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History magazine - researches
Reference:

The Chinese factor in the formation of the American foreign policy doctrine of "open doors" (1899-1900)

Baibakova Larisa Vilorovna

Doctor of History

Professor, Section of Modern and Contemporary History, History Department, Lomonosov Moscow State University

119192, Russia, g. Moscow, ul. Lomonosovskii Prospekt, 27 korpus 4, kab. G-421

larisa.baybakova@yandex.ru
Other publications by this author
 

 

DOI:

10.7256/2454-0609.2022.4.38480

EDN:

QZTRZX

Received:

19-07-2022


Published:

18-09-2022


Abstract: The article examines the formation of one of the foreign policy doctrines of expansionism, which became the main instrument of US foreign policy in the twentieth century. The theory of "open doors", the essence of which is to provide equal opportunities to all interested parties on the basis of unlimited economic freedom and unhindered penetration of capital, was proclaimed by Secretary of State J. Hay in 1899 in relation with China, which was considered as a potential market for the sale of industrial goods and a profitable object of capital investment. Having opposed the division of China by the European powers, the American ruling elites proposed to replace individual control over individual parts of the country, according to the concluded agreements on "spheres of influence", with the establishment of a collective system of external supervision over its entire territory. By putting external expansion in the form of international agreement, they wanted to force competitors stronger in military and political terms to play by the proposed rules, transferring power rivalry to the trade and economic area, where their commercial superiority was undoubted. The nationalist movement of the Yihetuans, which began in the autumn of 1898, aimed at expelling foreigners out of the country, jeopardized the idea of implementing the doctrine of "open doors". After much thought, the White House abandoned the widely disseminated peacefulness and approved the participation of the expeditionary force in the joint intervention of European powers in China. Interference in the internal political affairs of a formally sovereign state meant that the United States was involved in its violent redistribution. Later, Washington continued to follow its course around the world, creating an arsenal of new political and economic methods, officially formalized as a generally accepted international principle in the 1922 treaty of the Nine Powers.


Keywords:

colonialism, informal empire, William McKinley, John Hay, the open door doctrine, William Rockhill, ihetuan movement, Edwin Conger, alliance of eight nations, Edna Chaffee

This article is automatically translated.

Currently, the ruling circles of America, skillfully fomenting local military conflicts in all corners of the planet, are desperately trying to maintain their hegemony as the only superpower. And although the United States does not appear in reference books as a colonial empire, even American researchers themselves call their state the largest metropolis in the world. According to them, the assertion of Washington's political and economic dominance took place, as a rule, not by directly seizing territory, but by establishing control over world economic, financial and intellectual resources, adapting existing international institutions (Navy, WTO, NATO, etc.) to serve American interests directly [42; 37]. Such an "institutionalization of the system of superiority", which allowed Washington by the end of the twentieth century. (after the abolition of the USSR) to turn into a center of hegemony on a planetary scale [34, p.133-146; 25, p.190-197], necessitates the establishment and understanding of the initial moment from which the United States began building its global empire. In this case, we are talking about the turn of the XIX-XX centuries, when the country, having fully recovered from the devastating consequences of the Civil War of 1861-1865, reached a qualitatively new level of economic development, experiencing a stage of comprehensive industrial modernization. Within a few decades, the agrarian United States turned into one of the most powerful industrial powers in the world, surpassing most countries in terms of industrial output by the beginning of the twentieth century.

The awareness of the immediate need for expansion intensified in American society after the economic crisis of 1893-1897, when the possibilities of internal colonization of Western lands were completely exhausted, and the development of international trade for the export of commodity surpluses abroad was complicated by an acute competition with European countries for raw materials markets. Paradoxically, the United States, being a colony of Great Britain, which gained independence in 1789, initially condemned the imperialism of the European powers, deliberately refusing to create colonies. However, a century after their liberation from the hated oppression of the British Empire, they began to establish control over the western hemisphere in accordance with the Monroe doctrine proclaimed in 1823. One of the embodiments of the US imperial ambitions in practice was the Spanish-American War of 1898, during which they received not only the first colonies (Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Guam), but also formalized the annexation of the Kingdom of Hawaii, thereby establishing strategic control over the Pacific Ocean basin. This was how a special political and economic space was created, which later became known as “Pax-Americana".

Unlike the old colonial powers, the ruling elite of the United States, hastening to renounce the legacy of traditional European colonialism, called the newly acquired possessions "unincorporated territories", introducing a system of civil administration with an elected parliament acting under its own control. Thus, during the three-year occupation of Cuba, the appearance of democratization of the political regime was created by the reforms carried out by the Americans on the separation of the Catholic Church from the state, the creation of the supreme tribunal and the city police, the abolition of unpaid taxes of the former metropolis, and so on. However, despite the international commitment made by the United States to grant independence to the island, in 1903 the White House imposed on the Cubans the inclusion in the text of their constitution of the so-called "Platt Amendment", according to which the Americans received the right to interfere in the internal affairs of Cuba and the organization of naval bases [18, pp.253-260]. And although the star-spangled flag did not fly over the government buildings of the island state, it turned out to be in colonial dependence on the United States. In the future, the Cuban "model" of colonialism, which established puppet regimes, was used to limit the sovereignty of Panama, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Haiti.

The White House sought to combine methods of military-force confrontation with more flexible, nonviolent approaches in order to strengthen geopolitical positions in Latin American countries that made up the "inner courtyard" of the United States. In particular, the Philippines was turned into an American protectorate, where new, sophisticated methods of exercising power were practiced by political maneuvering, military threats, and often direct interference in internal affairs, compared with other colonial powers. Despite the formal nature of the rights and freedoms granted to the local population, their very proclamation "made US policy in the eyes of the world community much more liberal than the policy of the old colonial powers" [15, p.15]. According to the American scientist A. Schlesinger, it was about the formation of an informal empire at the beginning of the twentieth century, "without colonies in the political sense," but richly equipped with the attributes of imperialism scattered all over the planet (troops, ships, military bases, etc.) [35, p.206].

In other parts of the world that were not within the sphere of direct US influence, Washington sought to build a foreign policy based on "soft power", using the methods of economic liberalism, which was explained by the country's entry into the leading economic positions in the world. Having adapted the former colonial practices to their own needs, the American ruling elite exerted an indirect influence on local regimes, framing the path of imperialism with slogans of democracy, freedom and respect for human rights. Since the beginning of the twentieth century . The doctrine of "open doors and equal opportunities" has become a universal tool of US expansion, the formation of which was strongly influenced by the Chinese factor.

The reasons and essence of the formation of this geopolitical paradigm were actively studied by Soviet scientists on the basis of Lenin's theory of imperialism, who considered it as an instrument of US policy in relation to the current situation in the East Asian region [19, 32, 14, 12, 33]. By their general admission, it "reflected the belligerent nature of American imperialism, which was preparing to turn China into a solid American "sphere of influence" under the flag of "open doors" [17, p. 332].

In modern Russian studies, of which there are relatively few, the concept of Soviet scientists, which absolutized the methods of military force pressure and underestimated the more flexible approaches of US foreign policy, is recognized as overly ideologized. Now the doctrine of "open doors" is considered more in the context of the competitive struggle of Western countries for the capture of the vast market of East Asia. Thus, the version of Soviet scientists is actually confirmed that the so-called "civilized" formula developed by the ideologists of the White House for the unhindered penetration of foreign capital into any part of Chinese territory protected the interests, first of all, of American business, which had a huge economic potential to displace European countries not only from China, but also all other markets of the world [31, 27, 29].

