rebels was also complicated by the difficulties faced by the Russian army. So, in some parts there were even no topographic maps. L. L. Drake writes that because of this, it was necessary to look for guides of "languages" in villages and towns. Local residents helped the military with great reluctance "for fear of revenge from the insurgents" ^{[9, No. 8, p. 342]}.

Thus, the constant movements of the rebels and the lack of a permanent location not only complicated their search, but also reinforced the idea of their elusiveness.  

Many authors emphasize that the rebels had a serious network of informants and supporters among the local population. L. L. Drake points out that "... they never met a shortage of spies during the entire uprising, they had agents everywhere and mostly Jews" ^{[9, No. 8, p. 341]}. The memoirs describe numerous cases when the rebels were already allegedly warned by someone about the approaching Russian troops. So L. L. Drake tells that not far from Bialystok, a "gang" of rebels hung a landowner in her own house on a chandelier for refusing to pay them a contribution. The Russian troops did not have time to punish the perpetrators, as information about the incident was received a few days later, and "the gang had already disappeared" ^{[9, No. 8, p. 341]}. D. G. Anuchin writes that in different localities the revolutionary committee had its own agents who constantly lived in one place and did not cause suspicion. Thanks to these agents, from the author's point of view, food was collected from all the surrounding areas, and new people were collected to replenish the "gangs" of the rebels ^{[14, p. 513]}.

Captured Poles during interrogations reported that they received information about all secret orders received by units of Russian troops. This happened even though the keys to the encrypted dispatches were changed every day ^{[12, No. 10, p. 149]}. D. G. Anuchin also noted that it was difficult to catch the Poles by surprise, since they almost always knew about the movement of troops against them, and if their positions were unprofitable, they retreated ^{[14, p. 516]}.

Organization of rebel detachmentsMany skirmishes with Polish rebels led to great casualties on the part of the rebels.

Various authors have given many reasons for this state of affairs. From the point of view of I. V. Lyubarsky, this was due to the fact that "the Poles were so used to long–term concessions and submission of the Russian troops that – it seemed to them - even during military operations, our companies would stand unresponsively under the shots of the rebels" ^{[19, No. 4, p. 162]}.

Another reason for the defeats of the rebels, from the point of view of Russian officers, was poor military training. The "rebels" had little military experience, as a rule, were poorly trained. According to L. L. Drake, for the most part the rebels were poorly organized and led by "landlords and priests with little knowledge of military affairs" ^{[9, No. 9, p. 546]}.

Describing another skirmish, Alexander Vyazmitinov mentions that there were bad riders among the rebels: "... many improvised cavalrymen fell down, others, who, hoping to sit down, put their feet away in the stirrups, flew off their saddles, hung upside down and beat them on the ground while there was something to beat" ^{[11, p. 418]}. 

The rebel detachments gave the impression of being organized "in a hurry" ^{[9, No. 8, p. 341]}. The rebels' weapons were also often quite primitive. L. L. Drake writes that in the Western Region, the detachments were "almost untrained and somehow armed mainly with scythes mounted on shafts (such insurgents were called kosiners) and small-style single-barreled guns..." ^{[9, No. 9, p. 546]}. But, according to his observation, there were also rebels to be reckoned with. A. N. Witmer writes that in the case of the kosiners, the way they struck played a big role: if the blow was struck correctly, it could lead to severe injuries, but during the battle it was extremely difficult to do this, and the blow most often fell flat, leaving only a bruise ^{[10, p. 856]}.

Ya. N. Butkovsky, being an official, did not take an active part in military expeditions against the rebels, but once witnessed one of the skirmishes. He wrote about the actions of the rebels: "All this on the part of the insurgents looked like some kind of childish prank, but in no way like a war..." ^{[18, No. 10, p. 93]}.

In addition to problems with weapons, the rebels were experiencing a shortage of food. V. Shcherbovich-Vechora points out that the rebels captured in 1864 told that for the second day they had no hot food, and they quenched their thirst and hunger with blueberries found in the forest. The author writes: "And indeed, all the rebels, both the living and the dead, had completely blue lips from blueberries" ^{[15, No. 6, p. 729]}.

From the point of view of the Russian military, the rebels were not distinguished by discipline or high moral character. Russian soldiers who were captured, as well as arrested rebels, reported that the rebels "get drunk, because they always have vodka in abundance" ^{[14, p. 516]}. I. N. Ponomarev cites the story of a Hussar non-commissioned officer who was captured by an insurgent "gang": "As far as I could see, they have a lot of drunkenness in their squad, and they have bad discipline, although they call the authorities "pan pulkovnik", "pan surety", but there is no subordination, in a word, rabble" ^{[12, No. 9, p. 741]}.

