I. Kant: How is aesthetic possible?

Kormin Nikolai Aleksandrovich Doctor of Philosophy Leading Scientific Associate, Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences 109240, Moscow, Goncharnaya str. 12, p. 1, room 507 n.kormin@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction.

At one time Immanuel Kant, considering the structure of the transcendental method, asked questions: how is cognition possible, what are its limits, are we able to cognize objects a priori? He found their solution not only on the path of scientific understanding of knowledge itself (and the metaphysics of science is conceived by him as something that is actually philosophical in philosophy), which is laid in relation to the essential and unconditioned goals of the human mind that determine all sides of the cultural horizon, but also through the introduction of the concept of metaphysical anthropology into epistemology. Indeed, only a person carries out cognition, and since "every person has metaphysics in himself, although usually in a rather vague form" ^{[19, p. 51]}, it is impossible to expand epistemology outside of this metaphysical in us, outside the dimension of not only transcendental anthropology ("a nthropologia transcendentalis", which can be represented as self-consciousness reason and reason ^{[10, S. 395]}), but also pure aesthetics, developed in the "Critique of the faculty of Judgment". In general, the aesthetics of cognition is the elegance and drama of problem solving, and not what is sometimes called the luxury of half–knowledge. Some Kantian intuitions express the coincidence of epistemology, morality and the sphere of art – each of them is a manifestation of an indivisible spiritual feeling and equivalent. Revealing the meaning of the critical study of the faculty of judgment, it is important to understand what, in fact, is drawn in it regarding the Kantian problem as a whole. The following range of questions corresponds to this study: "Is empirical experience possible according to the transcendental law? Is there something necessary in our very sensuality, in empirical synthesis (and not only in reason and reason), that gives it a moment of necessity? Does not the pleasure of the forms of things mean the expediency of the subject in relation to things (and not just things – to judgment)? That is, just "for what?", "what's the point?". To the "tested" or "untested"" ^{[28, p. 1032]}. All these questions can be concretized for consideration in the theory of art, if we consider it from the point of view of what for Kant was something inscribed by the mind according to its own plan. For example, the conditions of a work of art – this apparent conceivability– are congruent with the a priori feasibility of feelings. But then how to pave the matrix path for the work itself, after passing through which the world turns out to be Aeschylus or Shakespearean? Therefore, the contour of the world itself is drawn aesthetically, but such a drawing is not carried out inside the world.

All these problems are connected with the study of the origin of the fundamental acts of reason, which also contains the rubrics of aesthetic thinking. After all, "the ideas of speculative, aesthetic and morally //practical reason in one system (ens summum, etc.)" ^{[17, p. 563]} constitute the content of transcendental philosophy, in which the mind indulges in a purely aesthetic occupation – it draws for itself the structure of the whole. The metaphysical design of these headings creates a disciplinary basis for understanding why, for example, "theology leads to aesthetics" ^{[17, p. 295]} in a transcendental sense – and outside of this semantic construction it is impossible to understand how truth and beauty relate, how an artist thinks of a work or how what a philosopher calls divine art is possible. In all this disciplinary framework, the metaphysical sound of aesthetic thought is felt. And "although nothing looks less attractive than metaphysics, but after all, the jewelry sparkling on the beauty lay at first in gloomy crypts or at least passed only through a poorly lit artisan's workshop" ^{[17, p. 77]}. Despite the fact that the aesthetic is inaccessible to direct observation on the metaphysical surface, however, it forms an expressive subtext to the metaphysical text, is imperceptibly worked out under this surface in a kind of universal non-perceptible workshop of discriminative consciousness, in which they are trained in the art of "making the world" (Kant). It is in this sense that it is permissible to assert that Kant's aesthetics itself is revealed by aesthetic analogies of metaphysical experience. After all, "the aesthetic is laid down in Kant at the very beginning, in the very core of the definition of form. It can even be shown that the so–called concepts of space, time, and other concepts are not concepts, but ideas of the mind, similar to aesthetic ideas. I mean that the very formulation of the definition of space as an idea in one place and the definition of aesthetic ideas in another place of the Kantian text are crystallizations and expressions of the same beating thought" ^{[24, pp. 127-128]}, which arises from the experience of the idea itself.

If we ignore Kant's early works, then metaphysical approaches to solving the question of the possibility of aesthetics can begin with a critical analysis of pure reason, independent of sensuality. It already contains the foundations of aesthetic theory, which is woven into a concise outline of the entire metaphysical system. Therefore, it is so important to understand how the system of Kantian metaphysics itself is configured. It would seem that what is the point of talking about metaphysics in this context, if the transcendental doctrine of principles recognizes the empirical rather than a priori character of aesthetic criteria. Even if we introduce aesthetics into the circle of speculative philosophy, the term denoting this discipline can be interpreted both transcendentally (or as a new transcendental aesthetics justified by Husserl) and psychologically. However, this is still a convention that manifests itself in a disjunctive judgment expressed in one fragment from Kant's transcendental doctrine of principles. Therefore, what, in fact, the term aesthetics implies remains unclear. It turns out that the topic of aesthetics in the "Critique of Pure Reason" can be closed on this. But let's not jump to conclusions. Since ancient times, aesthetics has been correlated with the reflexive awareness of the picture of the creative process, which Kant inscribes into the structures of both theoretical and practical consciousness. After all, "creativity (the beginning) stems from freedom" ^{[11, S. 431]} – this fundamental structure of theoretical and practical reason, but the problem here is that when creating something, we are always already beyond the beginning. And the practical application of the mind itself occurs only when it enters the path of freedom. Art also follows the same path, constantly encountering the complexities of metaphysical consciousness. This also applies to contemporary art, which is often characterized as the art of flow. In him, "the spasm of constraint with the idea of producing a masterpiece, some kind of unit containing everything perfect, containing everything in general, has disappeared. People are trying more to organize the flow in which something happens, and, moreover, even the very idea of world-building, world-building, absolute ideal, or a carrier of the spirit, an intellectual, has disappeared. This can be seen in art. The explanation of this fact itself is the explanation of metaphysical consciousness as consciousness in its actual form" ^{[25, p. 528]}. For aesthetics, it is important to clarify here what is the intention of this flow. The science of beauty itself as a practice of working, first of all, with the meanings of art, as a discipline focused on the free creation of meaning, arose simultaneously with metaphysics in antiquity. And it represented, in fact, the concept of creativity as a whole. That is why it is so important to find out whether there is something in Kant's transcendentalism that can be considered as a metaphysics of creativity.

The development of aesthetic discipline is connected with the identification of conditions for the possibility of the "miracle of beauty" (Pushkin), which has already happened, and further, into the depth of this amazing phenomenon, thought is unable to penetrate, cannot decompose it, when faced with the space of inexplicable ideas. It is possible to describe some inherent properties of the beautiful (to build its analytics), expressing, for example, the relation of its proximity to what is presented without concepts, and so on, but these are nothing more than specifications of beautiful phenomena (however, these specifications do not answer the Platonic question - what is beautiful in itself; in fact the beautiful remains indefinable), beyond which we cannot go in our quest to comprehend the mystery of beauty. It is equally important to consider how to understand the category of beauty under the sign of the aesthetic intention of cogito (in the materials for the Critique of Pure Reason, it is even said about its cognition: "for cognition of something as beautiful, etc., a special ability is needed in us, and not in the subject" ^{[17, p. 151]}). In the aesthetic works created under the same sign, we can feel the pathos of the theory of art, which allows us to get closer to how an artist can extract an experience that cannot be introduced by assumption, but it is necessary to establish the event of such extraction every time (that is, the very obvious fact that there is someone whom we can call an artist with his consciousness of his own rightness and one can only be born an artist, and only then assert that a miracle of art has happened, to begin the work of the soul and consciousness, which, as Marcel Proust wrote in "Found Time", "art will remake anew, this is a movement in the opposite direction, this is a return to the depths, where everything that existed in the past reality, it remains unknown to us, and now it must be rediscovered"). We are talking about the necessary semantic prerequisites of aesthetic creation and perception (as Paul Valery said, "we live in what we see, but we only see what we think about"), flashing the reflection of the invisible on the visible, they happen when the subject anticipates the state of creativity, when he is endowed with the talent of the way of thinking. Starting from these premises as from some further unanalyzed points from which the aesthetic world with its works comes into motion – a kind of transparent substances of beauty, these aesthetic aspects of the thing in itself – the artist connects incommensurable worlds in a work of art, reproducing, according to Valerie, the relations that define his work in the same way as several axioms make up the whole "geometry". Here the talent itself appears in the image of a charioteer of a soul full of feelings, that is, "a charioteer who keeps passions in check: he does not coddle them, but does not allow them to harden" ^{[17, p. 578]}. The soul method reveals the transcendental prerequisites of how we can contemplate the world and ourselves at all, see something in it: and "we do not see anything except what we can do ourselves. We must, however, first make ourselves" ^{[17, p. 432]}.  But how is this possible? And when creating ourselves or our work, are we dealing with some kind of beginning or semantic basis? Maybe the aesthetic is groundless at all? Answering these questions philosophically, it is impossible not to recognize that the aesthetic, if we have a meaningful conversation about it, exists in a kind of universal space, which is set by the transcendental as the "last foundation", glowing with meaning. Therefore, we cannot escape from the transcendental a priori aesthetic meaning.

In his comments on the materials for the Critique of Pure Reason, V. V. Vasiliev suggests that Kant's transcendental anthropology "is built from the sum of the main theses of his three "Critics", considered from the point of view of the ultimate goal of human existence" ^{[17, p. 616]}. But since the critical analysis of the faculty of judgment is the final consonance of all Kantian metaphysics, then aesthetics itself can be thought of as one of the ways to substantiate transcendental anthropology. The philosophy of beauty will also be structured in the process of metaphysical substantiation of the theory of cognition and morality, assessment of the mood on the basis of which it is necessary to perform actions, to identify the methodological culture of science. In the very basis of our reasoning about them, one way or another, we must put the concept of the (aesthetic) ability of judgment, without which it is impossible to build a system of philosophy, although this ability is unknown to us in its basis. Unlike other philosophical disciplines, aesthetics has to build a whole drama of its foundations, the art of which seeks to reveal the meaning of the boundary between the invention of foundations and the realism of foundations. Here, "grounds are needed for something for which there are no grounds "by nature"" ^{[27, p. 245]}. After all, all the cognitive, aesthetic abilities and moral forces of the soul, all the studies of nature and man teach us that "the inscrutable wisdom, thanks to which we exist, is just as worthy of reverence in what it denied us, as in what it gave us (was sie uns zu Teil werden lie?)" ^{[22, p. 693]}. That is why it is so difficult to correlate a moralizing and a non-moralizing view of art. It can be said that the foundations themselves in their aesthetic part are both inscrutable and endless.

So, we will try to supplement the Kantian question of how cognition is possible with another question: how is aesthetic possible? At the same time, we will focus on the analysis of those Kantian answers to this question that are given not in the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, but primarily in the Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of Practical Reason, and in other works of Kant on moral philosophy. The question itself is: "How is aesthetic possible?" it can be reformulated as a question about the foundations of the aesthetic, about the foundations of aesthetic science, dressing it up and decorating it, as Descartes would say, so that it could be more acceptable to the human mind. At the same time, aesthetics itself can be thought of as one of the ways to substantiate transcendental anthropology. But this question turns us first of all to the structures of metaphysical thinking. Here it is important to understand by what metaphysical reasons the aesthetic becomes suitable for an indirect description of the connection between the domain of the concept of nature and the domain of the concept of freedom, why in aesthetic research, as it is thought by Kant, theory is replaced by criticism.

Metaphysical experience as the basis of aesthetics.

But let's return to the question posed at the beginning of the article about how cognition is possible, it refers us to a system of philosophical ideas and principles through which the ideas about the epistemological landscape created in the Critique of Pure Reason are substantiated. But in the field of practical philosophy, the research field is changing under the influence primarily of the "Critique of Practical Reason", and such a change in the form of justification definitely implies a new philosophical interpretation, although the metaphysical vision of the structures of justification of this field does not change. After all, "metaphysical experience underlies all thought and understanding (as in the basis of aesthetics, ethics, psychology, etc.)" ^{[27, p. 928]}. But how can we find the foundations for the fundamental aesthetic categories – the beautiful, the sublime, the comic, the tragic, the heroic? Philosophical interpretation concerns primarily the concepts of a priori synthesis, purpose (substantiation of aesthetic judgment through the form of expediency of the object), pleasure (substantiation of aesthetic judgment through the consciousness of causality not with respect to the object of representation, but for the sake of creating the state of mind of the subject in which this representation arises) and art. We are talking about what is generated on some coordinated and concentrated grounds, the source of which is the artist himself, although his very creativity, the act of extracting from an infinite number of possibilities are not based on anything: true, he first turns his creativity into an object (a work of art), and then resurrects this creativity in the format of the foundation both are different from a transcendental point of view. Indeed, what is the point of citing the foundations of Pushkin's poetry? His poetry has no other foundation than the poet himself.

In contrast to the goal that characterizes the subject of a concept that is possible as the cause of this subject, pleasure as an empirical phenomenon has a different orientation. "The consciousness of the causality of a certain representation in relation to the state of the subject, [aimed at] preserving this state in him, can here generally denote what is called pleasure" ^{[18, p. 193]}. Its basis is precisely the goal, which contains interest as the basis for judging the object of favor. In both cases, we encounter the contours of a goal that has different semantic equivalents. When we identify the foundations of the causality of an object, a mental state or a moral act, possible according to goals, we find out the laws of what should happen in the field of morality, we note that interest always affects the very ability of desire dictated by human nature: we have an interest in the existence of an object associated with pleasure, as a result our judgment can become biased. But in the field of aesthetics, the problem of the goal implying interest is completely rethought. When making an aesthetic judgment, we are always free from any interest, and we cannot rely on the idea of an objective or subjective goal. We do not care at all whether the object depicted in art actually exists. The main thing is that this image evokes pleasure, which must necessarily precede the law, so that it correlates with the admiration of the inner principle in man, with the sublimity of his self-creation, with the transcendental manifestation of this principle, with the "transcendence of man to the human in him" (MK Mamardashvili). And here it is important to understand how aesthetic pleasure correlates in Kant's philosophy with an aesthetic idea, which makes it possible to generate many similar thoughts and ideas. In modern aesthetic concepts, traces of pleasure appear as accompanying various affective states. For example, in the so-called literary aesthetics, which reveals what lies at the heart of our admiration, it is emphasized that it, as "going hand in hand with our pleasure, is not unjustified, it seeks to agree judgments without resorting to any dogmatics" ^{[23, p. 10]}. But Kant's understanding of pleasure has a different orientation, its concept will be born in a polemic with an approach that reveals it in the field of sensuality, and such an understanding, as we will see, is much more important for aesthetics than just the parallelism of pleasure and the feeling of admiration.

On the basis of what is an aesthetic act performed? Maybe it is some kind of natural, accidental, spontaneous or arbitrary foundation, but then the region of aesthetic naturalism will be built on it. But if we go beyond this region, it becomes clear that some kind of equivalent should be found for it, and it will be some kind of independent foundation given to us a priori, connected with the foundations of humanity, with the structure of some primordial action, and, therefore, a metaphysical foundation. Or let's take another aspect of this question - isn't the aesthetic realized independently of the whole series of previous grounds, maybe it is conceivable as something that arose on other, different grounds from it? Or does it have its own producing basis that ensures the unity of the aesthetically produced by consciousness? In practical philosophy, which is in the most complicated relations with the philosophy of art, there is no need for ultimate justification: here "we do not need to undertake research on the reasons why something is liked or disliked, how the pleasure of a simple sensation differs from taste and whether the latter differs from the general benevolence of reason, on which the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is based" ^{[22, pp. 161, 163]}, because all this research field belongs to the field of empirical psychology. But we cannot fail to identify the already determining basis of the will, the motivating principle or objective basis of self-determination of which is the goal. As Kant emphasizes, the basis of the very principle of will is the following postulate: "rational nature exists as an end in itself. This is how a person necessarily imagines his own being; in so far as this position, therefore, is a subjective principle of human actions" ^{[22, p. 169]}, to which Kant's aesthetics will approach. The famous Kantian practical imperative is built on this supreme foundation. But how to fulfill it? It is here that Kant introduces the aesthetic principles of harmony and perfection, agreement between action and what humanity is in our person as a goal in itself. "In humanity, after all, there are makings for greater perfection, which is included in the goal of nature with respect to humanity, represented in our subject" ^{[22, p. 173]}, art just guides us to the idea of such humanity. And it is clear why these aesthetic principles of harmony and perfection, even aesthetic perfection, consisting in the agreement of cognition with the subject, will be supplemented by another one - the general principle of art, the interpretation of the metaphysical comparison of art and nature, nature and freedom. We are talking not only about the symbolic representation of the relationship between art and nature, but also about a real figure, the personification of this connection in the image of a genius. As the modern researcher L. Ostarik notes, "the creation of genius consists of a special unity of free human activity and nature, according to which "nature" means not just another aspect of creative subjectivity, but something that goes beyond it. This interpretation of the creative process of genius sheds new light on the special normative status of the rule of genius, that is, on its originality and exemplary character" ^{[22, p. 75]}. In the critical period, the metaphysical comparison of art and nature is first made in the "Fundamentals of the Metaphysics of Morals". In accordance with the guidelines of this work, humanity and morality are united by the fact that they have an intrinsic value, but it is impossible to find an equivalent for such non-natural properties that are expressed by market or affective price, dignity; neither in nature nor in art is there anything equivalent to them.