There is no consensus among American experts either: some of them, based on a realistic analysis of the situation in the region, emphasize the pragmatism of the "open doors" doctrine, focused mainly on the development of foreign trade, while others criticize this approach for excessive moralism, noting that the implementation in practice of the principle of free trade and the unhindered penetration of American capital to the markets of other countries is still an unattainable ideal [38, 41, 44, 54, 39, 36]. Nevertheless, most of them, following the statement of the researcher W. Williams, expressed back in 1959, agree on one thing ? the creation of an informal colonial empire of the United States began with the adoption of "open-door imperialism" by the ruling elite [53].

The archival materials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire provide additional opportunities for evaluating various interpretations of American foreign policy.The fact is that while the United States was perceived in Europe as nothing more than a state located on the outskirts of Europe, the great powers did not take seriously the threat emanating from overseas, but as soon as the American army won the Spanish-American war, the Russian government demanded that diplomatic departments take a deeper approach to the analysis of its military-industrial potential. The AWPRI contains more than 20 cases in which the formation and mechanism of the doctrine adjustment in the course of its practical implementation by the State Department and diplomatic missions in China are analyzed in detail. Such materials make it possible to highlight a wider range of problems that were initially not taken into account by the administration of President W. McKinley. This, first of all, refers to the uprising of the Yihetuan, which prompted the White House to make significant changes in the tactics of its actions in the East Asian region.

In this article, the main emphasis is placed on the analysis of the formation of the political part of the doctrine of "open doors", which was previously underestimated by Soviet scientists, and also was not affected by modern researchers. At the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. Washington did not have sufficient funds to solve all foreign policy problems by force: the reorganization of the armed forces was far from complete, and transport terminals used as transshipment bases were only being created in Cuba and the Philippines acquired after the Spanish-American war. Based on the current situation, it became clear that it was possible to defend one's own geopolitical interests only with the help of "soft power" aimed at creating a favorable image of Washington in the East Asian region. That is why it is so important to find out what methods the White House offered to the Qing court in solving trade and general political problems, for what purposes they allowed a certain degree of encouragement to the process of modernization of public administration that began in China, which was archaic in nature.

Recall that the Americans became interested in the wealth of the Celestial Empire only when it was already divided into spheres of foreign influence: England subdued Central China with the Yangtze River basin, France leased the southwestern provinces, Germany seized Shandong Province in the lower reaches of the Yellow River, and Japan extended control to Taiwan (Formosa) and the Pescadores. Extensive concessions were made by Russia, whose sphere of influence was the North-eastern region, which included Manchuria and Mongolia. In addition, on the territory of China there were concessions from Italy, Belgium and Austria-Hungary, which to one degree or another participated in the division of the Chinese "pie". Competition between European states sharply intensified after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, when Russia, France and Germany claimed exclusive rights to various parts of China, and the ruling elite of the United States identified Manchuria, which was part of the Russian sphere of influence, as an object of its own expansion. And although American diplomats in London and Berlin were given assurances that the rights of their citizens would not be infringed in any way, Britain and Germany soon recognized the legitimacy of their own privileges. At the same time, the Russian Ambassador A. Cassini informed the tsarist government of Italy's decision "to demand a concession from the Chinese Government in the port of Xiamen (prov. Zhejiang), in order to arrange a naval station there, as well as other advantages" [1, l.72]. The Americans themselves were thinking about a naval base (either on Zhoushan Island or in Samsa Bay, Fujian Province) [32, p.169].

Agreements with European countries signed by the Qing Court in the period from 1896 to 1898 became an important tool for dividing China into special spheres of influence, also called zones of "monopoly interests" or "special privileges". In the newly formed territorial units, foreign settlements and naval bases were created, which were withdrawn from local jurisdiction and became foreign enclaves, which testified to the partial loss of China's state sovereignty [28, p.37]. Thus, according to the articles of the Tianjin (1858) and Beijing treatises (1860), foreigners were allowed to have diplomatic institutions, trade in open ports, rent houses and land plots for the construction of houses, hospitals, churches and even cemeteries. They could travel to the interior of China, providing freedom of movement for Christian missionaries belonging to Protestant and Catholic denominations, as well as establish concessions with a special legal regime, including the creation of local self-government and police [51]. According to Russian orientalists, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the Qing Empire had a system of forcibly involving previously closed Chinese society into the global structure, while the list of so-called "capitulations" to foreigners, determined by unequal treaties, included low import duties, external control over the customs system, consular jurisdiction, predatory loans, the right of extraterritoriality, the creation of foreign settlements, etc. [23, pp.48-49]

Since the beginning of the 1890s, the share of US exports has been constantly growing in the East Asian region, which represented serious competition to European countries that had their own geopolitical interests in China. Under the pretext of freedom of navigation, American tankers settled in Shanghai, which was the busiest port of the Celestial Empire, and merchants occupied the lion's share of the Chinese market for petroleum products (kerosene) and textiles. According to reports from Russian diplomats, "if Russia is the most serious competitor of the United States in importing the first of these items, due to the cheapness of the Russian product, then Great Britain and Germany are the main competitors of this country in terms of importing cotton goods to China. The first of them finds good sales of its manufactories in the South of China, in the valley of the Yangtze River, while the United States holds the markets of northern China and mainly Manchuria in its hands" [1, l.157].

Entrepreneurs, united in the "American-Chinese Development Company" headed by J. Rockefeller and W. Harriman signed a memorandum in December 1898, in which they demanded that the White House take appropriate measures to protect their commercial interests [43, p. 382-383]. They were concerned not only about the rivalry with Russian merchants in Manchuria, but also about the existence of discriminatory tariffs in ports controlled by European powers. According to Russian diplomats, Americans "look at this vast Empire as a market for American trade and industry, the development of which takes on too large dimensions to be satisfied with existing other places of sale of American works" [1, l.72]. In addition, China was conceived as a transshipment point for further development of the territory of the Asia-Pacific region. It is no coincidence that the State Department was inundated with letters from businessmen offering all kinds of projects for the development of the Far East. One of them, for example, concerned the plans of the Pacific Coast Investment company, which wanted to "arrange the right steamship flights from San Francisco to Vladivostok with the intention of bringing iron ore from California for the Primorsky Territory, and from there to export coal for the American ports of the Pacific Ocean to compete with Australian coal, the price of which in recent years greatly increased" [10, L.2].

It is curious, but the idea of developing the Chinese market was thrown to the Americans by the British, who needed like-minded people in the struggle for Asian markets and sources of raw materials. Fearing the transformation of "spheres of influence" into de facto colonies, Great Britain strenuously sought allies to curb the expansion of European powers. Proclaiming the common interests of the Anglo-Saxon countries in the form of an alliance of the "Teutonic race", the English Prime Minister R. Salisbury in March 1898 addressed the American government with a proposal to counteract the further partition of China. The popularizer of the development of a joint foreign policy course was the English Admiral Charles Beresford, who, returning home from his trip to the East, briefly stopped in the United States in February 1899 [16, pp.43-54]. In honor of the foreign guest, Secretary of State J. Hay hosted a dinner, and President W. McKinley discussed with him the need to change the rules of trade policy that Britain and the United States should adhere to in order to stop the competition of the great powers in East Asia. The admiral willingly shared his thoughts on possible commercial benefits with representatives of the Chambers of Commerce of San Francisco, Chicago, Washington and New York, stating that Great Britain "does not pursue any selfish goals in China; it wants to open the whole of China to the trade of the whole world and eliminate all obstacles that exist for the said trade" [1, L.54-55]. In his opinion, British and American interests are identical in relation to everything that concerns China, therefore, economic expediency determines the building of common foundations of a single foreign policy space.