The Russian military, as a rule, rather poorly assessed the actions of the chiefs of the rebel detachments. The leadership of the rebels, according to A. Vyazmitinov, did not have unity: "Their bosses quarreled with each other and accused each other of treason" ^{[11, p. 417]}. I. N. Ponomarev in his memoirs describes the impressions of the military who participated in the battle of Lublin: "... the Polish youth fought with great courage, but their superiors, who were not familiar with tactics, made mistakes at every step; they sent people to certain death in vain, watching the course of the battle from afar, and ran away at the slightest danger from the battlefield, abandoning his subordinates to the mercy of fate" ^{[12, No. 9, p. 743]}. In the eyes of the Russian officers, the rank-and-file rebels were brave, which could not be said about their superiors. The Russian military was amazed that there were many very young rebels of 14-15 years old among the combatants. According to the Russian military, these children were "cannon fodder" for the leaders ^{[12, No. 9, p. 744]}.

Descriptions of rebel formations by many authors have similar characteristics. The use of the concept of "gangs" is indispensable, emphasizing the criminality of their activities and at the same time their disorganization. The military in their memoirs reproduce the image of something cowardly, most descriptions are characterized by such verbs as "run away", "run away", "stagger". The author selected the following characteristic for one of the "gangs": "... dispersed like a herd of turkeys" ^{[11, p. 420]}.

A separate description deserves the appearance of the rebels, which was remembered by many authors. As a rule, they did not have any uniform uniform. The rebels were dressed quite colorful, and their appearance influenced the idea of their disorganization. One Hussar non-commissioned officer described the rebel detachment that captured him: "It turned out that we were in the forest among some ragged rabble, but there were also dandies in the same Hungarian as our Hussars" ^{[12, No. 9, pp. 740-741]}.

From the point of view of the military and officials, the rebel detachments were poorly organized, and their participants were not trained in military affairs. If the Russian military received information about the brutality and awareness of the rebels mainly from external sources, then they saw the degree of organization of the rebels with their own eyes. During the skirmishes, the Russians had an idea of something chaotic, heterogeneous, even pathetic. This impression was influenced by the backward armament of the rebels, their appearance and information about the low moral level that prevailed in the ranks of the rebels.

Attitude to the defeated opponent

During the uprising, the Russian military had to deal with captured rebels. Such meetings with prisoners and wounded were very much remembered by Russian officers, which is confirmed in the numerous details described in the memoirs. It was these meetings that influenced the formation of a new view of the rebels, who now could not be perceived unambiguously as enemies.

Outside the battlefields, the Russian military managed to communicate more closely with the participants of the uprising. A. Vyazmitinov gives a story about a young Polish prisoner, Joseph Ostrogozhsky, whom he met. The author writes that the young man was sociable, spoke excellent Russian, and generally made a positive impression. Subsequently, it turned out that the captured rebel was a graduate of an engineering school and, as a former military man who violated his oath, had to be court-martialed. The author writes: "It's strange – how did this rebel arouse my participation in it? If a month ago we had met him somewhere in the field or in the forest, of course I would have killed him if he had not managed to warn me and kill me. And now my heart ached at the sight of the pale young man leaning back on the pillow. I tried to calm him down as much as I could" ^{[11, p. 414]}. Thus, we see that the young rebel could no longer be perceived by the author as an unambiguous opponent, he aroused sincere sympathy in him. The author even promised the young man to keep his secret ^{[11, pp. 414-415]}. Subsequently, A. Vyazmitinov learned that the military court commission became aware that the young man was an officer. He was sentenced to death, which was later replaced by exile ^{[11, p. 416]}.

There were many young people among the participants of the uprising. The young age of the rebels made an indelible impression on the Russian military. I. N. Ponomarev described his impressions after a skirmish with an insurgent detachment as follows: "Among the dead and wounded, I met many young men who were far from twenty years old" ^{[12, No. 10, p. 148]}. Russian Russian army officers who had escaped to the side of the rebels were repeatedly captured during the skirmishes. I. N. Ponomarev tells about one such case that occurred near the town of Serbets: "The Polish officers who fled were very young. They, surrounded by an escort, sat in the carriage, not daring to look into the eyes of others. Their faces were as pale as a sheet. They were well aware of the fate awaiting them" ^{[12, No. 10, p. 146]}.

A. Vyazmitinov emphasizes the mercy of the Russian authorities in relation to the rebels: "When the settling of accounts for old sins came, not everyone who had these sins was held accountable. We looked through our fingers at the past pranks of many" ^{[11, p. 419]}. For example, one rebel who voluntarily surrendered was taken into service by a draftsman. M. P. Mezhetsky also recounts a story about a rebel who voluntarily surrendered. It was a young landowner of the Shavelsky district, Stankevich. He told about the hardships and hunger that accompanied him during his stay among the rebels. Fearing revenge for his escape from the "insurgents", he asked to be imprisoned. Since Stankevich surrendered voluntarily, he fell under an amnesty announced by the government, and after the end of the uprising was released from prison. After these events, Stankevich personally thanked Mezhetsky for his help ^{[16, pp. 850-851]}.