If we understand aesthetics as a system of general principles of art, then the question arises: is there a shift in the orbit of justification in a different direction from that set in ethics? After all, we are not dealing with the real basis of the possibility of the aesthetic. As noted by K. Jaspers, who pointed out the unreliability of the correct logical summation of concepts in this area, in Kant's judgment of taste, all justification ceases, and the feeling of pleasure itself is the only predicate of judgment. A new conceptual structure of aesthetics is centered around this predicate. Indeed, a new kind of pleasure appears here, not defined by any concept, for which some additional grounds are found. The profile of the direction of aesthetic pleasure itself is changing, the empirical tortuosity and saturation of the pleasure directly experienced, to the structures of which some random, arbitrary human bases are attached. It is determined by the harmony of our cognitive forces, although the judgment of taste in the analysis of beauty is characterized as something that has nothing to do with the judgment of cognition, but is kept within the subjective conditions of cognition. "It is not a logical, but an aesthetic judgment, by which is meant the judgment that determines the basis can only be subjective" ^{[18, p. 151]}. And a purely subjective aesthetic evaluation of the subject precedes and justifies the feeling of pleasure itself, its universal significance.  The object is beautiful for us only because we are aware of what we are doing with the object representation in ourselves. If the connection of representations can have an objective character at all, then in an aesthetic statement we do not fix anything in the object, but only perceive what impression the representation of the perceived makes on us, and the aesthetic judgment itself can be empirical (Kant calls it a judgment of feeling, a material aesthetic judgment) or pure (formal). Kant's judgments here are not just formalism, the author of such formalism is, rather, someone who, according to P. Valeri's characterization, is close to the philosopher as an artist of form. In aesthetics, the very structure of justification is changing, since a new a priori principle is being sought, which the ability of judgment puts at the forefront of reflexive consideration of an object (whether it is an object of nature or a work of art), revealing the correspondence between the form of the object or the mode of its representation and our cognitive ability. And in modern philosophy, for example, in J. This principle of a prioriism is emphasized: aesthetics itself in the Kantian sense, revised by Foucault, is understood as a system of a priori forms that determine what appears before sensory experience, here aesthetics is "a division of times and spaces, visible and invisible, speech and noise" ^{[24, p. 12-13]}. For Kant, the interpretation of the judgment of taste in relation to goals is of fundamental importance, neither attractive nor touching can affect its nature, although it is possible that both may correspond with a favor for the beautiful. The judgment of taste cannot be based on either a subjective or an objective goal: "only the form of expediency in the representation by which an object is given to us can, since we are aware of it, awaken benevolence, which we consider without [through] the concept as having universal communicability, therefore, can form the determining basis of the judgment of taste" ^{[18, p. 197]}.  Subjective expediency can, without any connection with the concept, with the representation of the goal, only generate aesthetic pleasure, but such generation does not mean that pleasure is caused by something external, it is the cause of itself; it is pleasure that we experience, seeing only the form of expediency in the represented object. Therefore, aesthetic pleasure is fundamentally different from both cognitive and ethical pleasure and satisfaction, since it endlessly renews its foundation. Another question concerns expediency, conceivable in a situation where the reason is attributed to the basis of the possibility of an object, which is why the mind itself is in a difficult position. However, even here Kant connects the way out of this situation with aesthetic attitudes. After all, "the concept of things as goals puts reason as a cause in such a relationship with these things, in which we do not recognize it by any experience as the basis of their possibility. Indeed, it is only in works of art that we can realize the causality of reason in relation to objects, which are therefore called expedient or called goals" [ibid., p. 915].

Consequently, the aesthetic perceives and transforms impulses emanating from different areas of philosophical knowledge. Kant's metaphysics sheds light on the forms in which the foundations of the aesthetic are more and more clearly asserting themselves. The search for these grounds presupposes a philosophical interpretation not only of the pluralistic art, but also of the concepts of a priori synthesis, purpose, deep structures of consciousness (affective states of joy and pleasure, various perceptual hypotheses). We are talking about what is generated on some coordinated and concentrated grounds, the source of which is the artist himself, developing a gift received from above. Proceeding from Kant's analysis of concepts, it can be said that the condition for the objectivity of the experience of art is the transcendental unity of apperception accompanying the flow of artistic experience itself. But what exactly is the beginning that triggers the process of substantiating the aesthetic? One can, of course, say that "a baseless beginning gives everything a foundation" (V. P. Vizgin). But if, after all, we do not turn aestheticians, as follows from the logic of the author's judgment, into priests of this principle, explaining the sacred procedure of justification, and leave the region of aesthetic naturalism, then it should be recognized that some equivalent can be found for an aesthetic act, which will be the basis given to us a priori and independent of artistic experience. connected with the perfect foundations of humanity, that is, the foundation is metaphysical.

The aesthetic side of the problem of justification.

The significance of this judgment and the approach behind it is difficult to overestimate. After all, it is impossible to separate the aesthetic reflexive ability of judgment from cognition or morality, it is a special place where reason, reason and sensuality come into contact, and at the same time some kind of barrier that cannot be analyzed, preventing the communication of these abilities. In fact, this place, as if specially designed to bring particular cases under non-existent, still only being sought, laws, it is a kind of connecting knot in which other abilities are tied in different ways. "In parallel with the description of the phenomena of knowledge, moral actions, aesthetic phenomena, Kant deals with the problem of what I will call the space of fulfillment and realization. Wherever he has to resort to the term "faculty of judgment", to point out that ideal formations cannot be the basis of deduction, Kant means a simple thing... There is the content of thought, and there is a state that has happened in which this content is fulfilled and realized as thought" ^{[24, p. 198]}. And it is the vision of this distinction that is equivalent to what we are able to judge, moving towards building a new foundation for our theory. At the same time, the faculty of judgment is also involved in the basis of freedom – the supersensible, although this very basis is incomprehensible. The search for such a correspondence with the aesthetic ability of judgment is conducted on the basis of taste, which determines the consistency of the object (its form) with the cognitive potential, since it unravels everything and carries out already on the basis of feeling. It is equally important to identify the difference in the interpretation of necessity itself in the case of ethical and aesthetic judgment: if the former stands under the sign of a categorical imperative, then the necessity of the latter is a kind of approximate, always conditioned necessity, not deducible from concepts and not deducible from experience, assuming a common feeling and agreement of all with this judgment.

Following the attitude of Jaspers regarding the judgment of taste, in the case of which all justification ceases, it is difficult to assume that in the "Critique of Practical Reason" and "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment" the question of grounds is raised at all. And yet, despite this attitude, it is impossible not to recognize that in aesthetics the question of the foundations rests on the problem of a priori representations, from which a new form of creativity arises, when the creation of the connection of the representation is not with the subject, but with the subject. In addition, these a priori representations predetermine such a state of subjectivity as the highest pleasure - it is purely contemplative and does not arouse interest in the object of pleasure. The substantiation of the principle of this pleasure, produced in the subjective field of the conditions of the reflecting judgment, is nevertheless given, as we will see, in the field of the general condition. But by creating a panorama of the world, aesthetics not only tried to distinguish it from a kind of hedonism, from everyday aesthetic ideas, but also to build bridges between these structures. We are talking about a holistic review of the entire historical canvas of reality, about the relation of what was created by man himself in the world, which he constantly changed for himself by the acts of creativity, to how he should aesthetically act. How should he establish connections of aesthetic mentality, analyze various aesthetic objectifications of atropos, perceive the world depicted in art, judge its value, semantic contours and possible horizons. The constructive solution of aesthetic problems itself requires the interaction of the philosophy of beauty with anthropology and the history of art, which indicates the need for a syntagmatic aesthetic search, which must be carried out based on an understanding of the relationship between sensuality, imagination – this transubstantiation of "pure" sensuality, reason and reason. These relationships result in a "free play" of cognitive forces. Describing such an element of this relationship as imagination, this common root of the universal and singular, Jacques Derrida interprets its understanding in Kant's philosophy as follows: imagination "in Kant's opinion was already an art in itself, an art that initially does not distinguish between the true and the beautiful: after all, we are told about the same imagination, despite all the differences, "Criticism of pure reason" and "Criticism of the faculty of judgment" ... Imagination is a freedom that shows itself only in its works" ^{[12, p. 14-15]}. But the idea of freedom itself is not limited to this, because through it a person gives himself the law of action.

In this sense, the aesthetic sense involved in the construction of relations between imagination, reason and reason acquires the features of intellectuality. Outlining the historical horizon of the possibilities of philosophizing about aesthetics, A. Nivelle chooses for his research the concepts formed in the XVIII century, when "aesthetic awareness" arose ^{[20, p. 11]}, when philosophy was opened for aesthetic thinking. But why exactly did the XVIII century become so determined to bring the edifice of philosophy to an aesthetic conclusion? Among the factors of this process, A. L. Dobrokhotov highlights: "the emergence of new scientific disciplines that require not only a causal explanation, but also a category of purpose; the deep crisis of Christianity, squeezed by state power, secularism, extra-ecclesiastical spirituality; the birth of the idea of historicism; the emergence of the sentimentalist-democratic principle of equality of people in their nature; the discovery of natural pluralism of cultures; interest to national identity, to folklore; criticism of the repressive nature of traditional moral norms, in the light of which the shift of the intellectual interest of the epoch from ethics to aesthetics is understandable" ^{[16, p. 311]}. But the explanation of the degree and direction of this phenomenological shift depends on Kant's interpretation of the Enlightenment principle, based on the structures of self-support of the mind, on the attitude of "only myself" and the phenomenon of freedom. And it is this principle that clarifies the reasons for this shift to a much greater extent. The scope of the article does not allow us to identify the complexity, real and apparent contradictions that arise when describing this shift. It is more important for us here to consider how the implementation of the Kantian principle poses a new problem: are ethics and aesthetics commensurate or incommensurable structures of thinking?

The prerequisite for the reality of the aesthetic is the postulate of agreement reigning between sensitivity and intelligence, which alone allows us to understand beauty ^{[20, p. 300]}. As for intelligence, we do not mean the intellectual consciousness that manifests itself in the schematism of pure concepts of the mind, because the movement towards beauty arises here due to a sense of pleasure or displeasure. Nevertheless, the subjective nature of free play, referring to formal expediency, and the agreement of feeling, imagination and reason, their harmonious mood set the conditions of cognition itself. Consciousness finds access to conditions of this level only in sensuality, on which beauty itself depends. "The consciousness of purely formal expediency in the play of the cognitive abilities of the subject in the representation by which the object is given is itself a pleasure, since this consciousness contains in itself the determining basis of the activity of the subject for the revival of his cognitive abilities, hence the internal causality (which is expedient) in relation to cognition in general, but without limiting it in any way therefore, it [contains] only the form of subjective expediency of representation in aesthetic judgment" ^{[18, p. 199]}.

And yet, how universal is the procedure of the justification described above, revealing the relationship of the foundation to the effect, and such an attitude resembles a purely aesthetic relationship, namely, the relationship of the creator of the world with the world itself (this foundation does not depend on the effect, the relationship of unity and the property of completeness is not established between them)? Is this procedure applicable to other structures of philosophical knowledge that go beyond the boundaries of theoretical reason, and how to justify their boundaries drawn by thin lines, as if engraved on this structural field? In this article, we will be interested in the question of the truth of such a modal judgment as an aesthetic judgment (proposition) – this, if we follow Kant's logic, structure of quid facti, the actual, eventful surface of aesthetic knowledge (and the event itself, the event itself, as Hannah Arendt showed, only illuminates its own past, but is never derived from its past) towering above its substantial surface. The aesthetic is understood here as it is given by a particular synthesis in the fact of what has already taken place in art. And in the future, it is necessary to portray this fact more clearly with his own consciousness, in which M. Mamardashvili saw the text arising in the act of reading the same text. We are talking about a fact that we cannot invent by means of a rational definition, about facticity in aesthetic norms. It is here that most of the problems related to the discussion of whether we have a priori ideas in aesthetics, on which the very possibility of constructing a conclusion, a syllogism, including making judgments about art, depends; another question is whether aesthetic theory itself does not form some new facts. Yes, aesthetics is based on some indivisible structures that should be considered as further indecomposable facts, and it is their accomplished existence that tells us what is aesthetic, what is art – facts as echoes of transcendental apperception. Sometimes Kant calls them principles that are inevitably born in man himself and are the bearer of a priori ideas, a demonstration of how concepts can relate a priori to objects (the so-called deduction of pure aesthetic judgments, the only problem is what is the basis of this deduction). This demonstration concerns, according to Kant, only the fact by which we have assimilated the very concept, comprehended the very concept of "aesthetic". The paradox of this position is that the aesthetic principle does not depend on empirical data. But then what, exactly, are the facts in question? Kant is referring to the facts of reason, the facts of thought, and, one might add, the facts of art as suddenly arising, becoming the property of knowledge before their existence (even the idea of art in its cause "must precede its reality" ^{[18, p. 401]}). In this sense, the aesthetic itself can be considered as something underlying the aesthetic, and this tautology refers to the unspeakable, the event of art that cannot be deduced from thought, but is accepted as a fact, to the ontological status of art acquired outside of thought. There is no octave between ego cogito artistically and ergo sum as an artist, here nothing is a register higher or lower. The problem of the absence of such an octave is not a problem of the absence of a norm, it is a completely different problem, referring us to the interpretation of a certain strange facticity as a kind of additional structure, as a quid juris, as an opportunity to judge aesthetically by right. It can be said that the very deduction of the aesthetic concept used to answer the quid juris question, if one follows the logic of the "Critique of Pure Reason", "causes a lot of difficulties, since neither from experience nor from reason can one give a single clear reason that would explain the right to use it" (In 117). We cannot assume the aesthetic in facts as a kind of natural property, we somehow have to bring it under the concept of transcendental apperception. Here, something heterogeneous is taken as a fact, the synthesis of which requires something additional, such a possibility encourages the mind to move towards the concept of aesthetic and artistic through an incomprehensible for us "supernatural inner influence" (Kant), through internal, and not pre-established harmony, to postulate it as an unusual, unique fact, seen not from external facts, not even from expediency, but from a reasonable a priori, independent of aesthetic facts, from the movement of the facts of the open truth of art. In an aesthetic judgment, the voice of the artist's soul always sounds, philosophically heard. The singularity of this fact is that we can learn the aesthetic from the experience of the facts of art that we perceive, they are such because they are given to us, and not because they are obvious and objective. This is a unique experience – the fabric of this experience forms the produced, the work (opus), different from the action (effectus), made possible by the metaphysical shade of "creation through freedom". This is how Kant's intuition of art is born – it arises after what has already been done, when freedom has already become an event that occurred at the moment of the creative act. And since opus has already been given, then we can think something aesthetically, and something we can't. It is possible to interpret art when it exists, but no artistic act follows from the concept of art itself, because here everything is individual, concrete, everything has already been creatively resolved. And therefore, only after the fact it is possible to think aesthetically or build a theory of art, a concept of art for art, while it is impossible to distract from the fact that in this world an artist must take his place and everything will be determined by how he takes it with his creativity. In fact, aesthetics deals with art as an intelligible object, which can only be thought of as a priori executed. "One can even say that in art, the very possibility for a person to be a rational being is born, therefore, reason is born. That is why Kant speaks of aesthetics as a sphere where, oddly enough, the very a priori nature of reason arises, although for a philosopher the possibility of this remains mysterious and only assumed" ^{[15, p. 284]}. Proceeding from this a priori source, Kant's aesthetic problematics simultaneously refers to how to leave the world of art in knowledge and keep it in it. And with this discretion, the inner harmony describing the topology of the soul structurally corresponds to cognitive or moral attitudes. But at the same time, we must be aware, firstly, of how peculiar facts we are dealing with in aesthetics, which captures with its own knowledge an area that lies beyond the boundaries of the unknown. And, secondly, it is necessary to figure out how to correlate it with the general methodological position, which is that, according to P. Feyerabend, facts alone are not enough to force us to accept or reject a scientific theory. In this situation, we run into the boundaries of logic and methodology. For aesthetic theory, the problem here is whether we can acquire the ideal through the real.

Aesthetics always turns to specific givens, which are obvious to us, undoubted, but inexplicable, for example, in their sketchy facticity. Modern philosophy also refers to a similar facticity – it is enough to recall the interpretation of facticity in E. Husserl's phenomenology, introducing the concepts of the fact of primary impression and other facts of consciousness. For L. Wittgenstein, the whole world is a collection of facts, a person creates their images for himself, and these images are also facts. This creates an ontological picture of the world. "Sooner or later you will encounter existence or non-existence!" But this means, of course, that you will encounter facts, not concepts" ^{[5, p. 144]}. For aesthetics, which, according to the "Logical-Philosophical Treatise" and the diaries of 1914-1916, belongs to the field of the transcendental and is, like logic and ethics, a "condition of peace", it is important to state that facts serve only to help explain the task, but not to fulfill it. Indeed, no fact of aesthetic thinking can solve an artistic problem. On the other hand, is the aesthetic theory itself capable of presenting principles for the formation and discovery of new facts in the history of art, to give an understanding of the diversity of facts related to the identification of a person's place in the world and extracted on the basis of its own stable concepts.