Having dwelt in detail on the division of the Chinese market into economic segments, Beresford "tried to prove to his interlocutors that if, by misfortune, the Powers adopt a policy of "spheres of influence", then Russia will become omnipotent in the north of China, France in the south, England and Germany will take everything else, and the United States will be deprived, thus, by force of circumstances no influence whatsoever" [9, l.3]. The admiral saw a way out of this situation in providing all interested parties with equal access to any of the ports open for trade in China. This idea was not new to American diplomacy, as this principle was enshrined in a number of US documents. However, the White House, due to the dominance of ideas of isolationism in public opinion, which implied the rejection of involvement in armed conflicts outside the American continent, rejected the proposed action plan, although there was mutual understanding between the governments of both countries regarding the common goal of external expansion in the Celestial Empire. It is significant that in a correspondence with diplomat G. White dated September 24, Secretary Hay complained that "the union, in the current state of things, still remains an unattainable dream" [49, p. 221].

The formulation of a social request by business regarding the development of new territories was met with understanding in the ruling circles, and President McKinley was one of the first to speak in favor of external expansion. According to him, "the United States has not been an indifferent observer of the extraordinary events taking place in the Chinese Empire, as a result of which parts of its maritime provinces are coming under the control of various European powers." Moreover, he declared his desire to "defend his interests in this part of the globe by all means" [47, p. LXXII]. And since the scope of rights in the spheres of influence of the European powers was not clearly defined, the White House demanded that they define guarantees of freedom for the entrepreneurial activity of American citizens. However, the president softened the categorical nature of the demand by stating that "we are not looking for any advantages for ourselves in the East that would not be common to all. Asking to open the door for ourselves, we are ready to provide an open door to others. Business opportunities ... depend not so much on extensive territorial possessions as on an adequate commercial basis, broad and equal opportunities" [47, p. 907].

McKinley proposed a special tactic of economic penetration of business circles into China, requiring the lowest costs on the part of the state. The development of the territory of the Celestial Empire was supposed to be carried out not by force of arms, but by means of a solid financial potential, with the help of which the United States could establish dominance in the East Asian region in the near future. According to the President, "everything that we produce in excess of our domestic consumption should have access abroad... Gentlemen, let's always remember that we are interested in harmony, not conflict, and that our true greatness rests on peaceful victories, not wars" [45]. In this regard, Russian diplomats noted that in a message to Congress in December 1898, McKinley "made very energetic remarks about the outstanding commercial importance that the United States has the right to have in China, and about the firmness with which the Government will not hesitate, if necessary, to protect American interests in this country [1, l.333].

The President entrusted the strategy of building new relations with China to Secretary of State Hay, who advocated the creation of a free and open market for entrepreneurs of all nationalities working in China on the basis of the most favored nation provision. The approval of the principle of "open doors", in his view, was supposed to prevent conflicts between European powers that had geopolitical interests in the country. However, the Secretary of State himself was poorly versed in the value foundations of the foreign policy of the Qing Empire. There were no experts of this profile in the institution under his jurisdiction, and Edwin Conger, appointed in 1898 as envoy extraordinary to Beijing, did not have the appropriate diplomatic experience, having previously occupied a seat in the lower house of the US Congress. The way out of a difficult situation was to involve the diplomat W. Rockhill, who previously worked in China, in the development of the foundations of the foreign policy course. He had been interested in Chinese history since childhood, becoming the first American to learn to speak Tibetan. In 1883, his wife, having inherited 70 thousand dollars, helped the young man to take an unpaid position as an attache of the American mission in Beijing. And he, on his own initiative, undertook an expedition to Mongolia and Tibet, after which he published the results of travel notes entitled "The Land of Lamas", highly appreciated by the Royal Geographical Society.

Having begun work on the assigned task in January 1899, Rockhill was clearly aware that the struggle of European countries for the territorial dismemberment of China inevitably leads to an increase in imperialist rivalry, thereby causing its further fragmentation. He believed that the geopolitical interests of the United States in the East Asian region require the preservation of a viable Chinese state, so the Qing court needs help in maintaining territorial integrity. To develop the text of the document, Rockhill attracted a friend, an Englishman A. Hippisli, who served in the British maritime customs. Both experts, well aware of the current situation in China, advocated the removal of any barriers to free market trade on the basis of the most favored nation provision. They believed that joint Anglo-British interests could be best protected if they received support from the great Powers in the form of a formal agreement on the principles of existence within the single economic space. By putting external expansion in the form of some kind of international agreement, the Anglo-Saxon ideologists wanted to force competitors stronger in military and political terms to play by the proposed rules, transferring power rivalry to the trade and economic field, where their commercial superiority was undoubted.

The text of the document developed by them by the end of August 1899 was formalized in the form of an official appeal of the White House to the European powers. On September 6, Secretary Hay sent a diplomatic note to the governments of Great Britain, Germany and Russia, and at the end of November ? Italy, France and Japan, in which he formulated the main provisions of the "open door" doctrine. It stated that the US government "sincerely wishes that the interests of its citizens in China are not violated by the exclusive rights of any of the controlling powers in the "spheres of interest" and hopes to maintain an open market for all world trade there, as well as eliminate all dangerous sources of international irritation ..." [52, p.283]. Without disputing the privileges of foreign Powers enshrined in unequal treaties, he nevertheless called on each of them to do away with competitive advantages for their own citizens and observe equal commercial rights for all interested parties. In a document of a predominantly economic nature, the American government insisted on the acceptance by the European powers of a number of clear commitments: it was not only about stopping interference in each other's trade interests, but also refusing to levy discriminatory port tariffs and railway charges within the spheres of their own influence. It is noteworthy that the copies of the American note sent to Russia and the UK contained an additional requirement for the integrity of China, while the documents transferred to other countries did not contain it. This fact indicates that the "open door" doctrine itself was not a purely trade policy. Dreaming of the economic development of the territory of the Celestial Empire, the US government believed that it should first restore sovereignty, because "in the interests of the whole world, it would be better for China to be ruled by one power, and not by any greater number of them" [50, p.12-13].

From the text of the document prepared in the State Department, it followed that China was conceived as a powerful colonial enclave of the United States in East Asia. However, not counting on the establishment of monopoly domination in conditions of fierce competition, the American government acted as a defender of China in the fight against European colonialists. In an effort to convince the Qing court of exceptionally friendly intentions and lack of desire to deprive it of its powers, the White House approved the implementation of local administrative reforms leading to the restoration of the country's sovereignty. Advocating the modernization of the foundations of public administration, necessary "to strengthen the Imperial Government and preserve the integrity of China" [52, p.279-280], the Americans supported the transformative "policy of self-strengthening" pursued by the Qing court during the 1860s-1890s. They encouraged the activities of Chinese reformers to rearm the army and navy, create military educational institutions that widely used the experience of European states, liberalize private capitalist entrepreneurship based on borrowing Western technologies, including American technological transfer [30, pp. 78-98; 24, pp.447-502]. With the help of missionaries, the process of Westernization of the education system began through the teaching of foreign languages in schools and colleges [21, pp.5-15]. The main result of the reform of state institutions was the creation in the administrative hierarchy of the Qing in 1861 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (under the name "zongli yamen"), which carried out communication between the Chinese government and the ambassadors of foreign powers. The White House did not miss the opportunity to witness goodwill towards the highest dignitaries, seeking to satisfy their requests and wishes to one degree or another.