Separately, it should be said about the captive leaders of the rebel detachments. It was the leaders of the detachments that caused the greatest indignation among the Russian military. But sometimes it happened that after a personal meeting with these people, Russian officers could already show them mercy. A. N. Witmer describes the preparations for the execution of the head of the rebel detachment Kononovich. In the description of the rebel, we do not see hatred on the part of the author. He rather feels pity for the defeated opponent. The author says that, noticing that Kononovich was cold, he gave him his coat. For this act, A. N. Witmer was reproached by his comrades, to which he replied: "Yes, gentlemen, he is a former officer of our service and a good fellow at that; although he is our enemy, he is undoubtedly a good fellow, and, finally, I could not see the old man shivering from the cold" ^{[10, p. 871]}.

A. N. Witmer describes that Kononovich made a pleasant impression on him with his calmness and intelligence, as well as the fact that he showed himself to be a good military man. But the author notes that, although with regret, he had to accept that Kononovich was handed over to a military court, since he commanded a "gang", because of which Russian troops suffered losses ^{[10, pp. 872-873]}. A former Russian officer, Sadovsky, was also handed over to the military court, from the author's point of view, an "insignificant fanatic" who fled to the rebels without resigning before that. In his opinion, this man deserved the highest punishment. But among the condemned was a young man – Labensky. A. N. Witmer writes that Labensky's transfer to a military court caused him and his comrades horror. He was taken without weapons, and although Kononovich and Sadovsky, who were arrested with him, testified that he did not serve with them, but a denunciation was received by one of the rebels, in which it was reported about Labensky's important role in the "gang". The author was terribly sorry for the young man, and he tried to dissuade the commander, but still all the condemned were executed ^{[10, pp. 874-876]}. Talking about these events, the author recognizes for himself the need for the death penalty in relation to people who have encroached on someone else's life. But at the same time, A. N. Witmer considers execution for political beliefs unacceptable, which he considered the execution of Labensky, and in which he saw no sense and benefit, and perhaps only harm to the Russians themselves, who by this cruelty turned other Poles against themselves. A. N. Witmer's memoirs were created many decades after the Polish uprising, but he writes that even then, in his youth, he tried to put himself in the place of the Poles: "... I asked myself the question: if I were a Pole and hesitated, should I go "to hell" or not, – what would I do after the execution of a handsome young man, an ardent enthusiast? And in my soul I read a firm answer: I would immediately take up arms to avenge an innocent death and die as beautifully as he died" ^{[10, p. 881]}.

In turn , Count I. G. Nostitz assisted in commuting the sentence against one of the leaders of the rebel detachments – Roginsky. The author describes his motivation as follows: "In view of Roginsky's sincere repentance and the testimony he made, wishing to save the life of this twenty-year-old energetic young man, I escorted him to Warsaw and petitioned the Grand Duke Viceroy to grant him life" ^{[17, p. 571]}.

The most severe impression was made by the wounded people. During the pursuit of the rebel detachment, wounded rebels were found in one of the landlords' houses. Among them was a crippled boy of 15 years old, who aroused sympathy among the Russian military. For them, he was just a child, not a rebel. V. Shcherbovich-Vechora recounts the following scene in his memoirs: "... a Cossack officer, listening with great attention to the boy's story, noticed a cigarette on his table and, taking a handful of tobacco out of his pouch, put it on the table and said, "Oh, you puppy! Yes, you don't have to fight, but you should eat porridge! Well, on you! Have a smoke." The boy smiled slightly and bowed his head in gratitude. The appeal of a Cossack officer to a crippled boy, expressed, despite the apparent sharpness in words, with a touch of such good-nature, which only a Russian, by nature a gentle person, is capable of, made a strong impression on all officers ..." ^{[15, No. 6, p. 741]}. Subsequently, after questioning the hostess of the house, it became known that this place has been an infirmary for wounded rebels since the beginning of the uprising and that it exists with the knowledge of the government. This Branchitsky infirmary existed "on random voluntary donations", made most often by the leaders of Russian military detachments who passed through the Branchitsa to the neighboring forests in search of rebel detachments. As an example, V. Shcherbovich-Vechora cites the commander of the Kexholm Grenadier Regiment, General Rall, who donated 25 rubles in favor of the wounded ^{[15, No. 6, p. 742]}.