But what is the basis of the facts, does aesthetics conceptualize this basis? Of course, art is not a science dealing with empirical facts, it comes into contact with emotions, imaginary worlds, with the composition of inspiration, meaning and creation. It has some kind of expedient form (Gaetan Picon, who built his literary aesthetics ^{[23, p. 7]}, saw a characteristic feature of works of modern art in creation, and not in expression). At the same time, art sets a specific ontology. L. Wittgenstein saw the miracle of artistry in the fact that it gives the world, the reality that it really is. And here we are confronted with world facts, with the postulation of incredible, paradoxical facts, with the facts of reason. An equally difficult question is how the actual aspect of aesthetic knowledge is constituted, devoid of any fanaticism of knowledge itself, how to apply a priori representations to aesthetic experience. As H.-G. Gadamer wrote in Truth and Method, "Kant himself perceived as a kind of spiritual surprise that he came up with a moment of a priori, going beyond empirical universality, in relation to the sphere of taste assessments. The "critique of the faculty of judgment" arose precisely from this point of view. This is no longer just a criticism of taste in the sense in which taste is the subject of critical evaluation by others. This is a criticism of criticism, that is, it raises the question of the right to a critical attitude to matters of taste. At the same time, we are talking not just about empirical principles designed to legitimize a widespread and dominant taste, not about something like a favorite question about the reasons for the difference in tastes, but about genuine a priori, which should always and generally justify the very possibility of criticism" ^{[7, p. 85]}. The question is where it can be rooted. To solve it, Kant first completely rethinks the traditional idea of harmony between subject and object, reconstructing this idea on the basis of the indispensable subordination of the object, or rather, the phenomenon to the subject. But this reconstruction will not be a denial of harmony, but its affirmation in a new form of reflexive harmony. The result of such reconstruction is man as a lawgiver of nature, who implements it in his cognition through categories. And here reason and reason enter into a complex interaction, in the process of which it turns out: "it is necessary not only that phenomena obey categories from the point of view of form, but also that, from the point of view of content, they correspond to the Ideas of reason or symbolize the latter. At this level, a certain harmony, a certain expediency is re-introduced. But here it also becomes clear that the harmony between the content of phenomena and the Ideas of reason is simply postulated" ^{[11, p. 165]}. It manifests itself in the form of some indefinite harmony, which is processed on the field of kinship of higher abilities (imagination, reason and reason) into the concept of a common feeling. This harmony is processed in the process of substantiating aesthetic pleasure not on the basis of sensuality, but on the principles of correspondence between reflection and how we notice expediency in form, although this expediency cannot be justified by any purpose. Each active and spontaneous ability forms a new figure of harmony in its field. How, in this context, is the space of substantiation and constitution of aesthetic knowledge transformed, the conditions of its applicability are revealed, how are judgments about art placed in the modal framework of perception of aesthetic ideas that are beyond the theoretical cognitive ability? Starting with Hermann Cohen and up to the present day, the question of the ways of Kant's substantiation of aesthetics confidently occupies a special place in philosophical research. Therefore, it is so important to consider at the modern level, taking into account the peculiarities of the development of world kantology in the XX-XXI centuries, the metaphysical problem of the beginning of the aesthetic, its foundation. Of course, the rehearsal of this beginning should not be a metaphysical representation every time. But aesthetic thought cannot but follow the principles of thought as such: after all, "thought must ascend to the beginnings of metaphysics, without which no reliability and purity and even no driving force can be expected" ^{[20, p. 17]}, including in aesthetic teaching. And when it comes to aesthetic values, the essence of the matter lies not in aesthetic achievements, which, as Kant would say, we see, but in their internal principles, which we do not see. But what are these internal principles? Even when presenting these thought sources, a question of essential importance for aesthetics inevitably arises: after all, the metaphysical system is independent of the conditions of contemplation, as revealed by transcendental aesthetics in the first "Critique". But how does this relate to the aesthetic teaching set forth in the third "Critique"? Here it separates itself from Baumgarten's interpretation of the aesthetic and turns already to contemplation itself (or to what Husserl will call forms of contemplation in the non-Kantian sense), corresponding to the concept of an object through imagination, and not only to the conditions of contemplation, purified from all feeling. Is this form of justification reduced to a subjective justification of the possibility of the aesthetic – not to the subjective, which is such an a priori form of sensuality as space, but to the subjective, which does not fit into the tools of cognition, but is expressed in a sense of pleasure or displeasure as a subjective representation? It is with him that the idea of the expediency of the subject is connected. "The expediency that precedes the cognition of the object and which, moreover, even if there is no desire to use this representation for cognition, is still directly connected with the representation of the object, [such expediency] is that subjective in the representation that cannot become the moment of cognition. Consequently, the object in this case is called expedient only because the idea of it is directly related to the feeling of pleasure; and this idea itself is an aesthetic idea of expediency" ^{[18, p. 123]}.

Kant sought to philosophically depict aesthetic and artistic reality in all its originality, not bringing it closer, but also not separating it from the adjacent worlds of theoretical and ethical knowledge. Of course, aesthetic thought must go back to the beginnings of metaphysics. But what is the structure of this ascent? Does it not resemble the situation in the moral field, when Kant, as P. Riker believed, plunges into the depths of ignorance the study of the foundation of the foundation, while thinking itself, as it were, emerges from the depths, and then plunges back into it. But does this cognitive sinusoid coincide with the one that is set in aesthetic coordinates? And, in general, how should we understand here the process of justification, the very foundation, the beginning, how to find solid foundations of aesthetic knowledge? Characterizing the original itself as a creative concept, G. Cohen in Kant's Theory of Experience sees it as a concept of purpose in ethics, where the aesthetic principle itself can be justified, or, as he put it, beauty as a systematic thought of the original. However, to what type of foundations – a baseless foundation, or a timeless foundation, or such, according to Plato, the most reliable of foundations as an idea, or a formal foundation that may not resist the burden of life, or some other conceivable foundation – should the foundation of the aesthetic be attributed? How can we think of any basis in aesthetics, given that there are moments of spontaneity, intuitiveness, uncertainty in the types of reality that aesthetic activity deals with? Or is an aesthetic action, the foundation of which is in itself, maybe it contains its own foundation, which does not need any external supports? Why, finally, is the assumption we have made in aesthetics justified? As Kant once emphasized, "it is possible to think n a h a l o v m and r e, but not n a h a l o m and r a, because [in the latter case] it would take an imaginary time" ^{[11, S. 428]}. However, such a relativistic principle, understood as almost a world fact, in itself brings us closer to the explication of aesthetic problems. Although, and we must be aware of this, the problem of deduction from the foundation, from the beginning is especially difficult here. To paraphrase E. Husserl, we can say that the question of the beginning of beauty is the question of the primary knowledge itself, which should and can carry the entire multi-stage structure of universal aesthetic knowledge. In the territory defined by reason under a priori constitutive principles (and a priori itself presupposes, by the way, not only the criteria of universality and necessity, which means, according to Kant, existence given by its very possibility, but also reformatting the way of coordination, harmonization of contemplation and properties of objects) with respect to the ability of desire, we turn not only to our the desire to know something, but also to the structure of how to act on the basis of knowledge, to the structure of pragmatic statements relating to the sensual nature of man with its order of pleasures, desires, pleasures and sensory effects, to the very ability of judgment – this, according to Kant, the gift of the spirit endowed with special insight and enlightenment, this form of thinking mediates the connection between reason and reason. Criticism of this ability complements the critical analysis of pure reason and, in fact, is engaged in identifying the foundations of a metaphysical system, but this addition cannot be part of pure philosophy, since on this additional basis only an application is built for a priori, albeit not cognitive, but still related specifically to the cognitive ability, concepts of the mind, through which it sets certain requirements for the fulfillment of certain conditions only by the ability of judgment itself. If so, then how can I find this supplement. Does it adjoin the non–seamlessly constituted parts of pure philosophy – theoretical and practical philosophy - like, to use architectural analogies, arcbutanes in Gothic architecture located outside the main volume of the building of pure philosophy? Rather, it is a kind of transitional state, a kind of gallery inside the building of pure philosophy, and if it "is ever destined to be realized under the general name of metaphysics (and it is possible to develop it in its entirety and in all respects extremely important for the use of reason), then criticism must in advance explore the ground for this building to that depth on which lies the first foundation of the ability to [give] principles independent of experience, so that some part of the building does not settle, which would inevitably lead to the collapse of the entire building" ^{[18, pp. 71, 73]}. Rather, this addition could be called a kind of brilliant legato of the metaphysical system, and playing it (thereby introducing a certain game element into thinking), one should carefully listen to how the theoretical sound is replaced by the practical, how the metaphysical sound is evenly distributed from the epistemological tone to the moral tone.

Consequently, the specificity of the aesthetic aspect of the problem of justification lies in the fact that here the foundation itself is not just reproduced, but created, created anew every time. As a result, a kind of metalanguage of aesthetics arises, on which we can talk about the construction of a new foundation of aesthetic theory as a special place where reason, reason and sensuality come into contact (therefore, some of them can be comprehended on the basis of others), where the foundations of the faculty of judgment are combined with the foundations of freedom, with the moral foundations of existence. The question of the foundations in aesthetics rests on the problem of a priori representations, from which a new form of creativity arises, when the connection of the representation is made not with the subject, but with the subject. But how well have the foundations on which aesthetic knowledge is built been studied? Answering this question, it is important first of all to recreate the history of the concept of "general feeling", enshrined in the philosophy of Descartes and Kant, who raises the question of whether it can be assumed to exist with sufficient reason.

Aesthetics and metaphysics of morals.

Aesthetics is not defined by any coordinates, since it is taken out of the framework of constitutive constructions and is associated with normative structures that have a prescriptive status that suggests to a person the meaning of a sense of pleasure (displeasure). Criticism of the aesthetic faculty of judgment is based on the analysis of the faculty of judgment itself in the context of the basic abilities of the soul: the faculties of cognition, the faculties of pleasure and the faculties of desire, and from all these heterogeneous faculties a bridge is built connecting them with the concept of freedom. Kant succeeds in establishing this connection with the device of aesthetic thinking in the course of a critical analysis of the faculty of judgment. Let aesthetic judgments concerning mainly the beautiful and sublime in nature and art "contribute nothing to the knowledge of things, they nevertheless belong only to the faculty of cognition and indicate the direct relation of this faculty to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, according to some a priori principle, which cannot be confused with what may be the determining basis of the faculty desires, since this ability has its own principles a priori in terms of reason" ^{[18, pp. 73, 75]}, which determines the will with these a priori principles. But how important is this difference between aesthetic judgment and the basis of the ability of desire, which presupposes the setting of goals, and what is the symmetry of these distinctions, given that pleasure itself endlessly resurrects its beginning, and desire as a state of mind is directly realized in a creative act (although the artist sometimes transcends his own desire when constructing an image), being a companion of imagination? In addition, it is almost impossible to reproduce the source of the desire itself. Spinoza already believed that, although people are aware of their desires, they do not know their reasons, and the satisfaction of the desire itself almost results in a transcendental act. Even the most passionate desire cannot be taken for reality, which can be both the dictates of reason and aesthetic actions, which can only be considered guided by other mental attitudes. In aesthetics, the realization of lofty desires resists the desire for the predominance of the rational. The aesthetic action itself is motivated by desire and pleasure, which is here a kind of optional pleasure that challenges the narcissistic reflex; it is produced from sociability structures that are sufficiently developed "in our age of strong social ties" (Kant), and is not limited by the framework of modeling its prerequisites. The amplification, amplification, completion, addition of our "acts of pleasure and displeasure occur in ethics and aesthetics, which are produced by the element, or ether, of the transcendental. This wave of amplification that gives any human act – it is expanded simultaneously on two sides, capturing them together: on the empirical-contemplative side and on the side of ideas" ^{[24, p. 293]}.  

Unlike the faculty of desire, the faculty of judgment takes a metaphorical step over a deep abyss separating two legislative areas described by the concept of nature and the concept of freedom, the concept of phenomenon and the concept of the supersensible, intelligible. This is a step in the direction of a kind of metaphorical dialectic. The faculty of judgment, which Kant sometimes calls common sense, is realized aesthetically, provided that it is the ability to judge formal expediency on the basis of a sense of pleasure, such an embodiment of it we find in judgments about aesthetic experience and genuine art. After all, "everything practical that should be possible according to the laws of nature (the true field of art), according to the prescription given to him, depends entirely on the theory of nature; and only practical, subordinating to the laws of freedom, can have principles that do not depend on any theory; after all, there is no theory above the definitions of nature. Thus, the practical part of philosophy (next to its theoretical part) should not be understood as technically practical, but only morally practical teaching; and if the skill of arbitrariness, which, in contrast to nature, corresponds to the laws of freedom, should also be called art, then it should mean such art that makes possible a system of freedom, similar to the system of nature; truly, it would be a divine art if we were able with its help to fully fulfill what reason prescribes to us and actually implement its idea" ^{[19, pp. 53, 55]}. The mode of representation of such art corresponds to the most perfect mode of representation of the system of goals of all nature.

And if we strive to build aesthetics as a specific science focused on the entelechy of divine art, then the question inevitably arises about its philosophical justification and justification, because reason, striving to find the foundations of the aesthetic, that is, its, as Hegel would say, positivity to others and within the other, which is something relatively unconditional, forms aesthetics. as a science in which "knowledge has reached full equality with itself" ^{[8, p. 209]}. Any science understands the grounds and deduces from judgments about such grounds or reasons. And aesthetics is no exception, especially since, if we follow Spinoza, it exists somewhere in the interval between the comprehension of res creatae (things created) and that which is based on natura naturans as a universal creative ability, that is, causality, which itself has no cause and incessantly produces new forms. In modern philosophy, this causality will be interpreted in fact as a pure plane of immanence, where "unformed elements and materials dance" (J. Deleuze and F. Guattari).

In Kant, the aesthetic appears as a form arising on the border between theoretical and practical reason. If in the "Critique of Pure Reason" he, separating the idea of discursive clarity through concepts from the idea of another kind of clarity through contemplation, points to the order of the intuitive and aesthetic, then in the "Critique of Practical Reason" and in the "Metaphysics of Morals" it is important for him, along with the definition of the legislation of reason to substantiate the concept of freedom, to identify the structure of the aesthetic interpretation, referring to the a priori conditions of moral legislation, to moral meaning, although this interpretation appears here to be just a metaphysical explanation of subjectivity. "... The aesthetics of morals is, although not part of, but nevertheless, a subjective exposition of the metaphysics of morals, in which the feelings accompanying the coercive force of the moral law make it possible to feel the effectiveness of this force (for example, disgust, horror, etc., giving a sensual form to moral antipathy) in order to gain an advantage over a purely sensual urge" ^{[20, p. 81]}. But since we are discussing aesthetic problems, we are talking about sensuality, then how can we approach philosophy in aesthetic ways, bypassing that one, precisely "because of sensuality, a heavily overgrown path" (Kant), to such a diverse and time-building building of philosophy. But even if we find an aesthetic copy equal to the model of critical evaluation of all attempts to philosophize, how can we think of the aesthetic itself in its connection with the attitudes of practical philosophy, because reason itself in its theoretical application, according to Kant, would transcend itself if it dared to explicate the way pure reason becomes practical. This would be equivalent to trying to define how freedom is possible, and in the aesthetic sphere, which, unlike moral legislation, gives causality through freedom, to define how art is possible as creation through freedom. Hence, we must look not only for some other ways of substantiating the aesthetic, but also to answer the main question: how deeply we are able to dive into our substantiation of acts of aesthetic thinking related to one concept as the general basis of the aesthetic. We are talking about the criterion of an aesthetic hypothesis, which helps to find a more general principle, which can be, as they say in the Critique of Pure Reason, "the comprehensibility of the accepted basis for explanation or its unity (without an auxiliary hypothesis), the truth (correspondence with each other and with experience) of the consequences deduced from it, and, finally, completeness the grounds for explaining the consequences that point only to what is admitted in the hypothesis, and agrees with it, presenting analytically a posteriori what was thought synthetically a priori" (In 115). If we see the criterion of the aesthetic hypothesis in perfection, which does not complement Kant's transcendental table of categories at all and remains indifferent to the characteristic of the relationship of concepts to objects, then it should be borne in mind that the action of perfection itself in some way resembles the action of the transcendental faculty of judgment: both are able to look for certain grounds for some phenomena, to find the necessary arguments the only difference is that the faculty of judgment teaches how to apply rational concepts to phenomena and is able to bring them under the rules of reason, and the concept of perfection allows, according to Kant, to bring the way of applying categories under the general logical laws of correspondence of cognition with itself. Another and extremely difficult question is how the idea of who uses them and the transcendental consciousness correlates.

We will try to find answers to these questions first in Kant's "Principles for the Metaphysics of Morals", in the "Critique of Practical Reason" and in the "Metaphysics of Morals", as well as in some other works published in the academic edition of Kant's complete works. Why are they so important to us? The fact is that "Kant's ethics not only did not exclude aesthetics, but also ... demanded that it be the most universal, because in the transcendental method, the reasoned meaning of ethics speaks of a deep justification of aesthetics in the general interests of reason (von der tiefen Begr?ndung der Aesthetik in den allgemeinen Interessen der Vernunft)" ^{[26, S. 128]}. In these works, we will be interested primarily in those levels of thematization of the analytics of the sense of pleasure that are directly related to the problems of substantiating the aesthetic.