In this regard, the Americans' proposal expressed in the diplomatic note on the widespread transition to the Chinese customs tariff is of particular interest, thereby depriving foreign officials of the right to independently levy duties in the designated spheres of influence. The text of the document, in particular, noted that "regardless of what nationality [the port] may belong to ..., duties are levied by the Chinese government." And here it seems possible to agree with the opinion of the Soviet historian A. A. Fursenko, who believed that the plan of the American government was designed to, on the one hand, "by centralizing management in China to remove unnecessary barriers to commercial trade that took place at the municipal level to facilitate the activities of American entrepreneurs, and on the other, to in some legal forms, the idea of "united" actions of the European powers under the slogans of the integrity and inviolability of the Chinese territory as opposed to a separate policy expressed in the form of "spheres of influence" [32, pp.152-153]. Analyzing the significance of the "open doors" doctrine in general, it is worth recognizing that its most characteristic feature was the rejection of the European model of colonialism as a global project of Western domination in the East Asian region. The ruling elite of the United States demanded to ensure unhindered access to the vast Chinese market for American campaigns, turning the imperative of "open doors" into a universal principle of world trade, which, in combination with the theory of the mobile border (frontier), outlined in the works of F. Turner, was actively used to justify the movement of the empire "Pax-Americana" to the east.

Secretary Hay sought to give international legitimacy to the promulgated principle of "open doors", believing that "the obligations assumed by the Powers can be valid only if all Governments come to an identical agreement" [9, l.70]. Meanwhile, the reaction of European countries to the US proposal was extremely sluggish. Russia responded to the American demarche with a formal agreement. According to Russian diplomats, "to date, the United States has no political ties with China and could hardly point to any part of the country as the sphere of its primary interests. In view of this, the so-called open door policy represents significant advantages for them" [9, l.8]. Proceeding from this, Finance Minister S. Y. Witte recommended to the tsarist government to determine the permissible limits of the natural influence of the European powers, since, from his point of view, "the exact definition of these borders ... is one of the most important conditions for judging the projected agreement between Russia and the United States of North America" [9, l.35]. In particular, he protested against the equation of tariffs proposed by the Americans on the railways (Sino-Eastern and South Manchurian), where preferential rates for Russia operated. The same opinion was held by the Russian Ambassador Cassini, who believed that it was necessary to "respond in general terms flattering to the United States that the trade interests of Americans in China will be respected in our sphere of influence, as always, but should not go into details and especially bind themselves with written obligations." He was sure that "the other Powers would respond in the same sense" [2, l.190]. It is noteworthy that on the ambassador's report, Emperor Nicholas II wrote in blue pencil the words that "it seems Cassini is right." In the end, the Minister of Foreign Affairs M. N. Muravyov ordered "to limit ourselves at present to a response in general terms that does not bind us for the future and indicates the need for a preliminary thorough study of all the details of the case" [9, l.37]. The Tsarist government was waiting for the reaction of the great powers in order to accurately indicate its position in accordance with the current needs of the Russian Empire.

However, Europe was in no hurry to respond. For several months, none of the countries has given a written response to Washington's note, making its adoption conditional on the consent of all interested parties. According to the Russian Ambassador Cassini, only at the beginning of November "Berlin notified of the receipt of the request. No response has been received from Paris yet" [1, l.464]. In mid-November, it became known that the French government, having assessed its geopolitical interests located in the Yangtze Valley, with the sum of "300 million francs of French capital invested in various mainly railway enterprises," declared its consent [9, l.22]. Nevertheless, it was not until December 16, 1899, that the American embassy in Paris received an official response stating the desire of the French government "to apply equal treatment to citizens and subjects of all nationalities in the territories that are leased, especially in matters of customs duties and navigation fees, as well as tariffs for rail transportation" [52, p.279]. At the same time, Berlin declared that "German policy in the Far East is a de facto open-door policy, and Germany intends to continue to observe it" [1, l.501].

Of course, the position of Great Britain was of particular importance to the United States, but in early December, "London responded verbally, in very soothing terms" [1, l.333], noting that although the British government approved the American proposal, but its final acceptance "depends on the same consent of other Powers under similar conditions" [2, L.195]. In this regard, Russian diplomats pointed out that it was unlikely that "the British Government agreed to contribute in any way to ensuring the development of trade in China of a power like the United States, which is advancing in the Far East with giant strides and threatens to become a more dangerous rival than Germany in the near future" [9, L.45]. Nevertheless, as soon as Britain's position became clear, the tsarist government made a final decision. In the message of the Minister of Foreign Affairs M. N. Muravyov, it was noted that "England, Germany and France have declared that they are ready to follow the policy of open doors in their spheres of influence in the Celestial Empire. Under such conditions, I believe, it is not possible for us to go against the generally accepted political and economic principle of the Powers" [9, l.55]. Despite the existing differences between the European countries, on March 7, 1900, Secretary of State Hay declared "their agreements decisive and final" [9, L.89]. And although the answers received by no means corresponded to the exaggerated expectations of the White House, the principle of "open doors" as a new way of international relations, although not fixed by any treaty, was more or less recognized by the Western powers, and the United States, with their tacit approval, secured the right to exploit China's natural resources.

The nationalist movement of the Ihetuans, which began in the autumn of 1898, previously known as the "boxer rebellion" because of the similarity of physical exercises practiced by the rebels with fist fighting techniques [20, pp.344-347], threatened the very idea of implementing the doctrine of "open doors". With the support of the Dowager Empress Cixi, the popular masses' speech against the accelerated modernization of the country according to the Western model [26, pp.150-152] turned into a tough socio-political conflict that claimed the lives of hundreds of foreigners, not to mention the local population. The violent reaction of ordinary Chinese against the "overseas devils" who ruled the country, whose activities were associated with the destruction of traditions established for centuries and the absolutization of the achievements of European civilization, was expressed in the destruction of Catholic churches, attacks on Christian converts, murders of high-ranking diplomats and officials. Ordinary people, mostly illiterate peasants, being supporters of Confucianism, believed that they knew how to live properly, so they had nothing to learn from strangers. The popular protest actions were directed exclusively against foreigners, since the slogan "let's destroy the foreigners, save the dynasty!" appeared on the banner of the rebels.

Despite the obvious threat to the lives and property of the subjects, the ruling circles of the United States for a long time refused to act together with the Europeans, arguing that although circumstances sometimes require the government "to act in accordance with principles similar to those followed by other treaty powers, it should do it alone" [48, p.111]. The McKinley government, although it supported the general demand to suppress popular speech and restore order in the country, initially refused to send military formations to protect fellow citizens, believing that interference in China's internal affairs with the use of force would be regarded as a violation of China's sovereignty. In addition, the Americans did not have a permanent contingent of armed forces here, so their deployment on the territory of a foreign power could cause serious discord among the ruling elite, some of which, remaining in a position of isolationism, demanded not to interfere in another conflict of European powers. The choice in favor of the use of military force could have negative consequences on the state of international relations, since the internationalization of the internal conflict could lead to a further division of China, forever closing the door to the Celestial Empire that had just opened for the United States.