D. G. tells about another rebel infirmary . Anuchin. This place also made an extremely heavy impression on many Russian military. The infirmary was located in a house in the town of Izbica. There were many people with terrible wounds, most of whom hardly had a chance to survive. D.G. Anuchin writes that the view of this infirmary was a picture that can hardly be forgotten. The author describes what he saw in the house as follows: "Many of them cried, telling how they were deceived about the general uprising in Poland. The scene was so heavy that the Cossack standing behind me, who had killed more than one rebel, had tears streaming down his tanned face" ^{[14, p. 536]}. The commander of the troops, General Kostanda, allocated money for the infirmary, and asked the military doctor to examine the wounded. Anuchin writes that the dying rebels were in the care of local ladies and a city paramedic. Despite the diligence of the latter, most of the wounded did not recover ^{[14, p. 536]}.

D. G. Anuchin cites another story related to a meeting with a wounded rebel. The author, during a tour of the city, found a badly wounded rebel in one of the houses in Brduva and promised that he would call a doctor. Next, he describes the reaction of this person: "It was necessary to see what a ray of hope shone in his eyes; he turned around on the bed and tried to get a mug of milk from the table that stood on it. I thought he was thirsty and hurried to bring him a mug; but he grabbed my hand with one hand, and with the other handed me a mug to drink milk. He had nothing else to thank me for my concern for him. Sobbing, he fell on the pillows. Unfortunate victims!" ^{[14, p. 540]}. It was the victims of these terrible events, and not the enemies, that the military saw the wounded and captured rebels.

Conclusion The uprising of 1863-1864 was one of the strongest shocks in the history of the Russian Empire in the second half of the XIX century.

It caused a wide public response and left a big mark in the lives of the participants of these events. This can explain the fact that even decades later, the authors of the memoirs describe in such detail their feelings and emotions that were caused by events that were already far away for them.

Despite the fact that rumors of an impending uprising were already circulating at the end of 1862, it to some extent caught the Russians by surprise. Although the upcoming struggle seemed to be an extremely difficult task, the beginning of the uprising led to an increase in morale among the military. Firstly, it was due to the extreme brutality of the rebels, which the Russian military learned from various sources and which found new evidence. This caused a desire to punish the perpetrators as soon as possible. Secondly, in the years preceding the uprising, the Russian military were subjected to all kinds of humiliations by the local population ^{[17, p. 569]}. These humiliations in most cases went unpunished. The beginning of the uprising gave a sense of relief to some extent. The Russian military realized that the time of "connivance" was over ^{[19, No. 4, p. 161]}, and they would be able to fight according to the rules of wartime. The uprising was seen by the Russian officers as a losing cause for the rebels. This opinion is shared by all the authors. There were different ideas about the strength of the rebels and the time it would take to suppress it.

The fight against the rebels, from the point of view of the Russian military, had a number of difficulties. Firstly, this was due to the branching of the revolutionary organization: rebel formations existed throughout the Kingdom of Poland, as well as in the Western Region. Secondly, significant segments of the population sympathized with the uprising, who provided significant assistance to the rebels: they were provided with monetary and material support, given shelter in private homes, and also timely reported on the actions of the troops. Thirdly, the uprising had the character of a guerrilla struggle. The rebels attacked individual Russian detachments, and in case of unfavorable conditions for them, they went into the woods, where it was extremely difficult to find them.

From the point of view of military training, Russian officers, in most cases, did not rate the actions of the rebels very highly. A significant part of the people who were in the ranks of the "rebels" had no combat experience. Many authors wrote about the backward weapons used by the rebels, as well as about the low level of organization of rebel "gangs". In the memoirs, one can see the duality of the image of the rebel detachments. They are often described by the authors as something extremely pathetic, poorly organized. But there was also courage and sincere devotion to the idea among many rebels, which could not but arouse respect among the Russian military.

The most vivid impression of the rebels was formed after personal meetings with them – mainly prisoners and wounded rebels. Wounded people, as a rule, aroused sympathy among the military and a desire to provide them with all possible assistance. At such moments, the rebels, against whom the military was fighting, could no longer be perceived unambiguously as enemies. The young rebels also aroused strong sympathy. The Russian military extremely regretted that young people, due to their inexperience and susceptibility, were involved in these terrible events.

Thus, in the memoirs of the Russian military, you can see a multifaceted image of the rebels. It was formed both on the basis of the information they received from various sources, public attitudes, and personal experience. But if the society was dominated by an extremely negative image of the rebels, then for the officers and officials who were at the epicenter of the uprising, this image was richer and was filled with various shades. The views of the authors, who were separated from the rebels by a considerable distance, largely coincide with those common in society. But the closer the authors' contacts with the rebels were, the more human the image they described becomes.