The correlation of ethics, aesthetics, sensuality and reason, the place of aesthetics in the ideal world, its participation in the generation of thought is an important topic of modern philosophy. Kant sets the whole aesthetics of thinking. He is endowed with an amazing ability, moving along his path, to listen, as Heidegger emphasized, to poetry, to enter into fiction. But this type of movement confronts us with a borderline question about the foundations of our thinking that come into contact with poetry. At the same time, Heidegger likens thinking itself to what is created by the master, what moves the master's hand (Handwerkers). The condition for determining the place of aesthetics in the generation of thought is the fact that a person himself ignites thought in the act of creativity. From this point of view, it can be said that aesthetics has to do "with a certain generation of thought that we create for ourselves, but not by means of a completely empty concept, but by creating a fruitful concept in relation to ourselves and to the maxim of inner morality, therefore, in a practical inner relation, which is the only thing that the whole our immanent (doable) duty" ^{[19, p. 119]}, the idea of which every person carries in his mind. The form of such self-creation is not only thought as such, but also art.

The truth of this self-creation is mediated by aesthetic attitudes, historical realities of high art, ideas about the interaction of aesthetic and moral consciousness, which objectify it. Modern philosophy is increasingly turning to these objectifications – here are the most interesting studies on this topic that have appeared in Kantology recently. Their authors mainly touch on historical and philosophical issues: for example, an analysis of Gadamer's ethical project in connection with his aesthetic developments ^{[28, p. 11]}, a reassessment of Wittgenstein's metaphysics, his approaches to aesthetics, ethics and the theory of subjectivity. As is rightly emphasized in the article by M. Kiran, in the last two decades there has been a surge of interest in the study of possible relationships between the evaluative and ethical nature of works of art ^{[14, p. 129]}. In some works, such topics are emphasized and identified that can be brought under a broader concept. Thus, relying on the Nietzschean analysis of Kant's aesthetics, M. Smith outlines the boundaries and possibilities of metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics and their intellectual perspectives ^{[27, p. 17-18]}, revealing at the same time the peculiarity of Kant's works of the critical period about the sublime, related to its justification in moral psychology. At the same time, it is impossible to lose sight of the acute controversy over the description of the aesthetic neighborhood of the points of contact of theoretical and practical philosophy. Interest in such a description is also evident in modern continental philosophy, primarily in the practical philosophy of intellectuals, whose ideas are realized in the comprehension of such phenomena as affective labor, abstract art and spiritual life ^[19]. It is equally important to describe the points of contact between the cognitive and practical sense of feeling: "rational being has an absolute and inherent value, like morality itself, and therefore rational being in itself is a sublime object" ^{[13, p. 237]}, and such objectivity is extremely important for thematizing articulations of aesthetic content, for example, articulations aesthetic perception of natural beauty and moral ideas ^{[15, p. 115]}. Many studies shed new light on the core themes of transcendental criticism – the relationship between Kant's aesthetic theory and his critical epistemology, the dialectic of aesthetics and the theory of cognition in transcendental philosophy, the cognitive structure of aesthetic judgment ^{[29, p. 109-110]}, the relationship of aesthetic judgment with epistemological, or rather with paraepistemological task ^{[6, p. 202]}. Believing that a deep analysis of the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment" is necessary to understand the scope and strength of his epistemology, F. Hughes defends his position in the dispute about the central role of aesthetics in Kant's philosophy ^{[9, p. 10]}. Special attention is paid to the correlation of regulatory ideas in aesthetics and theoretical regulatory ideas in the Critique of Pure Reason ^{[26, S. 105]}. The question of the form of intentionality in Kant's philosophy is interesting and complex, which sheds light on three central problems for criticism that correlate with the modern analytical philosophy of perception: the problems of conceptualism, the status of imagination and the atomism of perception ^{[7, p. 505]}, the study of which is of fundamental importance for understanding the meaning of Kant's approach to aesthetics. A valuable study of Kant's way of thinking about aesthetics was undertaken by M. Rodriguez, according to which this reflection is not a late result of Kant's intellectual development, but rather a possible solution to an "old" problem stated by the philosopher two decades before writing the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment ^{[25, p. 10]}. Some researchers specifically pay attention to the discovery of the "post-Kantian" paradigm in the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment" ^{[17, p. 266]}. There is no consensus in modern literature on the fundamental principles of Kant's aesthetics, for example, on the question of Kant's theory of taste, as evidenced, in particular, by the dialogue between P. Geyer and G. Ellison ^{[4, p. 111-137]}. A new interpretation of Kant's concept of human experience is proposed, in which such different areas as knowledge, morality, perception of beauty and life are considered in a single perspective ^{[21, p. 12]}. Assessing the course of Kant's thought, R. Zuckert sees in it a way of resolving moral doubts about the aesthetic evaluation of a person ^{[30, p. 107]}.

The main task of the analysis of Kantian aesthetics is the systematic study of the third "Critique" - this brilliant completion of transcendental criticism, revealing its integrity and harmony. At the same time, many experts abstract from the study of it in the context of the entire Kantian philosophy, from revealing the evidential logic of the movement of Kantian thought into the field of aesthetics. In the Russian philosophy of the XX-XXI centuries, the exception to this process is the work of T. A. Akindinova, M. N. Afasizhev, V. V. Bychkov, A.V. Gulyga, T. B. Dlugach, K. M. Dolgov, M. K. Mamardashvili, M. F. Ovsyannikov, V. P. Shestakov, as well as the research of N. I. Balashov, E. Ya. Basina, V. S. Byblera, Yu. M. Borodaya, A. T. Bochorishvili, L. A. Kalinnikova, T. B. Lyubimova, I. L. Matsa, B. V. Meerovsky, L. N. Stolovich, M. Ya. Sarafa. Of particular note is the fundamental analysis of Kant's aesthetics by V. F. Asmus, who traces the internal logic of the development of the aesthetic problem in transcendental philosophy ^{[3, pp. 401-435]}. In modern Western philosophy, primarily in the writings of J. Deleuze, the very logic of the movement of Kant's aesthetic thinking is considered by the example of the category of harmony ^[11], the harmony of abilities (cognitive ability, desire ability, ability to feel pleasure), taking into account which a new meaning is given even to the history of philosophy itself. But Kant's logic of the deployment of aesthetic thought is much richer in its expressive means, since it includes not only the analysis of harmony, but also the concepts of creativity, perfection, beauty. However, it must be admitted that such a holistic logic of the movement of Kantian thought to the heights of aesthetics has yet to be reproduced. Aesthetics in Kant's view is both an intermediate link between the parts of the metaphysical system, and a way to solve the fundamental problems of the metaphysics of creativity formulated back in the period of the construction of the critical analysis of pure reason and the metaphysics of morals.

As we can see, our topic leads us to the definition of the place of aesthetics in the system of Kantian metaphysics, and although in the first and second "Criticism" the connection of aesthetics with moral philosophy has not yet become the focus of systematic constructions, nevertheless, the entire architecture of this connection is clearly worked out here. Kant correlates this study with the identification of the transcendental foundations of the possibility of comprehending the aesthetic structures of art experience, which becomes an expression of intimate knowledge about the cornerstones of morality. Here, ethical and aesthetic research is focused on the search for what the philosopher calls the general principle of everything created by reason. The aesthetic action itself is thought of as motivated by such a determining basis of the will as desire (in French art criticism poetry itself is considered as love for a realized desire), a fundamental sense of pleasure that is produced from sociability structures that are sufficiently developed "in our age of strong social ties" (Kant).

Types of aesthetic justification.

Kant is primarily interested in how the foundations of the aesthetic were revealed already in antiquity, or as he would say, in the transcendental philosophy of the ancients, which correlated its meaning with the logic of harmony, which was thought of as almost the substantiality of the aesthetic subject. The German philosopher will focus on the experience-dependent a posteriori synthesis of harmony and creativity, focusing on how harmony is created, how the harmony of the soul's abilities can be justified in the space of aesthetic judgment. At the same time, on the one hand, he seeks to rework the concept of harmony that has developed in the philosophical tradition, first of all, the abstract idea of pre-established harmony in Leibniz, which means "not the harmony of two different entities, namely, sensual and intelligible, but the harmony of two abilities of just the same entity in which sensuality and the mind combined into one experienced cognition" ^{[21, pp. 529-530]}. And such a reworking will be carried out not only in an explicit, but also in a hidden polemic with Leibniz's idea of it as an amazing pre-established harmony of all monads. On the other hand, Kant inscribes harmony, the unity of the combination of the manifold in knowledge (resembling the unity of the theme in a dramatic work) into the concept of relativity of the empirical basis, seeing in accordance with empirical laws the prerequisites of noticeable pleasure. At the same time, he draws attention to how, for example, the scenery of harmony changed in the power institutions of Europe, each of which defended only its subjective point of view on this category. From the interpretation of the social framework for the picture of harmony, Kant concludes: "the empirical foundations of definition are not suitable for universal external legislation, but they are also not suitable for internal legislation, because everyone puts himself as a subject at the base of his inclination, and the influence of one or another inclination prevails in each subject. And it is absolutely impossible to find a law that, under such conditions, would rule everyone with the consent of everyone" ^{[22, p. 343]}. Hence it can be concluded that the experience of harmony is clearly insufficient for the philosophical justification of the aesthetic. Not to mention whether a priori synthesis is possible in the process of such justification. But maybe there is another form of conviction in the truth of the aesthetic?

Ancient metaphysics often saw such a form in the new concept of the highest standard, in which Kant finds precisely the inner foundation based on reason in the sense of perfection, depicted either as an attribute of things or as a substance. The very concept of perfection "can be taken* either in a theoretical sense, and then it expresses the perfection of each thing in its own way (transcendental), or the perfection of a thing as a thing in general (metaphysical)... The concept of perfection in practical meaning is the suitability or sufficiency of a thing for all kinds of purposes. This perfection as a human property, therefore, as an internal one, is nothing but talent, and what enhances or complements it is skill" ^{[22, p. 373]}. As for perfection in theoretical meaning, it is considered in modern Russian philosophy (primarily in the works of I. T. Kasavin, M. K. Mamardashvili) as a prerequisite for the category of truth. In Kant, the substantial-attributive picture of perfection is complemented, as we see, by a new rational image of it (according to the German philosopher, even the very principles of rationality can be extracted from the principle of perfection), in which its anthropological, axiological and theological varieties should be distinguished – inner perfection in us as a possible result of our activity to fulfill moral duty, and the external independent perfection of the divine will as the beginning of the human will. Our representation predetermines the latter through the pleasure associated with how the object is reproduced by it. But if we consider the aesthetic as something connected with a form of practical activity (and it is impossible to reduce moral action to it), coupled with the interest of practical reason, then many problems arise with this consideration, especially if we take into account the further evolution of Kantian aesthetic thought, at certain stages of which aesthetic judgment is thought of as devoid of any interest, which only devalues judgment taste, deprives him of impartiality. On the other hand, it is impossible to ignore the concept of perfection in a practical sense, which reveals to us almost the active substance of the aesthetic – talent, creative talent. Therefore, it is legitimate to believe that the aesthetic can be justified not just as a natural gift (as Kant will say, "nature itself cannot be blamed for the biased distribution of its gifts"), but as an outstanding ability and talent woven into human activity and manifested both in moral action and in creative activity, that is, it can be it is justified as a concept of talent, without which it is impossible to create a region of artistic perfection. Here one should only remember M. Heidegger's warning that mental giftedness does not guarantee the ability to think, including to think aesthetically.

The question of whether it is possible to see in the ontological concept of perfection the tools for the rational justification of morality is quite complicated. The paradoxical nature of Kant's ethics of perfection is revealed by A. K. Sudakov. On the one hand, Kant criticizes the ethics of ontological perfection, but upon careful consideration of his position, "it turns out that not only the applied moral doctrine of the "Metaphysics of Morals" is at least "half" perfectionist in Kant, but that Kant's "pure" ethics, developed by him, first of all, in "The foundation to the metaphysics of Morals", for all its methodological purity and even precisely because of its methodological purity, it turns out to be oriented towards the ideal of moral perfection to such an extent that even the mutual relationship of the three glorified formulations of the law of morality cannot be adequately understood without taking into account this context of their justification. Kant's formal theory of morality itself is a reflection of the idea of absolute perfection of morals, but a reflection that has not been brought to its logical end" ^{[30, p. 66]}. In addition to the above analysis, it is important for us to point out the following points. No matter how critical Kant's attitude to the ontological concept of perfection may be, he still prefers it rather than the theological extraction of morality from absolute perfection. If, when justifying morality, one had to choose between the concept of moral feeling and the concept of perfection in general, then one should still give preference to the latter, "since, at least, by transferring the solution of the question from the field of sensuality to the court of pure reason, although it does not solve anything here, it nevertheless preserves, without distortion, for the closest definition is an indefinite idea (of goodwill itself)" ^{[22, p. 213]}. The very fullness of will, good will and virtue as a manifestation of the drama of our consciousness and the realization of freedom (and Descartes, as has long been noted, the terms "will" and "freedom" are equivalent) is a revelation of perfection, which has different degrees of definiteness. Of course, it is important to describe the conditions for the possibility of the existence of a higher perfection, which only God possesses, but neither from the content of knowledge nor from the religious experience of a person it is impossible to extract a strictly defined concept of the perfection of primordial essence. This transcendent perfection is not revealed to speculative reason, but only to the supreme principle of morality. But the mode of existence of this principle cannot be placed, if we talk about the aesthetic side, in a kind of empirical picture, it is subject to perfect reduction, which is clearly seen by the example of intramuscular illusions in relation to the maturation of the conceptualization of the ratio of moral and aesthetic feelings, virtue and beauty. The philosopher writes the idea of it even into the structure of the tongue-tied moral judgment, contrasting the aesthetic and the practical. Thus, describing the moral feeling, which is necessarily preceded by the law, Kant emphasizes that it "does virtue honor by attributing favor and appreciation directly to her, and does not tell her, as it were, directly to her face, that it is not her own beauty that binds us to her, but only our benefit" ^{[22, p. 209, 211]}.

But the problem of perfection can be approached from the other side. The revelation of talent as a particular principle is carried out in a certain intermediate area between the direct representation of perfection as a property of things and the indirect, symbolic representation of the highest perfection in substance, that is, God, understood by Kant in a practical sense as the correspondence of the absolute being for all purposes in general. But the interpretation of the intermediate area between the direct and indirect representation of perfection, given by the coordinates of practical reason, can be supplemented by the consideration of another intermediate area, the concept of which goes back to the first "Criticism". The critical analysis of pure reason is aimed at building a possible system of metaphysical knowledge that "writes off" the key to the consistency of reason, the very existence of which is associated with making judgments, and they are presented to Kant as an expression of the consent of free citizens. This key opens access not only to systematic, but also to expedient unity, the principle of which makes it possible to think of nature as if the justification of unity in the diversity of its empirical laws were carried out in the mind; through the stages of expedient unity, reason passes the school of completeness, revealing the whole system of freedom as the ideas of reason itself, in the legislation of which, and the concept of freedom is not hidden in moral legislation. In such a universal school, there are maxims of perfection, by which Kant understands "a d e k a t n o s t (die A n g e m e s s e n h e i t) ... diversity (Manigfaltigen) to his concept of integrity" ^{[12, S. 699]}. We subsequently find this interpretation of perfection modified in Husserl. "The corresponding idea of perfection would be the idea of adequate evidence; moreover, the question remains whether it is not fundamentally an infinite perspective" ^{[10, p. 28]}. According to the guidelines of the "Critique of Pure Reason", in the school of completeness, the mind is also trained in regulatory principles designed to set up creative experiments, invent what does not yet exist, even what is impossible, in order to open unknown "new ways" to it, expand and strengthen the empirical use of reason indefinitely (indefinitely far away)." (In 708), and also to comprehend what Kant calls something innermost in the way of thinking.

Summarizing the results of the research on this section, it should be noted, first of all, that even L. Wittgenstein considered the process of justification as a process of justification. In Russian philosophy, V. Solovyov created the work "Justification of good", but neither in the domestic nor in the whole world philosophy has yet appeared a fundamental work dedicated to the justification of beauty. The typology of the conceptual justification of the aesthetic proceeds from the concept of such units of the dismemberment of aesthetic reality, which were already characterized in ancient metaphysics as harmony and perfection. Based on these concepts, Kant believes that the interpretation of what aesthetic thought is manifests itself through epiphany as a pulsation of tension between the understanding of the creation of harmony, the scale of the picture of the movement of humanity as the creator of perfection, the sketch of the sublime event.

 Aesthetics and methodology.

But how to find the area of truth of aesthetic judgment stated at the beginning of the article as a judgment of taste, a judgment of pleasure for everyone. It is clear that here we cannot escape from the idea of method, the methodological regularity of the self-consciousness of aesthetic science. The difficulty is that the very idea of the method in its Kantian understanding as a method of action according to the principles of reason, which builds a matrix of their immanent application, despite its rational-reflexive structures, is not devoid of purely aesthetic content. But where do these principles in aesthetics come from? The aesthetician can expect success for his conclusions regarding such principles insofar as he uses cloud solutions to a creative problem in the field of design design, realizing that "the mind itself sees only what it creates according to its own project" (ibid., XIII). Kant correlates the understanding of the methodology itself with the process of improving the method of metaphysics, in the process of which it can take the confident path of science.  