The situation changed significantly at the end of November 1899, when the Qing court sent a decree to the local authorities on the need to combat foreigners. It said that "all the powers are looking at us with the eyes of voracious tigers," so provincial governors should "order generals and soldiers to beat the enemy to the end, not only without speaking, but without thinking about peace" [13, pp. 66-67]. In response, the European powers demanded that the Chinese authorities put an end to the outrages of the rebellious rabble, while the American envoy E. Konger, who was previously reputed to be "a man of peaceful and calm character," was the most active in calling for restoring order. Under the pressure of the intensified complaints of the missionaries, he unexpectedly for the Chinese, "who had high hopes for the friendly attitude of the North American United States towards them, spoke in such a decisive and threatening language" that the Chinese authorities decided to remove Yu Xiang from the post of governor of Shandong, who encouraged the actions of the Yihetuans. In his place was appointed reformer Yuan Shikai, who played an active role in the transformative "policy of self-reinforcement" [3, l. 210]. He not only issued a decree banning the activities of the "bandits of the Yihetuan", but also demanded the execution of those who approved of their actions. However, a number of influential dignitaries openly supported the rebels, including them in the official militia. Thus, a paradoxical situation developed in the country: the Qing court, calling for a fight against foreigners, at the same time condemned the violent methods of the rebels, and the local authorities were inclined to act at their discretion.

At the beginning of 1900, the number of Yihetuan settled in the capital province of Zhili reached 100 thousand people. They purposefully moved towards Beijing, smashing everything in their path ? bridges, railway stations and telegraph lines, considering them as innovations of the hated pro-Western industrialization. Despite all the efforts of the Americans to dissociate themselves from the European powers and portray themselves as a friendly trading partner of the Qing court, the Chinese, for the most part, did not see the difference between Christians of different nationalities who should have been expelled from the country. All this meant that against the background of the strengthening of the nationalist movement, the White House still had to decide on its own foreign policy course.

Clarification of Washington's position took place in January 1900 during a joint demarche of representatives of four foreign powers accredited to the Qing court (France, Germany, Great Britain, USA), who appealed to Zongli Yamen with a protest, demanding that the participants of the popular movement be severely punished [4, l. 21]. However, at that time, Secretary Hay scolded the envoy for supporting the position of European countries, saying that he considered it preferable if a separate presentation had been made from the American side [48, p.112]. In March, the European powers again demanded that the Chinese authorities intensify repression against the rebels, threatening to send armed troops to the rebellious provinces of Shandong and Zhili. The American envoy even admitted, as a deterrent, the possibility of "a naval demonstration conducted by two or three ships of each state in the Zhili Bay" [48, p.105]. And although the White House doubted the alarmist statements of a high-ranking diplomat, nevertheless, the Navy department was ordered to transfer one ship from the Philippines to Taka. As a result, the planned demonstration of military force by a number of European powers did not take place. The reason for this is the position of the US and French governments, which have instructed diplomats to "be careful" in their actions.

Indeed, in the response notes, the foreign ambassadors reported that they were satisfied with "the statement of Zongli Yamen that he would begin further consideration of the issue of ensuring the safety of the Christian population" [4, L. 81-82]. The compromise reached temporarily removed the sharpness of contradictions between diplomatic missions and local authorities. However, according to the Russian envoy M. N. Girs, "the situation may become serious if the Chinese government does not take decisive measures against boxers, but confines itself, as until now, to only a few arrests and the issuance of decrees condemning boxers" [5, l.236]. According to him, "if foreign Powers are convinced that the Chinese Government is powerless to ensure peace in the capital, then they themselves will take care of the safety of their subjects and each will manage in its own way" [5, l.237].

Negotiations between foreign ambassadors and the Qing court continued in early May, when, in response to the inaction of local authorities, a general meeting of the heads of European diplomatic missions was held, at which it was "decided to demand that the Chinese Government take the following measures: punishing all those who box in the streets or temples; punishing people who print or paste up proclamations against foreigners; instigators to arson and murder; the promulgation of these measures in the capital and northern provinces of China and the strict punishment of all police officers who do not observe their execution. All the envoys came to an agreement that if these measures are not taken by the Chinese Government within five days, then they should call for landings" [5, l.246]. The memorandum of the Chinese authorities received soon by the diplomatic corps, drawn up in general terms, was considered "unsatisfactory". Moreover, a number of ambassadors stated that "the landing of troops is an insufficient measure, and that the time has come for a more active intervention of the Powers" [5, l.250-251]. Envoy Conger also shared the concerns of European governments in connection with the intensification of the Yihetuan movement, although according to the instructions of the White House, he was recommended to "act independently in defense of American interests, where possible, and simultaneously with representatives of other powers, if such a need arises" [48, p. 143]. In his defense, he referred to the requests of missionaries who spoke in support of "joint action as the only possible defense." And although the Ihetuani had never attacked the buildings of the American mission before May, Konjer demanded that the Chinese authorities "faithfully comply with the provisions of the international treaty concerning the rights of American citizens" [48, p.122-123].

However, the diplomat himself unexpectedly found himself involved in a number of scandals. One of them was connected with the discovery of banned books containing slander against foreigners in a nearby bookstore. His demand for the immediate withdrawal of counterfeit literature from circulation was fulfilled by the local gendarmerie, which burned it in the presence of officials. The second unpleasant situation occurred with the servant of the messenger during the service in the mission chapel of the Presbyterian mission, to whom a shell thrown by someone over the wall almost fell on his head. Konjer immediately appealed to Zongli yamen with a demand to deal with the incident, while pointing out the presence of posters with threats against foreigners in adjacent buildings.

In mid-May, it became known that the rebels "began to destroy the railway and burned several stations, including the one closest to Beijing." According to Konger, "trains to Tianjin no longer run" [5, l.252]. The telegraphic communication of foreign departments with the outside world was interrupted due to further actions of the rebels, who, in protest, cut wires on telegraph poles and dismantled the rails of the railway track. Diplomatic correspondence from China to Washington began to arrive with great delay, although the secretaries of Zongli Yamen sometimes delivered it to the addressees as a gesture of goodwill. In particular, the exchange of encrypted information between Secretary of State Hay and employees of diplomatic missions in Beijing was carried out through the "good offices" of the Chinese ambassador to Washington, W. Tingfang. Without receiving systematic instructions from the White House, American missions (missions and consulates) had to make their own decisions with an eye to the constantly changing conjuncture in the country.

On May 21, Conger sent a desperate message to the White House, in which he said the following: "A village 40 miles from Beijing has been burned. 60 indigenous Catholics were killed. Foreigners have not been attacked yet. The Chinese government is alarmed and promises an immediate crackdown. The diplomatic corps demanded immediate effective measures" [48, P.127]. At the same time, a collective note from European ambassadors was sent to the Imperial Palace, in which measures of paramount importance were listed against the Yihetuan movement: it was, firstly, about the arrest of persons provoking riots on the roads and distributing posters with threats against foreigners, and secondly, the arrest of owners of public places where the rebels gathered thirdly, the punishment of officials who condone rioters, and fourthly, the execution of those guilty of murder and arson of foreigners' property.