Taking lessons in the school of integrity, we comprehend the art of building the system itself or its architectonics, in the aspiration to which the nature of reason is embodied and the scientific feature of our knowledge in general is realized. It structures a specific methodology that generates the need for systematic unity as a method. But how does the concept of method continue to unfold in relation to aesthetic issues? Kant finds an aesthetic aspect by analyzing the history of pure reason; analyzing the reasons for the main upheavals in metaphysics, he finds this aspect, at least in relation to a certain method – the method of exploring nature, using the aesthetic concept of the sublime to form a critical attitude to such a method, whose adherents can even "achieve more in resolving the most sublime problems of metaphysics than speculation"

^{[10, in 883). The limitations of the naturalists of pure reason are understandable, but in this case the theme of the sublime problems of metaphysics is more important to us. Another question is how to develop it? Kant connects this development with the apotheosis of the entire culture of the human mind, with the introduction of harmony into the world of science, the axiological focus of metaphysics on its main goal – universal bliss. But it's not just a matter of method as a way of exploring the sublime problematics of pure reason. Aesthetic concepts are included in the structure of Kant's methodology, the transcendental doctrine of method, and on the other hand, namely, from the side of the concept of harmony, consent, the carrier of which is the architecture of the transcendental object. It arises at the point of transition from theoretically possible to practically possible cognition a priori, that is, to such an analogue of expediency in nature as the practical expediency of human action. By the way, this point is also set by the coordinates of the aesthetic mind, since it finds a new point for its foundation through the reflective ability of judgment in the synthesis of the concept of expediency and the experience of pleasure, catharsis. And this point is the point of connection of something more than what is expressed in an aesthetic statement, connection with the criterion of meaning; neither one nor the other can be determined by moving from one structure of the statement on the topic of aesthetically perceived to another. The method of investigating the sublime problematics of speculative reason is a method of metaphysical imitation of the sciences, which transcendentalism decides to prove, "going against the testimony of the senses, but following the truth"; with its help, a revolution is made in metaphysics itself, associated with a change in the way of thinking – we initially a priori know in things only what we we ourselves have contributed to them and attributed to them, including comprehending beauty a priori, and to all these phenomena "nothing can be attributed except what the thinking subject takes from himself" (ibid., XXIII). Transcendentalism combines a synthetic method and metaphysical analysis, which is most fully manifested in dialectics; it matches the nature of metaphysics itself, since it establishes a harmonious connection between two heterogeneous cognitive parts – the knowledge of things as phenomena and the knowledge of things themselves, and brings them "to a common agreement with the necessary idea of reason – with the idea of unconditional and he believes that this agreement is obtained only through ... true discrimination" (ibid., XXII). Aesthetics, through the concept of harmony, structures changes in the old method of research in metaphysics, and Kant thinks of the critique of pure reason itself as a treatise on a method that defines the boundaries of metaphysics.   Kant likens the transcendental method to methods of calculating building structures. "Considering the totality of all knowledge of pure and speculative reason as a building, at least the idea of which we have, I can say that in the transcendental doctrine of principles, we have made an estimate for building materials and determined for which building, what height and strength they are suitable. However, it turned out that although we dreamed of such a tower that would stretch to the heavens, the supply of material was actually enough only for a dwelling spacious enough for our activities on the basis of experience and high enough to overlook it; [it also turned out]} that the bold enterprise mentioned above was to end in failure from- due to the lack of material, not to mention the confusion of languages, which inevitably had to cause disagreement among the builders about the plan and scatter them all over the world, so that everyone would start building independently according to their own sketches. Now we are interested not so much in materials as in the plan of the building; having received a warning not to get carried away blindly with any project that may exceed all our abilities, we still, not being able to refuse to build a solid dwelling, will make an estimate for the construction of a building in proportion to the stored material that is given to us and together with our needs" (ibid., B 735). However, the comparison of the transcendental method, referring to the formalization of the system of pure reason, and the construction of a building involves not only the formal rationalization of construction equipment, but also its "distribution", which is carried out at the level of synthesis of such structures of construction itself as science and art, construction skills, but such synthesis already acquires an aesthetic form and is performed in architecture. Yes, it is quite possible to attribute Kant's characteristics of formal technique as such to the construction technique itself, among which the aesthetic features of imagery and plasticity stand out. Therefore, Kant's methodology itself can be aesthetically viewed as a methodology of transcendental architecture. A sketch of this methodology can also be created as a sketch for a monumental picture of abilities. Showing how Kant finds a correspondence between two connotations of abilities: cognitive ability, the ability of desire and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, on the one hand, and imagination, reason and reason, on the other, J. Deleuze emphasizes that the very "teaching about abilities forms a real interweaving that establishes a transcendental method" ^{[11, p.155]}.

Methodological consciousness presupposes a reflexive analysis of the initial postulates of a holistic worldview, and if we talk about aesthetics, it should be recognized that in it these postulates cannot be reduced to the concepts of harmony and perfection, they do not exhaust the methods of substantiating the aesthetic that have developed in the intellectual history of mankind. Such methods can be logical arguments, and articulations of practical dispositions and desires (establishing a causal connection between representations and their objects), behavioral structures subject to moral evaluation, and collective perceptions. With the help of feeling, we are able to express a judgment, but, as Hegel emphasizes in Philosophical Propaedeutics, "feeling itself does not indicate grounds and is not guided by grounds. What feeling we have, the feeling of approval or disapproval, is actually only the experience of the soul. But feeling in general is fickle and changeable. Now it is like this, then it is different. Feeling is essentially something subjective. What is the object in feeling, such is it only in me as a special individual… If I refer to something only to my own feeling, then I do not want to bother to consider the grounds and, therefore, I do not want to agree with the universal. In this case, I withdraw into myself and express only what the thing in me is, and not what it is in itself objectively and in general" ^{[8, p. 14]}. Nevertheless, the belief in the correctness of the judgment: "this work is magnificent" is formed on the path of artistic perception, although, of course, it can also be justified in the arguments of theorists and art historians constructed in accordance with the laws of logic. Mr. Weil would have attributed such a belief to the category of directly experienced, which, despite its subjectivity, is still absolute, no matter how vague it may be, there is something in this nebula that is given to me in this way, and not otherwise. The properties of the real world are necessarily relative. The relativity of the experience of practical life will not move us to aesthetic grounds, since an empirical idea of a work of art that we like presupposes some judgment of its perception expressed by ourselves, some subjective assessment of what is aesthetically given this way and not otherwise. Under this condition, "everyone can find confirmation for their subjective point of view, no matter how it differs from others" ^{[8, p. 14]}. By the standards of this absolute and at the same time relative construction, not only the projected amount of immersion in the basis of aesthetic reasoning is determined, but also the degree of a higher concept underlying aesthetic impressions. Therefore, to a certain extent, the judgment of S. K. Klini can be attributed to the problems of the aesthetic, based on very fragile foundations, to the problem of substantiating the aesthetic, according to which the foundations in one of the directions traditionally distinguished in mathematics should extend only to intuitively visible limits, and art itself constantly pushes these limits, and even the limits of unsurpassed artistic perfection. Another question is how to extract from these intuitions those that may be relevant for understanding historical processes in the world of artistic reality.

The principle of methodological regularity in aesthetics refers to the boundaries of a strange domain called the faculty of judgment, which are the boundaries of an aesthetic project. To approach them, one must first find out how practical reason and the culture of reason relate? Morality has a specific legislation that gives for the sensually perceived world (natura ectypa, conformed nature) the form of the intelligible world (natura archetypa, prototypical nature). The practical law is based not only on the judgment of identity, but also on morality, the legislation of which transfers us from the first nature to the second, establishing certain anthropological restrictions: moral legislation "as applied to man ... borrows nothing from knowledge about him (anthropology), but gives him as a rational being laws a priori" ^{[22, p. 47]}. The whole field of anthropology structures the concept of the transcendental fulfillment of the ability of cognition, in particular, the sophisticated experience of the ability of judgment, a kind of tuning fork for tuning cognitive tools. It is conceived by Kant as an empirically refined, excellently developed predisposition to various subject areas, associated with natural intelligence and perspicacity, which contribute to the experiences of our cognitive ability and moral norms, a living image of the moral mood of the soul. Pure philosophy, not without the help of the faculty of judgment, gives man a priori legislation "in order partly to distinguish in which cases it finds its application, partly to open him access to the will of man and persuasiveness for execution; after all, man himself is affected by so many inclinations that, although he is capable of the idea of practical pure reason, however, he it is not so easy to make it concreto effective in your lifestyle" ^{[22, p. 47, 49]}. The very type of the faculty of judgment protects reason as a practical ability that affects the will and its works from steps towards empiricism, which, in fact, uproots morality in the way of thinking. At the same time, the typicality of the faculty of judgment also protects against rapprochement with the mysticism of practical reason (although mysticism itself, unlike empiricism, is still commensurate with the sublime image of the moral law), but this mysticism is able to simplify the aesthetic movement of thought in the process of schematization of the symbolic field: such simplification is prevented by the opposing way of building moral concepts on the basis of contemplation The invisible Kingdom of God is the rationalism of the faculty of judgment with the tools of their application commensurate with it. The activity of the faculty of judgment gives "to the way of thinking, according to moral laws, that form of beauty which is admired, but which therefore is not yet sought (laudatur et alget), just as everything, the consideration of which subjectively causes in us a consciousness of the harmony of all our faculties of representation, and at the same time we feel that all our cognitive ability (reason and imagination) becomes stronger, arouses goodwill, which can be communicated to others, although at the same time we remain indifferent to the existence of the object, since we consider it only as an excuse to notice the makings of talents ..." ^{[22, p. 725; minor changes have been made to the translation]}. The very form of this activity acts as an ein besonderes Talent (a special talent, gift or gift), the owner of which needs to be developed, in honing the very ability to make subtle distinctions. The point is that, as Kant emphasized, the talent of a genius should become a model. And in modern psychological studies of the mechanisms of creativity, the ability to it as a self-healing process is also considered as a "correlate of giftedness" (D. B. Bogoyavlenskaya). In Kant's view, the creative act, as it were, complements the activity of the mind in summing up one concept under another, with the essential difference that the summing procedure itself is reformatted here – now foresight consists in finding out whether a concept can be summed up not under another concept, but under a rule that is in constant search of a mentor in its own normative sphere and the talent itself becomes a model Analog of such a mentor is the natural ability of judgment, in whose parting words the rule just needs. But the relationship between them is interdependent, because the rule itself serves as a tool for correcting her herself, even in order to cast a critical glance at her incorrect movements. It is noteworthy that the normative sphere itself can no longer be attributed to the class of theories subject to renormalization. It is impossible to teach such a natural talent, there is simply no place to study it – there is no school in which the makings of talents that elevate us are revealed. The rich intellectual, religious and philosophical history of the gift can be found in some foreign studies ^[2]. In place of creative giftedness in art, something else cannot be put as an equivalent, since its value is found only in the corresponding moods, and even taste, which has only an affective price, is not subject to any metaphorization, since it corresponds to "favor for the simple aimless play of our feelings" ^{[22, p. 187]}. The gift itself can only be felt in some way, as the hero of Vladimir Nabokov's novel "The Gift" Fyodor Konstantinovich Godunov-Cherdyntsev felt it in himself, who at one time "with some joyful, proud energy, with passionate impatience was already looking for the creation of something new, still unknown, real, fully responding a gift that he felt like a burden in himself." But when we speak of this gift, we do not mean one sensual contemplation, not one sensual condition for the application of pure concepts of the understanding (schematism). Joseph Brodsky generally associated the idea of him with the problem of scale – after all, the gift is always smaller than the giver.

From Kant's point of view, when we discuss the problem of the gift, we also mean the so-called natural mind, with its power of reason and its own concepts, that is, the ability to think. Subsequently, Martin Heidegger will associate the phenomenon of thinking itself with a gift, but expressed by another German word – die Gabe, which also translates as a gift, a gift is an asset that we call talent. If the gift of judgment conceived by Kant presupposes a normative parting word, then the gift understood by Heidegger is an incentive to think, which is analogous to the act of manual work. As Derrida emphasized, "if there is thinking of the hand or the hand of thinking, as Heidegger gives it for thinking, then this hand no longer belongs to the system of conceptual grasping. They belong rather to the essence of the gift (Gabe), to giving, to giving (Gebund), which – if it were possible – would give without taking anything in return" ^{[14, pp. 281-282]}. Even this cursory glance shows how important the aesthetic signature of transcendental anthropology is – a signature that is determined by the metaphysics of creativity.

Thus, it is difficult to overestimate the understanding of the connection between the aesthetic and the ethical and the methodology behind it.  Aesthetics reaches some depth of the methodology itself. At this depth, a peculiar aesthetic ability of rational grasping is felt - the ability of the mind to see only what it creates according to its own project, the ability to improve the method of metaphysics. Kant associates the development of lofty problems of metaphysics with the apotheosis of the entire culture of the human mind. Kant's methodology itself can be aesthetically viewed as a methodology of transcendental architecture.

Pleasure and the culture of spiritual gifts.

Concluding his speech in Berlin on October 22, 1818, Hegel gives a brief description of the metaphysical system. "The hidden essence of the universe does not possess the power in itself that would be able to resist the boldness of knowledge, it must open up to him, unfold the depths of its nature before his eyes and let him enjoy them" ^{[9, p. 83]}. But what kind of pleasure is this, or the concept of pleasure close to it in its meaning, and how will it be portrayed by Kant in connection with cognitive activity, how will it be integrated into the aesthetic structure of the action, its justification? The scope of the article will not allow us to consider this problem in the context of the entire system of Kantian criticism, so far we will focus only on those aspects that are present in Kant's ethical works.

The aesthetic signature is also determined by the conceptual abilities of the mind to excite a subjectively fundamental sense of pleasure associated with the deepest joy or, if we recall Epicurus, with a joyful heart. The situation is different when we consider the faculty of desire, the concept of which eliminates all pleasure or satisfaction. In the moral judgment itself, we are dealing with a special kind of pleasure – a practical pleasure or one that arises on the intellectual basis of the represented good. The importance of its consideration in this context is determined by the fact that the pleasure arising from the aesthetic contemplation of an object is mainly determined by practical expediency in the architectonics of the object, and not by its aesthetic figure. At the nonconceptual level of understanding of the ability of desire, it may well be even about some kind of negative pleasure, which speaks of our independence from sensual inclinations, or about the manifestation of empirical interest in the existence of the object of feelings, as well as intellectual interest in the existence of the object of will. But the very question of the relationship between the concept of pleasure, as it is understood in practical philosophy, and the idea of the highest pleasure experienced in aesthetic contemplation is quite complicated, since this idea combines, as can be seen from the materials for the "Critique of Pure Reason", the ideas of feeling, perfection, beauty, affiction and the ability to distinguish. The phenomenon of pleasure is connected with the field of feelings, and the relations of things affecting our sense of pleasure are indicated by the predicate of affinity. That is, here we are not talking about objective properties, but about the ability to distinguish them according to the feeling of pleasure, about the way the soul affects. As for the aesthetic side itself, it should be borne in mind that sometimes in the affiction itself they saw "the knowledge of perfection and imperfection of objects, but perfection is not a sense of beauty and pleasure, but the completeness of the object. And although it is true that every completeness is pleasant, and we have the ability to apply the idea of perfection to everything and depict everything as complete, however, the knowledge of completeness, i.e. the perfection of an object is not the knowledge of pleasure, because the question still remains whether it is connected in some cases with pleasure and displeasure. If we assume that the object is an object of pleasure, then perfection is also liked, and then completeness is not always even required for pleasure" ^{[17, p. 152]}.

And here it is time to return to the problem of the factual side of knowledge, which takes the meaning of a synonym of truth, to the problem of expanding the very concept of fact. A fact, according to Kant, is a subject for a concept whose objective reality can be proved. But is it possible to prove an astounding aesthetic fact, if we take it as an episode of the process of formation of practical philosophy, which not only builds a definition of the subject, but also gives it a real status? Among the variety of facts, Kant highlights in practical philosophy the subject field of experience, which depends on ideas, first of all on a unique idea – "the idea of freedom, the reality of which as a special kind of causality ... is proved by the practical laws of pure reason and, in accordance with them, [is found] in actual actions, therefore in experience. – This is the only one of all the ideas of pure reason, the subject of which is a fact" ^{[18, p. 791]}. Conformity to facts refers to the level of claims formed under the influence of those that are presented to the scientific theory. Aesthetic theory also makes a claim to correspond to the facts of aesthetic experience and the history of art. But Kant's aesthetics is a theory of a special rank – philosophical. In it, the universal significance of an aesthetic judgment cannot be proved logically, as in science, so here the understanding of a fact is closer to its interpretation as an empirical basis for creating an aesthetic theory referring to superempirical, supersubjective meanings that cannot be extracted from facts, and in this sense, elements of specific objectivity, facts, evidence that we have, for example, aesthetically perceived something, accepted as a given, the self-evidence of aesthetic consciousness, the facts of its reproduction. In art, the reality of the idea of freedom is revealed in the experience of its creation, and this event of pure reason (and the very desire for an event, as Derrida emphasized, is never allowed) is the actual frontispiece of aesthetic knowledge, saying that there is a fact of aesthetic connection as something that actually took place in the space of communication of some substances with each other. This communication is an invisible condition for the existence of beauty. The aesthetic fact itself happens as a unique human event. But should we start from this fact as a prerequisite for the embodiment of the supersensible in the sensually perceived world? And can we feel pleasure from such an incarnation?  

The relationship between the idea of the supersensible and our abilities has a clearly defined orientation: in the process of realizing this relationship, according to Kant, the image of a moral being is set. But how can the feeling of pleasure be integrated into the structure of this intentionality? For Kant, the common way of justifying pleasure through the ability of desire seems problematic, which would direct the attitudes of practical reason along an empirical path. Although even in the sketches of 1778-1780, he sees in pleasure something belonging to desire. Therefore, in the Critique of Practical Reason, he gives his own, purely rational, definition of pleasure as "the idea of the correspondence of an object or act with the subjective conditions of life, i.e. with the causality ability possessed by the representation in relation to the reality of its object (or the determination of the forces of the subject to activity in order to create it)" ^{[22, p. 297]}. This formulation in some part coincides with the definition of pleasure in the materials for the "Critique of Pure Reason". In essence, such a definition gives a kind of analogue of Kant's factology, the idea of a kind of fact of life. For Kant, the representation itself is not just a conceptual structure, since it directly correlates with the concept of life itself – this internal principle of self-activity, or, as A. Bergson will say, "the incessant flowering of novelty." Life is the ability to act according to the principles of the ability of desire, which precisely constitutes the specified causality, creates opportunities for working with representations through which their objects are determined. Kant's understanding of life, which does not coincide with the interpretations of its biological structure, but complements them, turns us to comprehending it as, in essence, an activity of consciousness, as a transcendental possibility. And it is precisely the feeling of pleasure that Kant considers as a contribution to life, which also appears in the aesthetic field. "Objects are beautiful, ugly, etc., not by themselves, but in relation to living beings... Pleasure and displeasure are the ability of agreement or opposition of the principle of life to certain representations or impressions of objects" ^{[17, p. 152]}.  

How does the feeling of pleasure appear when thought moves towards the distinction and unity of the good, useful and pleasant, delivered by a simple sensation? Before answering this question, it is necessary to trace the evolution of Kantian thought related to the interpretation of the image of pleasure. If we follow the logic of the first "Criticism", then practical philosophy should be considered as an expression of the modality of pleasure – at least, all its conceptual tools relate to the structures of pleasure, enjoyment, which are taken out of the framework of representation as a reproduced image of the object, and therefore excluded from cognitive ability. However, the materials for the first "Criticism" allow us to conclude that such a ruling is hardly justified. "A being," writes Kant, "who does not act, is deprived of the ability of pleasure" ^{[17, p. 153]}. To judge these structures, concepts from the field of specific rationality are required. What is pleasant to us excites a sense of pleasure, which in practical philosophy has a special status, being distinguished by a certain steadfastness in relation to other attitudes and values of practical life. In the materials for the Critique of Pure Reason, pleasure is generally regarded as the "basis of activity", as "an experience in accordance with the general feeling through the sensory faculty of judgment. This is something in between, learned from sensuality with the help of an idea" ^{[17, p. 153]}, which paves the way to spiritual pleasure. If what we like is in harmony with the cognitive ability, then we can characterize it as good, the resulting pleasure can be considered as a reflective pleasure. At the same time, the connection between something we like or an object that generates a sense of pleasure and pleasure itself is optional. Otherwise, a modal judgment is built in aesthetics, where thinking about the beautiful just assumes such a commitment, even a necessary connection with a sense of pleasure. In addition, the very "pleasing as a result of agreement with the general feeling is beautiful" ^{[17, p. 153]}.

Pleasure belongs to the register of metaphysical sounding already in the intellectual culture of antiquity. And how problematic shifts are imprinted in theoretical discussions about pleasure can be observed by studying the entire Western tradition of philosophizing – from Plato and Aristotle to Freud. Plato attributes pleasure to the kind of limitless (apeiron), Aristotle, in whose aesthetics, as Derrida emphasized, the Western metaphysics of art recognized itself, to the kind of indefinite, since there are different degrees of its testing and enjoyment. Stagrit understands pleasure as something whole – a kind of monad that is entirely present in the present and acquires perfection at any arbitrarily taken time. In the Nicomachean Ethics, he represents pleasure as a kind of escort of consciousness activity, it corresponds to it (in its various forms – from mental activity to sensory activity, in which the innate judging, that is, discriminating, ability is realized; this does not mean that pleasure, inseparable from thought and feeling, is identical with them); like according to the waves, effectiveness can sometimes rise, becoming enthusiastic and tense, then fade, becoming careless, and fade, and such a metronome of activity sets the pace of pleasure manifestation. It brings us closer to some ultimate experience, which can only be realized philosophically. Yes, and philosophizing itself gives special pleasure, just assuming contemplative activity. "In any case, it is generally believed that philosophy, [or love of wisdom], contains pleasures that are amazing in purity and steadfastness, and, of course, those who have knowledge spend time in [contemplation] gives more pleasure than those who seek knowledge. And the so-called self-sufficiency is primarily associated with contemplative activity" (1177a 25-28). Pleasure and activity are interrelated, even merged with each other. The objective content of thought and feeling reveals at the same time the very principle of pleasure, the highest form of which is set by the structures of perfect activity having an aesthetic connotation. It is a kind of operator of activity. "Pleasure makes activity perfect [and complete] (teleioi) not as a property (hexis) inherent in it, but as a kind of completeness (telos) that arises along the way, like beauty in [people] in the prime of life" (ibid., 1174b 32-34). By bringing perfection to the activity, pleasure by its very integrity creates some additional strength for gaining the fullness of life. It can be regarded as a kind of force, sensual in its power, but spiritual to the extent that it can be a kind of moral vow.

In the treatise "On the Soul" Aristotle introduces the concept of pleasure in a context that only in the case of analyzing the problem of knowledge in action, recognition through similarity, as well as the similarity of sensory perception with thinking can contribute to an adequate understanding of the modality of this experience. The very concept of pleasure, which fluctuates in the space of the soul's activity, has various meanings that characterize it as a structure deeply rooted in the human race. Although it depends on the senses, it still refers not to the sensually perceived becoming that replenishes our nature, but to the process of realization, embodiment into reality and goal-setting, as well as the use of what is. Pleasure itself has a rather motley appearance: "the pleasures of beautiful things and of shameful things are different, and it is impossible to find pleasure in justice, being unjust, and in music, not being musical" (ibid., 1173b 28-31). But is it possible to clarify what it means to be musical, and how to integrate it into thinking, including theoretical thinking, approaching, for example, the creative nature of imitation with its complex configuration of relations to the phenomenon of pleasure?

We can experience pleasure both from speculation and from comprehension of the identical. Reaching a certain intensity and depth of experience, pleasure gives a kind of intentional "push", referring to "the activity of the center of feelings (aisth?tik? mesot?s) aimed at good or evil as such" ^{[2, p. 438; (III, VII, 431a 5-10)]}. At the same time, it is connected with the active nature of thinking itself and with the way we think of forms in images. Arguing about the nature of poetic art, Aristotle in "Poetics" finds one of its causes in the tendency to imitation, through which even the first steps to knowledge are made: "... the results of imitation give pleasure to everyone; the proof of this is the facts… Cognition is a most pleasant thing not only for philosophers, but also for other people, only the latter are involved in it to a lesser extent. Looking at the image, they rejoice, because they can learn from such contemplation and reason what is what" (1448b 5-15). But what assumptions are these proven facts based on, which are marked by a strong seal of their moral origin? We are talking about pleasures that are considered good, which should be recognized as inherent in human nature. A virtuous person, who sees the purpose of his own activity in beauty, turns pleasure into his property. Even the highest good is for Aristotle in a sense a pleasure. To understand pleasure and suffering, according to the Nicomachean Ethics, is "a task for a philosopher about state affairs. Who, like an architect, erects a [higher] goal, looking at which we define every thing as evil or as good in whatever sense" (1152b 1-5). Among the many forms and variants of hedonistic attitude, we also find aesthetic pleasure (for example, "a musician finds pleasure in beautiful melodies"). But speaking of pleasure in this sense, we have to redefine the very concept of aesthetic, some of its categorical structures. If we talk about ancient aesthetics, it is, first of all, the concept of imitation. Commenting on some passages in the Poetics and other treatises of Aristotle, where the problem of recognizing pleasure as a kind of cause of metaphor is considered, J. Derrida summarizes: "The prize in the form of pleasure rewards the economic unfolding of the syllogism hidden in the metaphor, the theoretical perception of similarity. However, the energy of this operation suggests that similarity is not an identity. Mimesis provides pleasure only on the condition that it allows you to see in the act that, nevertheless, does not give itself in the act, but only in its very similar counterpart, in the mimeme" ^{[13, p. 275]}.

The redefinition of the aesthetic concept entails a "meta-question": is it possible to make a pulsation composition, in the rhythm of which pleasure is carried out, internally connected with the affinity of sensuality, the effect of the object on the soul, with the intensity of sensory impulses, the subject of aesthetic theory? Trying to answer this question, we immediately encounter difficulties in explaining the collision between stimulus and freedom, sensuality and intellectuality, impulse and motive. It is clear that objects can affect our feelings, as a result of which the aesthetic principle of the game is unwound, "there is a game of sensations in the soul according to the ability of pleasure and displeasure" ^{[17, p. 161]}. But are they only the starting point of the affiction movement, and are there any restrictions for this act?  After all, sensuality can also act as a source of affiction, through the active soul certain structures are affected in thinking, and even more so in the process of volition, although not all moral phenomena are able to affect our feelings. The feeling of pleasure relates directly to the self–affiction of consciousness; by affecting and affecting itself (whether by objects, works, or states of the soul), pleasure is combined with other sensory impulses - after all, as Kant emphasizes, we are affected, and not only captured by passions. And here everything depends on the degree of freedom. When considering the pleasure that only "active entities" can experience through the sensory faculty of judgment (and for them all predicative relationships indicate signs of the ability to be affected by things as objects of pleasure), it must be borne in mind that semantic predicates themselves can be represented by various manifestations of a sense of contributing to life, expressing the consent of the principle of life and impressions of the object. In this regard, the question of the mode of affiction becomes important, about exactly how and with what the soul is aesthetically affected: if I reflect on the beauty of an object, then I comprehend "how it affects me" ^{[17, p. 151]}).

The understanding of some synonymous terms, for example, pleasure, bliss, depends on the feeling of pleasure that we experience, which gives us pleasure in practical judgment. Kant proceeds from this understanding when trying to solve the question of what each of us sees as his bliss, on which the basis of the ability of desire or the ability to act at his discretion rests. It is with desire that the feeling of pleasure directly correlates – it is a subjective expression of the world of human ideas and aspirations. And although pleasure, within the limits assigned to it by practical, appears as a heterogeneous phenomenon, sometimes not knowing any final satisfaction, nevertheless, this subjective expression does not imply any verbal competition, clarification of relations, explanation, discussion. Therefore, the reduction of the judgment of taste to such an expression can be characterized by a Latin saying: de gustibus non disputandum (tastes are not disputed). Note that it is still necessary to be able to approach the aesthetics of this reduction, embedding it at least in Husserl's understanding of the reduction itself as the beginning of philosophy. When we mean the judgment of taste, the phenomenon of aesthetic pleasure and surprise, then the dispute is quite appropriate, especially if it occurs during the birth of a new philosophical system. It is then that the reduction itself manifests itself as a "surprise to the world" (E. Fink), and the transition to it and to what is after the fact of reduction is extremely important in aesthetics, since in it the completion of reduction will mean the discovery of the history of art, which can be interpreted as a layer of archaeological sources of consciousness. And this actually involves rewriting the entire history of world art. But back to the judgment of taste. In philosophical aesthetics, the dispute about tastes itself is conducted on the basis of the claim put forward by one of the parties to the universal communicability of the judgment about him. The judgment of taste is beyond the enjoyment of the pleasant precisely because of the former's claim to universal significance.

Pleasure as such is divided into two kinds – practical, necessarily related to the interest of the inclination, and pleasure distinct from it, optional, randomly set by an aesthetic program or associated with a desire for an object, this desire generates representations aimed at making their objects real, which can only be realized through activity. And the ability of pleasure itself is attributed by Kant in the materials to the "Critique of Pure Reason" to the feeling of activity, as a result of which pleasure itself can be considered as a predicate of desire, expressing the basis of the definition of objective representations. "The pleasure of an activity that produces representations is twofold: either we define this activity as if problematically, without considering whether it corresponds to the generation of representation, or we define representation because we have considered the basis of its ability to generate representation" ^{[17, p.157]}. The interpretation of this generative ability will be developed in the third "Critique". Aesthetic pleasure is conceived here as unrelated to the existence of the object of representation, it is peculiar only to the representation itself. Kant calls such pleasure contemplative, or inactive, benevolence. Benevolence itself is close to what Kant describes in the concept of taste, and in practical philosophy it will appear only occasionally. In the future, it will be important for Kant to identify different types of pleasure: the pleasure experienced in contemplating the beautiful is on a completely different level than the pleasure that causes pleasant and kind things in us, the manifestation of the latter in me is preceded by the greatness of the law as an action of free force, which is self-sufficient, does not depend on any other basis. The empiricism of the pleasant is inseparable from the interest in the subject, it is completely conditioned by its ontological framework. I can enjoy pleasant sounds, but I have no right to expect the same impression from another. The good can also give pleasure, but unlike the impression of the beautiful, moral pleasure develops in the process of forming such an idea that characterizes the attitude of the subject to the existence of the object. As a result of this specification, the aesthetic is allocated to an autonomous area, described by the concept of disinterested aesthetic pleasure and an indication of the claim of aesthetic judgment to universal significance (but this is not a logical universality, because this claim, the level of which is manifested only in the space of subjectivity, is based on a completely different basis – on the free play of cognitive forces). Analyzing the structure of aesthetic judgment in the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, V. F. Asmus emphasized that it "is not based either on the conscious interest of the subject or on his inclination. Expressing a judgment about the pleasure provided by the object, the subject feels free. He cannot point out as the basis of his pleasure any special conditions that would be inherent only to him as a given subject. But that is precisely why he should look at the personal pleasure he has experienced from the subject as having a basis in what he has the right to assume from everyone else. He has reason to assume the same pleasure for everyone" ^{[3, p. 443]}.

But this suggests that we learn about the facts of the location of pleasure in many places from the experience of communication, which again pushes us to the problem of the factual side of knowledge, which becomes more complicated in the analysis of practical reason. Here it is reflected in the form of the fact of reason – this, as noted in the comments to the Critique of Practical Reason, "a paradoxical concept that emphasizes, on the one hand, the non–deducibility of the moral law from experience (the fact of reason), on the other - its non-deducibility, direct evidence (the fact of reason)" ^{[24, p. 745]}. This is somewhat reminiscent of an aesthetic fact: the necessity of an aesthetic judgment also cannot be deduced from experience (as, indeed, from the concept), but at the same time its complete obviousness does not cause any doubt.  The paradox of the fact of reason contributes to understanding how it is possible to think a moral law. In the practical sphere, we are deprived of the opportunity to replace deduction from sources of a priori knowledge with empirical evidence. Therefore, "the moral law is given, as it were, as a fact of pure reason, a fact that we are aware of a priori and which is apodictically certain, assuming that no example can be found in experience where it is precisely observed. Thus, the objective reality of the moral law cannot be proved by any deduction and by any efforts of theoretical, speculative or empirically confirmed reason; therefore, if one wants to abandon apodictic certainty, this reality cannot be confirmed by experience, therefore, it cannot be proved a posteriori, and yet it is in itself indubitable." ^{[24, p. 391]}. But the situation changes if we deduce the moral principle from itself, revealing the kind of reliability of the moral law as a metaphysical causality that completely defines itself, then it is the law of causality through freedom, or what Kant calls the law of possibility of a supersensible nature. Within the framework of such deduction, pure reason begins to ethically metaphorize, transferring the justification of the will into the intelligible order of things. Authenticity, conceived as a metaphysical law of aesthetic events in the sensually perceived world, characterizes knowledge of this law as establishing creation through freedom (absolute spontaneity), that is, art. Here the metaphysical law modifies the way of proving its facticity, its reality and immanence.

Morality is not based on passions, sympathies, inclinations and motives emanating from sensuality, on the concepts of pleasure or displeasure, but all this empirical and psychological series should be considered one way or another if we turn to the principles of morality. Ethics as a discipline is created within the framework of practical philosophy, which involves argumentation in favor of sensual nature. And all practical concepts. as stated in the Critique of Pure Reason, "they relate to objects of favor or lack of it, i.e. pleasure or displeasure, therefore, at least indirectly they relate to objects of our feelings. But since feeling is not the ability to imagine things, but is beyond any ability of cognition (although Kant sees sensuality as one of the two main trunks of cognition, but he portrays it as something by which objects are only given to us – N. K.), then the elements of our judgments, insofar as they relate to pleasure or displeasure, therefore, belong to the practical elements of our judgments, and not to the whole transcendental philosophy, which deals exclusively with pure concepts a priori" (B 829). This is one of the first references to the problem of feelings of pleasure and displeasure, which we already meet in the "Critique of Pure Reason".