Konjer, despite the White House's instructions to go his own way and act independently of the European powers, nevertheless signed a joint appeal to the Qing House. When explaining his position, he said: "Foreign governments can no longer sit idly by and watch all these repressions and murders. I can only speak on behalf of my government… It has always been and remains a good friend of China and wishes it nothing but prosperity, but now it is more determined than ever to support the contractual rights of American citizens and newly converted Christians." He noted that "the newspapers of Europe and America are sending out the most alarming telegrams about the state of anarchy that exists here, and that ... the Chinese government is either aiding these bloody robbers, or is too weak to suppress and control them." The envoy threatened that "if the threat from the crowd is not prevented, it will be necessary to request the dispatch of a sufficient number of American infantrymen to ensure the security of the mission." In response, the Chinese authorities asked the diplomat to delay the final decision, promising to restore order in the country in the near future ("Oh, don't do that, there's no need for that") [48, p.128-129]. At the same time, "the Chinese Government appealed to the Envoys with a request to postpone the landing call for three days in order to make sure that the Chinese troops are able to restore calm" in the country [5, l.255].

And indeed, on May 25 and 29, imperial decrees were published, which stated the need to punish the rebel leaders strictly, up to arrest. However, to the general horror of the Europeans, the sent soldiers, instead of restoring order in the capital, began attacking Europeans from the very first days and throwing stones at them. In the vicinity of Beijing, bridges, mechanical workshops and railway stations nearby to the capital were burned, while foreign specialists serving them were besieged in their homes, and Chinese converts from the American Methodist mission were killed. The rebels marked the houses of foreigners with blood, which meant that the house was doomed to burn, and its owner to death. The most terrible news concerned the call of the Yihetuans to go to Beijing without delay [48, p. 133]. In such an alarming stop, on May 26, a regular meeting of the diplomatic corps was hastily convened, at which it was decided to additionally organize armed protection of the missions without delay. The Imperial Court agreed not to put obstacles in this, but limited the number of military personnel in each of them to 30 people.

On May 30, the ambassadors of Great Britain, Russia, France and the United States personally came to Zongli Yamen to discuss the conditions for sending additional guards to the capital. And although negotiations with the Chinese authorities took place in the form of a "friendly request", there were also open threats against the Qing court. In particular, Konjer demanded that the authorities "immediately arrest the murderers, punish them quickly and adequately, and provide the surviving Christians with the same unquestioning protection that will allow them ... to remain in peace and security in their homes." His position completely coincided with the opinion of European diplomats who argued that one should not rely solely on government troops intended to protect missions. According to their general opinion, if "the Chinese government refuses to grant a reasonable request, then the guards will arrive without permission, and no doubt in much larger numbers than currently expected." Saying goodbye to the officials, the diplomats reiterated their determination to "adhere to the decision to send troops here, with or without permission" of the local authorities [48, p.138-139].

Konjer, like the other heads of European missions, once again requested permission from the State Department to send additional reinforcements to China [48, p.131]. On the night of June 1, 15 foreign ships with landing troops arrived at the port of Taku, including "350 British, Russian, French, Japanese, Italian and American guards, who significantly calmed the situation in Beijing" [48, p.132]. The Americans were represented by a detachment of 48 Marines and 3 sailors from the cruiser “USS Newark” under the command of Captain J. Myers. Their arrival was timely, since just a few weeks later the capital was surrounded by rebels who began the mass extermination of missionaries and Chinese converts to Christianity, called "second-rate devils": their bellies were ripped open, their heads were cut off and burned alive. In Beijing, "rumors spread about the murder of a French bishop, the burning of the Mission in Mukden and the poisoning of the Mukden jian-jun" [7, L.49]. On June 4, Conger sent another dispatch to the White House with an opportunity, which was received only on October 24 due to a long failure in the mail. In it, he reported that "contrary to all our expectations, the general situation is becoming more serious every day," since the number of rebels in the capital is constantly growing against the background of support from the army and the Empress Dowager, hostile to foreigners. In his opinion, "the government does not want or cannot (probably both) cope with them" [48, p.140-141].

On June 14, a full-scale siege of the diplomatic corps in Beijing began, where 525 soldiers and officers guarded 900 people. Eyewitnesses reported that rebel artillery was firing at diplomatic missions, so "the Austrian, Italian, Dutch, Belgian Missions, part of the French were destroyed. The Russian, German, American, part of the French, Japanese and English Missions continue to defend themselves...There is a shortage of provisions and combat supplies" [6, L.43, 16]. According to Konjer, "there was hardly an hour during which there was no shooting at any part of our positions and some embassies, varying from a single shot to a continuous attack along the entire line."… The shells rained down so thickly that when the besieged ran out of ammunition, five liters of Chinese bullets were collected in one place in an hour and poured into new ones" [48, p. XII]. The fires that started in the capital destroyed most of its business center, where banks, theaters, restaurants, shopping and souvenir shops were located, while many people died in the fire. The buildings of the American mission were also burned, so all its employees fled to the British embassy. Communication between the US diplomatic institutions located in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenyang and Wuhan was interrupted. According to Konger, the situation in the city is close to anarchy, since "in no reasonable sense can we say that there is still any government in China" [48, p.155].

European countries could not fail to take measures to strengthen their military presence in the northeast of China, where troops were arriving from Europe. On June 16, they presented an ultimatum of surrender signed by representatives of Japan, Great Britain, France, Russia and Germany to the commandant of the fortress of Fort Taku, who was ready to speak on the side of the Ihetuans. The American side declared neutrality due to the lack of authority to conduct military operations against China, but allowed the Monocasi gunboat to be used as a shelter to accommodate civilians. Chinese troops tried to resist, but were defeated by a combined contingent of troops. The loss of a strategically important military facility prompted the local authorities to side with the Yihetuans, abandoning the former neutral position. On June 19, the Grand Council of the Imperial court declared war on foreigners and appointed Prince Tuan, known as the irreconcilable enemy of Europeans, commander-in-chief of all troops. On June 20, Empress Cixi signed a decree declaring war on the European powers. It said that foreigners are getting bolder every year, taking over the wealth of the country and treating the Chinese saints with contempt, so "it is not worth dragging out a miserable existence, condemning themselves to shame in the eyes of posterity. Wouldn't it be better to move the troops into a punitive campaign and decide the fate right away!" [13, p.116]. At the same time, the government severed diplomatic relations with foreign powers and invited their representatives to leave the country urgently, within a day. To intimidate foreigners, the Ikhetuani committed the "St. Bartholomew" massacre on the night of June 23-24, during which about 30 thousand people died, mainly Chinese who converted to Christianity. The rebels attacked the homes of "overseas devils", beat them to death and killed them, pouring Christian blood into the Chinese capital. The culmination of the violence was the murders of the adviser to the Japanese Embassy A. Sugiyama and the German Ambassador K. von Ketteler.