Man as a rational being is sensually affective, but is it possible to talk in aesthetics about the ultimate forms of sensuality, the idea of which would predetermine such internal human states as pleasure or benevolence, their various types – benevolence to the beautiful, benevolence to the good and benevolence to the pleasant, intellectual satisfaction. That is, for aesthetics, the question of the criteria for the significance of this representation is important, and, consequently, the ability of the mind itself to excite these subjective states in the soul, although they mean absolutely nothing to the judgments of the mind itself. No less important is the question of how the idea of the feeling of pleasure is transformed from the second "Criticism" to the third. The feeling of pleasure, the intentionality of which does not relate to the same objects, even depends on how each of us regards, for example, bliss - this "still very random practical principle, which in different subjects can and should be very different and, therefore, can never be a law: when they want bliss, it is not the form of conformity to the law that is important, but only matter, namely, whether and how much I can expect pleasure if I follow the law" ^{[22, p. 337]}. Despite this, the feeling of pleasure is such a fundamental state of subjectivity that without it it is difficult to justify the ability of desire, which refers us to the representation that determines the will. Pointing out the conditions under which the practical synthesis of will and representation can become a priori, J. Deleuze notes that "even when the representation is a priori, it sets the will through pleasure associated with the object that is represented by this representation: thus, the synthesis remains empirical, or a posteriori; the will is set "pathologically"; the ability of desire he is at the lowest level. In order for the latter to reach its highest form, the representation must cease to be a representation of an object, even if it is a priori. It should become a representation of pure form" ^{[11, p. 150]}. But how is this pure form possible, and how does the status of the feeling of pleasure in the moral sphere differ from its status in the aesthetic sphere. The difference is that in the first case, pleasure recedes into the background, as it were, and the will set by the ability of desire is no longer determined by it, but by the form of the law, and in the second, the feeling of pleasure itself is attributed to the concept of expediency, as a result of which an aesthetic idea of expediency arises. So, in fine art, "the very essence is a drawing in which the basis of all the prerequisites for taste is formed not by what gives pleasure in sensation, but only by what one likes due to its shape. The colors that color the drawings belong to the attractive; they themselves can, however, enliven the object for sensation, but they cannot make it worthy of contemplation and beautiful" ^{[18, p. 205]}. However, the question of the aesthetic meaning of expediency itself seems quite problematic.

The ability to feel pleasure itself has, as already noted, various forms – from the lowest to the highest. Another question is what are the origins of the ideas themselves associated with the feeling of pleasure. The ideas that we encounter in aesthetic judgments cannot stem from an external feeling, otherwise we would reduce them to an attraction interested in the existence of an object that gives pleasure, and would characterize them as generating a pleasant sensation.  These ideas cannot arise from reason, which determines "an arbitrary choice only because they presuppose a feeling of pleasure in the subject, then the fact that it serves as the determining basis for an arbitrary choice depends entirely on the ability of the inner feeling to be affected by something pleasant" ^{[22, p. 331]}. Pleasure as the basis of an arbitrary choice depends even less on a practical interest in the existence of the object of the will. And only in the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment" will Kant find a form for the ability to feel pleasure, which can be associated with an aesthetic representation that a priori establishes the highest states of subjectivity. What kind of form is this?

Apparently, not only knowledge can be a priori, but also an act of a special kind – although knowledge is also a certain order of compression of the activity itself. Kant, as it were, reproduces the idea of a kind of aesthetic a priori – if we keep in mind the attitudes of modern philosophy, then it can be considered as a kind of pre-experimental a priori, pragmatic a priori. Aesthetics itself, as we have seen, is in a complex relationship with the structure of practical reason, which allows us to experience "the sublime character of our own supersensible existence" ^{[22, p. 515]}. However, it does not coincide with the practical interest of the subject. This sublime character has a rather complex aesthetic drawing, made, including moral lines, because there is nothing sublime in the personality itself, in the person itself, since it is subject to the moral law. But the sublime is present here insofar as the person is at the same time legislative in relation to this law and only therefore obeys it" ^{[22, p. 203]}. This ethical interpretation of the sublime will be developed in the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment" in the analysis of the mathematically and dynamically sublime. How, then, can one comprehend the aesthetic without going into the tools of the third "Criticism" yet? The only thing that can be said, paraphrasing Kant, is that we do not comprehend the absolute necessity of the aesthetic, but we nevertheless comprehend its incomprehensibility. And, perhaps, it may not even be about comprehension, not about understanding, but about some other aesthetic structures - for example, about amazement. Recalling his first impression of the theater, Eugene Ionesco wrote that he was "captured not by the plot, but by movement, a whole lot of people, a moving world. What was happening between the characters did not interest me, I was struck by the presence (la pr?sence) of everything, the phenomenon of the entire universe, which seemed to unfold in a reduced form before my eyes. Again I realized that something was happening, that there were people here for a reason, that I was here, that I was looking at everything… I have retained the ability to be amazed, thanks to which I can sometimes get out of the maelstrom of things and return to my real place, attentive immobility. It is no longer me, but the world, the creations are moving terribly and majestically, stunning me: this is a narrative, an epic, a performance. It is worth starting it with explanations, as we cease to understand anything… Not to understand – to be amazed – that's what is closer to comprehending the incomprehensible."

The question of the relationship between practical reason and aesthetic, creative reason is extremely complicated. How complex it is becomes evident by the example of the faculty of desire, the various degrees of which depend on ideas arising either from feeling or from reason, which Kant also sometimes considers purely aesthetically – at least, he clearly says that "reason itself is distinguished by beauty (Verstand wird von Sch?nheit... unterschieden)" ^{[11, S. 327]}. In our life, we follow the laws of the supreme ability of desire, being determined by our own ideas, which specifically determine their entire subject field. In the context of reasoning about this ability, Kant introduces a concept that will become key in the aesthetic analysis of the ability of judgment – the concept of pleasure. If in the third "Critique" the feeling of pleasure – this connecting link between the faculty of cognition and the faculty of desire, thought of as something mysterious in the principle of the faculty of judgment – appears as one of the abilities of the soul, then in the "Critique of Practical Reason" Kant paves the way to understanding it, first of all, as the idea of proportionality, proportion life phenomena, which are inevitably subordinated by reason to the attribute of the thing itself, as subjective prerequisites of life itself, although the position remains quite problematic as to which of these structures is a sufficient condition for the formation of the fabric of the experience associated with pleasure. "If the concept of good is not to be derived from the practical law preceding [it], but should serve as a basis for this law, then it can only be a concept about the existence of which foreshadows pleasure and thus determines the causality of the subject, i.e. the ability of desire to create it. And since it is impossible to see a priori which representation will be accompanied by pleasure and which by displeasure, it would be a matter of experience alone to decide what is directly good and what is evil. The property of the subject, in relation to which this experience can only take place, is a sense of pleasure and displeasure as a receptivity inherent in the inner feeling" ^{[22, p. 425]}. From an aesthetic point of view, the image of the feeling of pleasure, correlated with the culture of spiritual gifts, is important here. The understanding of this image arises in the context of Kant's reflections on the first grounds of arbitrary choice. In the Critique of Practical Reason, such a basis is the attitude of the idea of an object that develops in subjective reality, within its limits the desire to realize this object is formed through the supreme ability of desire; it is this subjective attitude that Kant calls pleasure, which the objective world provides us with. But it is impossible to form a priori knowledge about such a representation regarding the possibility of its connection with pleasure. The situation is different with the understanding of the origins and causes of the highest pleasure from the beautiful, which we will meet in the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment. Here they are conditioned by the reflected representation of the form in the aesthetic judgment, and are in no way connected with the pleasure provided by the idea of the existence of a thing. Nor do they concern the pleasure associated with the representation of subjective conditions of life, which Kant considers in the Critique of Practical Reason. Such pleasure should be considered as the determining basis of the desire for this thing, which generates only a pleasant feeling. The subject anticipates this sensation from the actual object, caused by the very ability of desire, according to the laws of which people can act. An act as such has value depending on what directly determines the will – the moral law or the specified pleasant feeling. In addition, "one can find pleasure in the mere application of force, in the consciousness of the power of one's soul in overcoming obstacles that oppose our plans, in the culture of spiritual gifts, etc., and we quite rightly call it refined joys and joys, because they are more than any others in our power and they do not dull, but rather strengthen the feeling to even greater enjoyment of them and, while amusing us, at the same time develop our culture" ^{[22, p. 333]}. But how do these refined joys relate to aesthetic joy? And how to find the grounds for it? The answers to these questions are generally consonant with the principles of aesthetic methodology.

Therefore, the problem is how the mind can maintain its pristine purity in its judgments about the aesthetic. The epistemon from Descartes' "The Search for Truth through Natural Light" compares our feelings, inclinations and the ability to judge with the painters who participate in the work of these abilities. At the same time, the best of the painters is the mind itself. But here, before the aesthetician, who has reached, in Cartesian language, "the limit called the age of knowledge," the question arises: is it worth destroying the former building of aesthetic knowledge to the ground and erecting a new one? Cartesian answers to this question are well known. But does Kant share Descartes' point of view? In this section, we have touched on only one aspect of this problem, related to the portrayal of the concept of pleasure, with how it is embedded in the structure of aesthetic action, its justification. Descartes regarded pleasure as the love of beauty. We take a rather narrow framework for analyzing this problem, as it is developed in Kant's ethical writings. Already in the Critique of Pure Reason, the question arises about the ability to distinguish objective properties in accordance with the feeling of pleasure, in the future this topic develops as part of a mental action describing the relationship between the perfection of the object and the knowledge of pleasure, embedding the feeling of pleasure in the structure of a specific intentionality that sets the image of a moral being, in a way of promoting life, which also appears in the aesthetic field. Kant's moral philosophy allows us to give an answer to the question whether it is possible to make a composition of pulsation, in the rhythm of which pleasure is carried out, internally connected with the affectionation of sensuality, the effect of an object on the soul, the intensity of sensual impulses, the subject of aesthetic theory. 

Dramaturgy of the foundations of the aesthetic.

In Kant's interpretation of pleasure contained in moral philosophy, the moment of determining the forces of the subject to activity in order to create an object is important for aesthetics, and this makes it possible to strengthen the thematization of creativity in practical philosophy. For aesthetics, the concept of free will arising in this connection, which is under the sign of motives represented only by reason, is of obvious interest. Even in the sketches of 1778-1780, describing the ability of desire aimed at approving or disapproving of something, Kant emphasizes that it "must be active and consist in action. But our capacity for desire goes even further. We desire without even being active, without even acting. It is an idle desire, or dreaming [Sehnsucht], when we desire something without being able to achieve it. An active desire, or the ability to act and refuse to act in accordance with the approval or disapproval of the object, since this is the cause of the active power of generating the object, is free will (arbitrium liberum)" ^{[17, p. 157]}. Unlike benevolence, arbitrariness correlates with the ability to act at one's discretion, thereby revealing a certain creative moment, since this ability correlates with the baseless creation of an object, whether it is a work of art or some preparatory fragment for it. Such a creation has its own motivating reasons, which lie in the sensory domain. Aesthetically, it is important that the noble character of the desires themselves be formed, so that it is possible to avoid a situation where sensuality reigns supreme. "The free and fine arts are what leads us from the desire to enjoy to the desire to contemplate, which frees people from the bondage of the senses. After all, the one who, for example, finds pleasure in poetic matters is already free from gross sensuality" ^{[17, p. 160]}. But observing the proportion of sensual motives, the aesthetic movement again goes back to its foundation, since free will itself, taken in the context of the accomplishment of an act, is determined not by the motives affecting it, but by the basis, which is pure will, set by the idea of the goal; under the concept of will, in the autonomy of which a priori synthesis is concluded, and arbitrariness is summed up as a supersensible object, freedom itself is determined, according to Kant, by the ability of the subject as a thing in itself to spontaneously begin a state. The positive concept of arbitrariness correlates with the ability of reason, with its aesthetic side, which consists, firstly, in amazement at everything connected with the realization of the possibilities of the human mind, and, secondly, in understanding art as creation through arbitrariness, starting from the actions of reason. At the same time, the principle of conformity also comes into force with the freedom of arbitrariness, which has as its condition an action subject to the laws of obligation, which brings us closer to the aesthetic trajectory of the action itself. The personality is aware of the identity of itself in various ontological sections, and the actor himself is considered, thanks to the specified act of free will, as an action of action, even "as the creator of the action [Urheber der Wirkung], and it, together with the act itself, can be imputed to a person if the law is known before that, according to which some kind of obligation" ^{[19, p. 69; translation changed]}. This aesthetic constant is also directly related to the moral and practical law or to the categorical imperative, because the one who develops and establishes them, that is, the legislator, is the creator, although not of the law as such, but the creator of everything to which our own reason with its pure ideas a priori and necessarily obliges us, which, according to Kant, are God, freedom and immortality.

From the above triad, the transcendent and freedom are of fundamental importance for aesthetics. The concept of freedom justifies the entire space of moral ideas. Man, as a free being, is subject to moral laws, to which freedom prescribes the ultimate goal. Taken in its transcendental definiteness, the goal as such is conceived by Kant as the causality of the concept that grasps the object. The structures of mutual responsibility generate a moral duty, when a strict obligation must act under any conditions, creating proportionality with respect to the law, that is, the fulfillment of duty by a person as a free being. Man himself can and should be represented in a twofold sense: "from the point of view of the peculiarity of his capacity for freedom, that it is completely supersensible, therefore, is represented only from the point of view of his belonging to humanity as a person (homo noumenon), in contrast to the same subject, but burdened with physical definitions, from man (homo phaenomenon)" ^{[19, p. 113]}. But how this representation, this capacity for freedom is expressed in aesthetics, is revealed in the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment" in the context of reflections on the ideal of beauty, where the philosopher considers humanity itself in the person of a person as an intelligentsia – a person who aesthetically judges agreement with universal goals – as an ideal of perfection. The concept of freedom itself justifies the whole array of practical legislation, different from the principles of pure reason. But how can pure reason itself enter the path of the practical? Kant's answer is negative. "How pure reason can be practical - human reason is powerless to give such an explanation, and all efforts and labor to find this explanation are in vain" ^{[34, p. 269]}. Practical reason itself is somewhat similar to aesthetic reason - at least, the same principle of incompleteness is characteristic of both, and practical and aesthetic ideas refer us to a prototype, which can be approached indefinitely. And for aesthetics, of particular importance is the question of how freedom itself (this universal regulatory principle) and the unconditional practical law maintain an internal connection, how this connection is anthropologically fulfilled (the aesthetic aspect of this fulfillment indicates art as such, which is nothing but human mastery). For man, freedom is a transcendent concept, and its idea is the only concept of the supersensible, which, as already noted, proves its objective reality, its analogue and metaphor is nature itself – this, according to Kant, a model, a symbol of intelligible nature. Aesthetic consciousness of freedom is not given to us a priori, the question is different: are aesthetic synthetic judgments (that is, those in which such knowledge is expressed in the predicate, which was not previously implied in the subject) judgments a posteriori or a priori? For example, to which class should the judgments about art be attributed, which in its transcendental-anthropological dimension is conceived by Kant as creation through freedom. However, understanding this anthropological dimension is far from simple. Thus, unlike epistemology, moral philosophy as metaphysics does not depend on anthropology, although it nevertheless needs it in its public application. The problem is that freedom itself cannot serve as the source of comprehension of the absolutely practical as something non-empirical, its concept is purely negative and consciousness does not have direct access to it. And in the aesthetic sphere, the fact that the basis of freedom generated by the supersensible is connected with the human ability of judgment, which establishes harmony between imagination, freedom and reason, is of fundamental importance. In matters of fine art, Kant believes, the faculty of judgment stands rather on the side of reason than on the side of freedom and imagination. The source of practical comprehension can only be moral, although in the aesthetic sphere freedom itself is expressed more in play than in obedience to the moral law. This does not negate the principle of the artist's comprehension of inner freedom through the moral law that restricts it. In general, a person, as a sensually perceiving being, "judges that he can do something, precisely because of the consciousness that he must do it; and he learns freedom in himself, which otherwise, without a moral law, would remain unknown to him" ^{[19, p. 349]}.

As we can see, Kant thinks of the aesthetic as being on the border between the theoretical and the moral, while building a certain model describing their resonant interaction. True, this is a rather blurred boundary – indeed, where the boundary lies between the starry sky above us and the moral law in us, but it is along this that art makes its way.

According to Kant, we must think of the aesthetic in such a way that it is based on specific structures of the substantiation of our Ego consciousness, that is, so that it reproduces the two-fold image that a person thinks of himself: both as perceiving himself as a phenomenon in the sensory world, and as an intelligentsia independent of sensory impressions, that is, our true self as a result, a person can be attributed to the intelligible, supersensible world as the foundation of the sensory world. In the latter case, we carry out a certain aesthetic act of metaphorization, the condition of which is the ability to think of ourselves as free. As a result of the execution of this metaphorical act, "we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as a member of it" ^{[19, pp. 241, 243]} and learn the autonomy of our will as an intelligentsia, as well as its consequence – morality.

Hence, in order to answer the question of how the aesthetic is possible, it is necessary first of all to understand how Kant structures his teaching about the higher abilities of man as a subject of the intelligible world, the idea of which is connected with the concepts of possibility and activity. The mind's interest in the latter, in the volitional effort associated with it, or "the mind has a direct interest in action only when the universal significance of the maxim of this action is a sufficient determining basis of the will" ^{[19, p. 263]}. The aesthetic just refers us to the ultimate forms of activity unfolding in history, embodied in creativity and art. Their interpretations are more or less related to the understanding of whether we are able to represent the world and be realized in amateur activity. A magnificent picture of the abilities themselves is given in the "Fundamentals to the Metaphysics of Morals". "... A person really finds in himself the ability by which he distinguishes himself from all other things and even from himself, since he is affected by objects, and this ability is reason. The latter, as pure amateur activity, surpasses even reason, among other things, also in the following respect. Although the understanding is an amateur activity and does not contain, like feeling, only representations that arise only when we are affected by things (i.e., passive), nevertheless, with the help of its activity, it can create exclusively such concepts that serve only to bring sensory representations under rules and in this way unite them in one consciousness; without such use of sensuality, the understanding could not think anything at all. The mind, under the name of ideas, shows such pure spontaneity that in this way it goes far beyond everything that sensuality can give it, and performs its most important task by distinguishing the sensory world from the intelligible, however, by this it outlines its boundaries to the mind itself" ^{[19, p. 239]}. This interpretation of abilities is extremely important in terms of our research, because it is based on the understanding of their internal connection, a kind of consonance of all three abilities, perceived by consciousness as an integral structure, that the Kantian aesthetics will be built.  To create it, Kant will need to discover, as he admits in a letter to K. L. Reinhold, another kind of a priori principles (albeit the "poorest in the basics" of the a priori definition), different from those on which the building of speculative and moral philosophy is being built. He hopes to build the aesthetic building itself on a foundation in which the elements of the entire system of the soul's abilities will be laid.