In the current situation, the diplomats, fearing for their safety, refused to leave the inhabited buildings of the missions, barricading themselves in the embassy quarter. The essence of their worries was very clearly expressed by Konjer, stating that "in a civilized country, of course, there would be no question of our security, but here, where there is practically no government, whose army is only a rebellious horde of wild thugs, it is impossible to foresee what they can do" [48, p.145]. Meanwhile, the imperial court, hastening to apologize for the cases of grave insults to foreigners that allegedly took place due to a misunderstanding, asked the US government to convince the Western powers to refrain from continuing hostilities and resolve the misunderstanding through negotiations. In confirmation of their words, the Chinese authorities obliged the governors of all provinces to take responsibility for protecting the lives and property of European citizens [48, p.275]. For his part, Secretary of State Hay informed the command of the expeditionary force about this request of the Chinese authorities, while expressing hope for its possible fulfillment, but refused to communicate with other powers [48, p. 279].

In mid-July, international forces consisting of military units of England, France, Germany, Russia, the USA, Japan, Austria-Hungary and Italy, forming an expeditionary force, launched an offensive against Beijing. The American landing force of 3,420 marines, who arrived on the ships ”Oregon“ and ”Newark", was led by Colonel E. Chaffee, who soon received the rank of Major General for his services. It was to him that the colorful definition of the purpose of the American intervention as "an expedition to help China" belonged. At his suggestion, an informal system of joint command was developed, according to which the heads of national military units acted independently, and gathered together only at so-called "conferences" to make strategically important decisions. Describing the role of the United States in the armed forces of the international alliance, contemporaries noted that the Americans took "the most active part in military operations", trying to create "the impression that the United States plays the leading role in all these events" [8, L.54].

To explain his participation in the suppression of the uprising of the Yihetuan, Secretary of State Hay distributed on July 3, 1900, a second diplomatic note addressed to the European powers, which contained a new interpretation of the principle of "open doors". It stated that "the policy of the United States Government is to find a solution that can provide China with reliable security and peace, preserve its territorial and administrative integrity, protect all rights guaranteed by treaties and international law, and ensure the principle of equality and impartiality in trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire to the world." Among the intentions of the White House, which undertakes to act in concert with other European powers, mentioned the restoration of telegraphic communication channels with diplomatic missions, assistance in protecting the lives and property of Americans, as well as "assistance in preventing the spread of unrest in other provinces of the Empire and the recurrence of similar disasters" [48, p. 300].

The Secretary of State's call to preserve the sovereignty of the country, whose territory had long before been divided between European powers, objectively questioned the legitimacy of foreign spheres of influence and at the same time created the ground for the activation of further US-Chinese contacts. The program of action proposed by the White House did not oblige Americans to protect the country's territory from other colonial powers, but suggested that interested parties only adhere to the principle of equal and impartial trade in all parts of the Chinese Empire. And although none of the great powers gave an affirmative answer to the new initiative of the State Department, Hay soon announced that he had received the agreement in principle of all interested parties. The doctrine of "open doors" became a powerful political tool of the ruling elite of the United States in the fight against European rivals in the East Asian region.

Analyzing the proposal of the American side, Russian diplomats noted with irony that "in negotiations with the Chinese Government, every note of the Washington Government takes the form of a formidable ultimatum. In political pictures, "Uncle Sam" is depicted of gigantic stature with a naked saber in his hand, and midget allies are sheltered on the tail of his tailcoat, or "Uncle Sam" protects the integrity and inviolability of China from greedy and greedy allies" [8, L.52]. Thus, the fact was emphasized that the White House's non-binding diplomatic note could not prevent any power from claiming this or that part of China's territory in the future. In any case, the request of the Imperial House sent to Washington on July 16 "regarding the possibility of obtaining guarantees of China's territorial integrity from the treaty powers" remained unanswered [48, p. 279].

In mid-July, due to the approach of an international contingent of troops to the capital, the embassy quarter was subjected to a number of armed attacks by the rebels.On July 16, Conger sent a despairing telegram to the White House, in which there were only two phrases: "In the British mission we are under continuous shelling by Chinese troops. Immediate assistance is necessary to prevent mass slaughter" [48, p.156]. His heartbreaking appeals reflected the real state of affairs, since due to the destruction of telegraph lines, the White House's communication with diplomatic institutions went only through the head of the Consulate General in Shanghai, J. Goodnow. At the same time, the main developer of the open door doctrine, W. Rockhill, was sent to help American diplomats, who was required to "inform the State Department about all known issues concerning the general state of affairs in China and especially about all points affecting the interests of the United States in any way" [48, p.57]. However, in the conditions of the siege of the embassy quarter, he could do little.

Meanwhile, a multinational military coalition of more than 55 thousand people, in which a detachment of Americans amounted to 3125 people, was fighting its way to Beijing. There were disagreements among his leadership about the overall strategy of action: some countries (Britain and Germany) advocated storming the capital, while others, led by Russia, were inclined to diplomatic negotiations. In such a situation, the Qing court, fearing a complete defeat, turned to President McKinley for help on July 19. A secret message sent to him said that "to overcome the current difficulties, China attaches special importance to the United States" and hopes that the White House "will take the initiative in ensuring the consent of the powers in restoring order and peace" in the country [48, p.294]. In a reply letter dated July 23, McKinley stated that the intentions of the United States Government in favor of the territorial and administrative integrity of China, stated earlier with sufficient clarity, have not changed at all, since "the people of the United States do not want China anything but what is just and just," and the purpose of sending troops to Beijing was elementary protection Americans who were in the country. As for further bilateral cooperation, from the President's point of view, it is possible only after the restoration of full-fledged work of diplomatic missions and the elimination of danger to the lives of their employees [48, p.295].

A week later, Secretary of State Hei, fulfilling the president's instructions, again called on the imperial court to strengthen the protection of diplomatic missions, placing responsibility for their security on the Chinese authorities. According to him, "the government will not enter into any agreements ... without prior free communication with Ambassador Conger" [48, p.260]. A reply telegram received a few days later from Zongli yamen somewhat calmed the hotheads in Washington. It said: "All foreign ambassadors in Beijing are safe and well. Recently, vegetables, fruits and provisions have been delivered to them repeatedly. The relations are the most friendly" [48, p.282-283]. The favor of the Qing court, within which the struggle of various factions escalated, was explained by the lack of understanding among the ruling circles of what they want ? to fight with foreigners or end the matter in peace. Hence, militant decrees were replaced by resolutions on enhanced protection of missions, and shelling – gifts. The increased attention to the needs of American diplomats was based on another reason ? they were planned to be made the main mediator in negotiations with representatives of the diplomatic corps. And indeed, at the beginning of August, a number of influential Chinese dignitaries turned to J. Goodnow, who was the consul General in Shanghai, with a request to stop the movement of allied troops in the direction of the capital [48, p.285]. The diplomat forwarded their request to the head of the American expeditionary force, Chaffee, who stated that the White House could agree to such mediation only after fulfilling all the requirements set out in the President's July message [48, p.285].

Meanwhile, in early August, the situation in the capital took on a critical character: more than 230 foreigners and thousands of Chinese converts to Christianity were killed, while the number of human losses in the American mission amounted to 60 people killed and 120 wounded. According to Konjer, the diplomats were on the verge of starvation: "half a portion of horse meat has already been eaten, and there is only enough food for two weeks" [48, p.159]. As before, there was no telegraphic communication with the outside world, so the only possible option of leaving Beijing for Taku was thought of under the cover of armed guards. It was about a convoy escorting a large group of people ? about "8000 Europeans, including 50 wounded, 200 women and children and more than 500 Christians who will be killed if they stay here" [6, l.144].

On August 3, the multinational military coalition came close to the Chinese capital. The Qing court unsuccessfully tried to organize street battles, but finding himself in a hopeless situation, he was forced to initiate negotiations with his opponents. Li Hongzhang, known for his reformist views, was appointed chief negotiator with the European powers, who had to find mutually acceptable peace terms. Having met with Consul Goodnow, he directly told him that now "America has an opportunity to demonstrate its friendship," and if he receives a refusal, he "will have nothing to say" to the Europeans. The dignitary reduced the essence of the negotiations to getting an answer to only one question: "If free telegraphic communication is restored between the ambassadors and their governments, will the Americans be able to get the allies not to attack Beijing while waiting for negotiations?". In response, the American diplomat stated that the Chinese government, "threatening the lives of a large number of Americans, has taken a very unfriendly position and can hardly expect the same friendly attitude from America" [48, p.263]. He once again confirmed the official position of the White House, which consisted in the need to restore severed ties with diplomatic missions and obtain guarantees for the safety of their employees and family members [48, p.261].

On August 5, the imperial decree on freedom of diplomatic relations was published, but it no longer played a special role, since the combined contingent of eight allied countries entered Beijing a week later, lifting the siege of the embassy quarter, which lasted 56 days. And although the Ikhetuani left the capital before the assault began, the "civilized" allies engaged in looting the city. The Americans were given the southwestern district, in which Chaffee officially banned robberies and murders. However, according to eyewitnesses, the capital was given over to looters. Thousands of innocent citizens were ruined and killed, while diplomats did not have time to fill railway cars with "trinkets" (furs, silks, precious vases, silver ingots and other artifacts), and marines were engaged in robbery [40]. At the same time, the Americans continued to assure the imperial court that "the policy of the United States is to find a solution capable of ensuring permanent peace and security in China, as well as preserving its territorial and administrative unit" [48, p.265]. The inconsistency of the US government's position was expressed in the fact that, on the one hand, it rejected all proposals for a long occupation of Chinese territory and advocated the withdrawal of foreign troops from Beijing immediately after the final defeat of the uprising, and on the other, it sought from the local authorities to sign a peace treaty on extremely strict conditions.

In general, participation in the armed "alliance of eight nations" had serious consequences for the United States, since the Chinese lost faith in the good intentions of the Americans, who failed to dissociate themselves from the European powers eager to divide China among themselves. Their discontent intensified after Washington approved the final protocol of 1901, which demanded huge monetary compensation of 450 million taels of silver from the ruined country, the deployment of foreign troops in the capital and the rejection of economic autonomy.And although in the future the White House continued to advocate for the most-favored-nation regime in trade, the Qing court was not so accommodating. Attempts by American business to "unlock" the doors of Manchuria, having staked out the principle of open doors in the construction of railways and banking investment projects failed [22, 11]. Bilateral relations were not improved by the broad gesture of the White House to return the indemnity received from the Chinese, provided it was used to establish a Western-style university in Beijing. A serious blow to the ruling circles of the United States was the signing of the Anglo-German agreement on October 16, 1900 on the basis of the open door principle, which refuted the slogan of a united front of the Anglo-Saxon countries. And although its participants stated that their main goal was to jointly counteract the spread of Russian influence in Manchuria, the Americans felt deprived of sharing the Chinese "pie".

We can agree with the opinion of modern American historians who believed that if the United States had not intervened in the uprising of the Yihetuan by using military force, the history of bilateral relations could have gone a different, more favorable way [46, p.7-9]. But there is no subjunctive mood in history, so the United States, as a result of a short-sighted policy, took an appropriate place among the colonial powers. And although the foreign policy ideologeme initially failed to achieve its goals, the authors did not consider it untenable due to a number of specific factors associated with the uprising of the Yihetuan. In the future, Washington continued to follow its course around the world, creating an arsenal of new political and economic methods, formalized as a generally accepted international principle in the treaty of the nine Powers of the Washington Conference of 1922.

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Peer Review

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The events of recent years have led not only specialists - political scientists, sociologists, economists, historians - but also ordinary observers to the question of the formation of a modern system of international relations. Indeed, the monopoly of the United States of America on global power is being destroyed before our eyes, which will inevitably lead to the building of a world based on mutual trust. In this regard, it is important to study the historical experience of the formation of Washington's foreign policy doctrine. These circumstances determine the relevance of the article submitted for review, the subject of which is the Chinese factor of the US foreign policy strategy at the turn of the XIX - XX centuries. The author aims to analyze U.S. policy in the East Asian region, identify the interests of Western coalitions in China, and determine the role of the Chinese factor in the further evolution of American foreign policy. The work is based on the principles of analysis and synthesis, reliability, historicism, the methodological basis of the research is a systematic approach, which is based on the consideration of the object as an integral complex of interrelated elements. The scientific novelty of the article lies in the very formulation of the topic: the author seeks to characterize the process of formation of the political part of the doctrine of the "open doors" of the United States, which was previously underestimated by Soviet scientists, as well as almost untouched by modern researchers. The scientific novelty of the article is also determined by the involvement of archival materials. Considering the bibliographic list of the article as a positive point, its scale and versatility should be noted: in total, the list of references includes over 50 different sources and studies. The undoubted advantage of the reviewed article is the involvement of foreign English-language materials, which is determined by the very formulation of the topic. From the sources attracted by the author, we note documents from the funds of the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire, as well as published documents on the uprising of the Yihetuan. From the research used, we point to the works of A.M. Kozlov, A.S. Pushkarev, N. V. Fedorov, A.A. Fursenko and other authors, whose focus is on various aspects of China's foreign policy in the late XIX - early XX centuries. Note that the bibliography is important both from a scientific and educational point of view: after after reading the text of the article, readers can refer to other materials on its topic. In general, in our opinion, the integrated use of various sources and research contributed to the solution of the tasks facing the author. The style of writing the article can be attributed to a scientific one, at the same time understandable not only to specialists, but also to a wide readership, to anyone interested in both the history of American foreign policy in general and the Chinese factor in particular. The appeal to the opponents is presented at the level of the collected information received by the author during the work on the topic of the article. The structure of the work is characterized by a certain logic and consistency, it can be distinguished by an introduction, the main part, and conclusion. At the beginning, the author defines the relevance of the topic, shows that "Awareness of the immediate need for expansion increased in American society after the economic crisis of 1893-1897, when the possibilities of internal colonization of Western lands were completely exhausted, and the development of international trade in order to export commodity surpluses abroad was complicated by acute competition with European countries for commodity markets." The author analyzes in detail the differences between American diplomacy in China and European diplomacy, identifies the role of England in attracting the United States to China, and also examines Washington's position on the nationalist movement of the Chinese. It is noteworthy that, as noted in the peer-reviewed article, "participation in the armed alliance of eight nations had serious consequences for the United States, since the Chinese lost faith in the good intentions of the Americans, who failed to dissociate themselves from the European powers eager to divide China among themselves." The main conclusion of the article is that the United States, as a result of its short-sighted foreign policy, received the status of a "colonial power" in the eyes of China. The article submitted for review is devoted to an urgent topic, will arouse readers' interest, and its materials can be used both in lecture courses on modern and modern history, and in various special courses. In general, in our opinion, the article can be recommended for publication.