The design of this building involves the development of issues related to the understanding of the paradoxical method, which makes it possible to clarify the attitudes of the researcher who judges the beautiful in nature and in art, or the attitudes of the methodological consciousness of the artist, who, in the image of the subject of freedom as a noumenon, simultaneously turns out to be a phenomenon in the experience of his own creativity. He, like every free person, can judge his own actions, which are necessary, but have not yet been accomplished. Hence the paradoxical nature of the requirements for identifying the meaning aesthetically visible by the subject or created by the artist. All these problems become the subject of discussion in modern Kant studies – not only in the extensive scientific literature, but also in philosophical forums (at some of them there was an acute question about how Kant works out the philosophical contours of the beautiful ^{[8, p. 3]}). Bearing in mind this paradox, it is quite natural to ask about the place of aesthetics in the system of philosophy, whether, for example, it is not a manifestation of just what Kant calls the luxury of reason. And, in general, can aesthetics be attributed to metaphysics or pure philosophy? Or it belongs to the category of those disciplines that mix pure and empirical principles, which is why they cannot be recognized as philosophical. The aesthetic (as well as some moral structures) can also be said to contain "certain subjective limitations and obstacles, but the latter not only do not hide and obscure it, but, on the contrary, shade it through contrast, so that it only shines brighter through them" ^{[22, p. 71.]}

The aesthetic facet of this problem is felt in the "Critique of Practical Reason" when trying to solve the question of what grounds the will has – empirical or pure. If the definition of the will were based on the concept of good, then it would have to be recognized that, since "this concept has no practical law a priori as a guiding thread, then it would be possible to see the criterion of good or evil only in accordance with the object with our sense of pleasure or displeasure, and the use of reason could in this case, it consists only in determining, on the one hand, this pleasure or displeasure in full connection with all the sensations of my existence, on the other – the means to acquire their object" ^{[22, p. 439]}. Such a definition is possible only empirically, but then one would have to admit that practical reason has lost a priori legislation. Reason and reason have different views on the problem of pleasure, on its empirical nature, but pleasure itself enters into the structure of subjectivity, decorated with the features of good will. Unlike the mind, the mind recognizes the will directly, and not through an incoming sense of pleasure.

But what, in fact, is the basis of pleasure, and the aesthetic principle in general? It, like any principle, "must be based on concepts; on any other basis, only flashes can take place" ^{[22, p. 715]}, the manifestations of which in the aesthetic sphere have no meaning. Of course, these concepts can only claim to be subjectively practical, and this meaning is associated with the expression of a sense of admiration, nobility and generosity, something hidden in us that elevates the soul, morally shapes it. Therefore, we can make sure that "human nature is able to rise above everything in such a way that only nature can give in the form of an incentive to the opposite" ^{[22, p. 719]}. But there is also something aesthetically disturbing here. After all, if human nature did not change, then "the moral value of actions, to which the entire value of the individual and even the value of the world in the eyes of higher wisdom is reduced, would cease to exist at all. Thus, as long as the nature of people would remain the same as now, their behavior would simply turn into a mechanism where, as in a puppet show, everyone gestures well, but there is no life in the figures" ^{[22, pp. 691, 693]}. True, puppet theater is only one of the varieties of art, and aesthetic figures themselves are unthinkable without figurative synthesis as a product of transcendental imagination. Although the question of the relation of aesthetics to the unchangeable human nature, of course, is not removed by what has been said.  

Feelings of admiration for what elevates the soul are aroused in us first of all by the laws of morality, the legislator of which can be a person as the face of a person – this carrier of an exalted image; such admiration is also aroused by the concepts of the law of duty in relation to the moral law, which poetry perfectly conveys, for example, some lines of Juvenal. Aesthetic structures are no less important in the vivid depiction of moral mood, which allows "to make the purity of the will impressive by examples, at first only as its negative perfection, since in an act of duty it is not influenced by any motives of inclination as a determining basis" ^{[22, p. 725]}. The law as such must be observed out of duty, and not for any near-aesthetic reasons, such as an appropriate frame of mind, an idea of an exalted act committed not because of the wisdom of morals, but simply in an affective state, spontaneous aspiration or a fantastic mental disposition. All of them are connected with ethical dreaminess that transcends the boundaries of pure practical reason and captivates many minds with its imaginary, not actual moral perfections, perfections as such, without which it is difficult to imagine the idea of humanity. By the way, the idea as such, according to Kant, is also impossible to think outside of perfection, including the moral idea as a prototype of practical perfection. But the field of ethical reverie has its limits, because approaching the aesthetic impressionability associated with it, as well as "encouraging actions as noble, sublime and generous, we only set our minds on moral reverie and inflate people's self-conceit, because we inspire them with the insane illusion that the determining basis of their actions is not duty" ^{[22, p. 505]}. In fact, aesthetics as such, and not its replacement, is correlated with the idea of perfect duty, an aesthetics analogous to transcendental aesthetics in the analysis of theoretical pure reason and characterized by Kant as the aesthetics of pure practical reason; its justification will be conducted in the context of ideas about freedom as a condition of the moral law, its sublime character, about morality as a consequence the autonomy of the will, about the sublime image of human nature itself. After all, the condition of human dignity "can only be that which elevates a person above himself (as part of the sensually perceived world), which connects him with the order of things that only reason can think of and which at the same time encompasses the entire sensually perceived world, and within it is the empirically determined existence of a person in time and the totality of all goals (which only befits such an unconditional practical law as moral)" ^{[22, p. 511]}. If the objective basis for the self-determination of the will, subject to moral law, is the goal (Kant thinks of the will itself as the ability of goals and the inner sense of pleasure that is rooted in us, which we seek and cultivate), then it is unlikely that such an objective basis can be found for the feeling of pleasure itself as a purely subjective ability that cannot to serve as the first basis of a moral act. In this connection, in the second "Critique" there is even a certain opposition between the practical and the aesthetic: "the direct determination of the will by reason alone is the true basis of the feeling of pleasure, and it remains a purely practical, and not an aesthetic definition of the ability of desire" ^{[22, p. 601]}. But this position problematizes the understanding of aesthetics as a structure adjacent to practical philosophy. Will Kant find a way out of this difficulty? First of all, it is important to get rid of all kinds of illusions about the possibilities of the aesthetic, as well as from taking moral motives for sensual motives. "To be determined to actions," writes Kant, "directly by the pure law of reason, and even to feed the illusion that the subjective in this intellectual definiteness of the will is something aesthetic and the action of a special sensually experienced feeling (after all, intellectual feeling would be a contradiction) - all this is something extremely sublime in human nature" ^{[22, p. 603]}, and, therefore, there is something purely aesthetic in it. But Kant warns against what he calls a false glorification of the moral mood. And even aesthetic joy cannot be the basis of a moral act. Some philosophers, who sought to identify the principle of morality, avoided the path of searching for "a law that would determine the will a priori and directly and only in accordance with it – the object. They could see this object of pleasure, which was to constitute the highest principle of good, in bliss, in perfection, in moral feeling or in the will of God, but their foundation has always been heteronomy, and they inevitably had to come across empirical conditions for moral law, because their object as the direct determining basis of the will they could to be interpreted as good or evil only depending on how the will directly relates to the feeling, which is always empirical" ^{[22, pp. 441, 443]}. Only under the sign of rational formal legislation can the rehearsal of the beginning of practical reason take place a priori. Considering the grounds for satisfaction, pleasure with a perfect act, Kant emphasizes that its roots do not go deep into the phenomenon of pleasure as such, because it itself is set by a rational definition of the will and "remains a purely practical, not an aesthetic definition of the ability of desire. And since this definition internally encourages activity as well as the feeling of pleasure expected from a planned action, to the extent that we easily take what we ourselves do for something that we only passively feel, and then we take moral motives for a sensual motive, as always happens with the so-called deception of the senses... Respect, and not pleasure or the enjoyment of happiness, is, therefore, something for which no previous feeling based on reason is possible (because such a feeling would always be aesthetic and pathological)" ^{[22, pp. 601, 603]}. The feeling of aesthetic pleasure itself is difficult to find an analogue in the moral world, at least Kant doubts that such an analogue can be the consciousness of direct compulsion of the will by moral law. The phenomenon of self-satisfaction is especially important here. If freedom (the only one, according to Kant, of all the intelligible that is in us) since the ability to observe the moral law is separate from inclinations, then "aesthetic satisfaction (as it is not called in the proper sense of the word), which is based on the satisfaction of inclinations, no matter how subtle they may be portrayed, can never be adequate to what they think about it. In fact, inclinations change, strengthen when they are favored, and always leave behind more emptiness than the one they thought to fill [with them]. Therefore, they are always burdensome for a rational being, and although he cannot give them up, they still make him want to get rid of them" ^{[22, p. 605]}. Freedom itself is symbolically likened to pleasure, which in this case can be considered as bliss.

Practical reason reveals the foundations of the process of creating the objectivity corresponding to the representations, that is, the foundations of the will – this ability of practical reason to realize this objectivity. Therefore, it is difficult to agree with the point of view of some researchers who believe that the explication of the methodological principle of conformity formulated by N. Bohr – in the language of aesthetics, this principle can be characterized as the principle of harmony (or as what N. Bohr himself will call harmonic components) – took place only in the “Critique of the ability of judgment". In fact, the features of this methodological principle are already visible in the "Critique of Pure Reason" and in the "Critique of Practical Reason", where even pleasure itself is thought of as an image of the conformity of the object with the subjective conditions of life. By analogy with the transcendental aesthetics developed in the first Critique, Kant admits even the aesthetics of pure practical reason that is not identical to it, expressing the hope that in the future it will be possible to comprehend both as elements of the unity of the entire faculty of pure reason, overcoming its division into theoretical and practical reason. The beginnings of aesthetic a prioriism are already present in biblical thinking, this is the a prioriism of creation, absolute creativity, all the stages of which, from the first to the seventh day, set the a posteriority of the created, when each act of creation ends with an ontological statement: "let it be", "and it became so." We are talking, as it is said in the epistle to the Hebrews of the Apostle Paul, about "the foundation of which the artist and builder is God" (11, 10) in his formidable greatness, and this Artist, as Descartes would say, does not precede me in time, and therefore we can only talk about the unfinished foundation of aesthetics, containing it proof.

But how can we construct a rational statement about the aesthetic if its basis is not explicit, if it does not contain the basis of why we know what we know aesthetically, dealing with unproven knowledge, with an indefinable basis. The very statement about the aesthetic, as we have seen, does not have rational transparency. Does this mean that we should judge him, as Kant would say, without any grounds that could be cited? The tradition of transcendental philosophizing thinks the rational utterance itself in such a way that something factual is embedded in its center, which cannot be reproduced on analytical grounds, this is facticity within consciousness itself, when something really exists, but it is impossible to understand with the mind. As it is impossible to understand the movement of Michelangelo's hand when he created the ceiling frescoes of the Sistine Chapel, Goethe emphasized that without seeing them, "it is difficult to form a visual idea of what one person can do" ("kann man sich keinen anschauenden Begriff machen, was ein Mensch vermag"). Works of art can be understood only on their own (and not on a knotted relationship with others) grounds. And in aesthetics they can be comprehended if they are reduced (and the reduction itself, according to M. Merleau-Ponty, stretches the intentional threads connecting us with the world as it is) to such a phenomenon of knowledge that accommodates transcendental structures of consciousness, structures of awareness of their way of being given to consciousness, here art itself is revealed as the horizon of consciousness is like the consciousness of a visible work.

The aesthetic is a modification of our consciousness, and consciousness itself, as V. F. Asmus emphasized, is the first object really given to us, which does not require any explanation, projection or representation. And having such a conceptual consciousness, you can completely rebuild your ideas about art, your knowledge about it into aesthetic knowledge, or derive it "from some grounds that are revealed when the spirit is turned to itself (reflection works)" ^{[6, p. 363]}, when the reflexive ability of judgment is applied, the reflexive unity of the artist's consciousness is manifested. Hence the synthetic nature of the bases of reproduction of the artist's Ego in time is clear. Therefore, the transcendental tools are implicitly embedded in the very foundation of aesthetics, projections of the manifestation of the actions of the "inner" in the artist are laid, some self-reflective structures of the experience of artistic consciousness are allowed, which are integrated as a priori into the transcendental apparatus justifying the possibility of the first object actually given to us. And bearing in mind this intuition of consciousness, one can both assert and deny that the aesthetic justifies itself, one can admit that it is both communicable and unreported. The whole drama of the foundations of the aesthetic does not presuppose any of its scenario as a basis for the construction of aesthetic thinking, since this scenario is historical and non-logical, it is a reductive case, and its very possibility is based on freedom. In addition, we do not know the true foundations of creativity, in its reality, in its primary authenticity, it is clear from itself, that is, absolutely, and the artist uses this reality only in relation to what he knows from himself. Each work of art is a system of interactions and syntheses that create their own foundations. Another question is how they relate to the ideally initial ones in relation to the world and man, with absolute foundations, without which there is no aesthetics (with its paradoxes of creativity and creation: "free creation of what cannot be otherwise" ^{[6, p. 400]}). The structures of transcendental metaphysics "can, for example, clarify that if we called the inexpressible, say, "beauty", then it is pointless to expect expressiveness and definiteness from beauty later: after all, calling something "beautiful" outside of us is its action in us - and then the meaning is absolutely complete, actually infinite, and there are no degrees, additions and additions or approximations" ^{[23, p. 576]}. We are talking about the absoluteness of what becomes the basis for the artist or generates it, but absoluteness in a strictly defined sense, because the foundations themselves, unlike semantic constructions, are not infinite. At another level – the level of metaphysical a posteriori, that is, knowledge gained from anthropological experience, already in New Testament thinking it is recognized: "whoever creates and teaches, he will be called great" (Mt 5:19). In other words, it expresses the need for a unique reproduction of the world by consciousness, the project of a new beginning of creativity, the creation of an eternally new, and such reproduction and design opens the border of aesthetic subjectivity.

Conclusion.

The relevance of the research is due to the need for a modern reading of the aesthetic heritage of Immanuel Kant. The subject of the research is the transcendental structures of the justification of the aesthetic category, identified by the German philosopher. The object of research is the interpretation of aesthetic phenomena, as they are understood by Kant mainly in the "Critique of Pure Reason" and in the "Critique of Practical Reason". Analysis of primary sources and research results of modern philosophers devoted to Kant's metaphysics and aesthetics has shown how unique a place in the history of world aesthetic thought is occupied by his development of the problems of the perfect, beautiful, sublime, heroic, tragic, the form of art itself as a symbolization of good. In fact, they formed the image of all modern aesthetic thought. The very structures of the substantiation of these concepts point to the paradoxical nature that the aesthetic has in transcendental philosophy. In one form or another, it contributes to understanding how the "idea of humanity in our subject" is possible. In this sense, it is important to distinguish between the grounds for beauty and the grounds for truth and goodness, taking into account that some researchers construct concepts that affirm the problematic nature of the latter. Since we are talking about aesthetic knowledge (and for Kant it is important that it is not illegal knowledge), we mean the structures of aesthetic predication, which means that we cannot extend the process of predication of the aesthetic any further and talk about the aesthetic in itself or by itself. In fact, Kant introduces the principle of relativity when he lays the foundation of the building of aesthetic knowledge.

The complexity of the analysis and research of the aesthetic foundations is connected with the identification of their unity, but at the same time with the assertion of their multiplicity and multidimensionality. The aesthetic itself is a modification of our consciousness, which is why it is so important to understand what role aesthetic attitudes play in creating the landscape of cognition, in forming the self-consciousness of a person who turns himself into a bowl in which, if it were filled, infinity would "foam" (Hegel), in determining the true horizon of social connections, in measuring new experience, associated with a high state of citizenship. We are talking, in particular, about such movements of the consciousness of society, by which it elevates itself, about ways of experiencing or catharsis, when an artist, without succumbing to the social craze, creates something indivisible so that a person can experience, for example, a feeling of love for the motherland, and this love, as Virgil said, will overcome everything.  The whole structure of art itself is based on the fulfillment of the impossible, but the paradox is that through this impossible we are able to see something in the world, give ourselves a new life in the face of works of art, works of productive imagination (they create a composition of the worlds of the universal primary basis), and the artist to find his own beginning in art. In this sense, art has no other grounds than itself, its obvious necessity: the composer thinks with music, making a spiritual discovery, and therefore it is impossible to determine the interval between the composer himself and his opera or symphony. So, without absolute foundations, there is no art, no beauty and perfection - with their timeless, eternal, that is, absolute foundations - there is no. All this speaks of the extraordinary complexity of the drama of the foundations of the aesthetic.