Comparative analysis of the integration groupings of the EU and the EAEU

Moroz Elena Nikolaevna Bachelor's Degree, the faculty of International Regional Studies and Regional Management, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation 119606, Russia, g. Moscow, pr. Vernadskogo, 84 Helen_moroz9@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

Integration (Lat. "integer" — "whole" or "integratio" - restoration, replenishment of the whole) involves the creation of a new independent whole formed from the totality of individual parts.

Regional integration is a long-term voluntary cooperation of two or more entities (States or State entities, respectively, especially Governments) in a limited geographical space for the purpose of permanent institutionalized merger and joint settlement in one or more policy areas.

The legal basis of regional integration, as a rule, is a contractual agreement, according to which material rules are adopted and/or institutions are created, which, if necessary, can be adopted.

It should be noted that regional integration is the process of peacefully overcoming political, material, economic and social barriers separating countries from their neighbors, as well as working together to manage common resources and work with regional wealth.

Russian economist, one of the founders of the national school of integration studies Yu.V. Shishkov emphasizes that the integration of national macroeconomic organisms is not a fashion, or even a method of trade or political confrontation between groups of countries, but "a natural phenomenon prepared by the entire previous history of human economic activity"^[1].

Yu.V. Shishkov proposes to comprehend the essence of integration through the concepts of internationalization and globalization. Based on the fact that internationalization is the most general concept of increasing interaction between States - from the first manifestations of the international division of labor to the modern complex and multilevel system of international relations and interdependencies - and - from bilateral to regional and global levels. Thus, in his opinion, "globalization is a new quality of internationalization at the stage of its maximum possible development in breadth, and integration is the highest stage of its development in depth".

Signs of integration

Doctor of Economics, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences O.V. Butorina identifies five main signs of integration ^[2]. The first is to characterize integration as a system (when the whole in question is greater than the sum of its constituent parts ^[3]). The result of integration is a synergistic effect, "that is, obtaining such a force that exceeds the sum of individual forces"^[2]. For example, the euro - the single European currency - is stable, has a high purchasing power, a high degree of public confidence in the monetary unit, a stable inflation rate and more weight than the previous national currencies combined.

The second sign is that the integration association is isolated from the outside world, and borders and barriers to trade and movement are eliminated inside the association, i.e. a free unified space is created. In other words, trade in goods within the integration grouping takes place without restrictions, and the import of the same goods is subject to a high tax or prohibitive anti-dumping duty. Isolation also occurs in other areas, for example, it is enough to recall the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Constitution, proclaiming European values and forming the so-called the ideological profile of unification in the world.

The third feature is that integration is purely voluntary. As O.V. Butorina notes, "the spontaneous increase in the interdependence of states (for example, due to active foreign trade, the activities of TNCs and financial groups) cannot be considered integration." In addition, the forceful unification of territories cannot be called integration.

The fourth characteristic is that, unlike international organizations, integration extends not only to foreign policy, but also to the domestic policy of the participating countries. In addition, international organizations are more specialized (for example, the OSCE - on security issues, the World Bank - in finance, WHO - on health). Regional integration associations have a more universal character and affect a large number of spheres (both political and economic), depending on the degree of integration.

The fifth distinctive feature, according to O.V. Butorina, is based on the awareness of regional integration as a community of the future historical destiny of its members. Or, in other words, the unity of the image of the future and the general desire for it.

We fully agree with the identified signs of integration processes, but it would be advisable to supplement the existing signs with another one - the presence of supranational governing bodies at high stages of integration, which is also a difference from international governmental organizations.

Effects and levels of integration

The division between countries caused by geographical location, poor infrastructure and ineffective policies is an obstacle to economic growth. Regional integration allows countries to overcome these costly divisions by integrating markets for goods, services and factors of production, thereby facilitating the flow of trade, capital, energy, people and ideas. Regional integration can be facilitated by a common physical and institutional infrastructure.

Regional integration can lead to significant economic benefits resulting from discrimination of non-residents in comparison with residents of the integration association, reduction of tariff barriers, elimination of other obstacles to free competition of commodity producers, capital investors and other economic entities.

Since regional integration creates winners and losers within the association, policies and institutions become necessary to ensure the inclusiveness of regionalism and the management of social, environmental and managerial risks.

There are two levels of integration processes. The first level is the processes of globalization, covering the whole world, uniting politics and economics, bringing together the legal systems of states and value systems. The next level is regional integration processes. They differ from simple globalization in that they are more deeply intertwined with the initially sovereign rights of the state and at the same time create an enclosing external framework of the region.

The result of regional integration processes is the formation of an interstate association with its own legal system. As an example, the European Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Eurasian Economic Union. In these integration groupings, there are features of such a legal phenomenon as community law ^{[4; p. 251]}.

Features of modern integration processes in Europe

The integration processes that began in Western Europe after the Second World War were unprecedented. At the beginning, when the consequences of the two world wars were still being felt, great importance was attached to pacification and stabilization of the region. The victorious powers sought, on the one hand, to resolve the age-old conflict between France and Germany, and, on the other, to reintegrate Germany into the international political and economic system.

Both Germany's accession to NATO in 1955 and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 contributed to the achievement of these goals. The creation of the ECSC, consisting of six countries - France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, and, later, in 1957, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC) was the first stage in the creation of a complex integration organization, which has now turned into the European Union.

The ECSC proclaimed the goal of strengthening peace in Europe and uniting peoples, and established a common market for coal and steel. The Euratom Treaty was created with the aim of developing cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. The EEC was necessary to create a common market with free movement of goods, and then goods, services, capital and individuals.

Economic cooperation has been the basis of integration building in Europe from the very beginning. At the moment, it is in the field of economic cooperation that the EU has achieved the greatest success. Despite the fact that political integration between Member States was seen as an inevitable and desirable outcome, the degree of integration was a matter of debate.

From the Schumann Declaration to the Fouche Plan. One of the first initiatives to develop political cooperation was the Pleven Plan of 1950. France, not supporting the idea of Germany's inclusion in NATO, offered its own version of the rearmament of post-war Germany within the framework of a single European defense community with supranational controls. The essence of this proposal was to prevent Germany from developing its own military potential. Despite the fact that the original plan did not suit both Britain and the legislative bodies of France, following the results of negotiations in May 1952, The Treaty on the European Defense Community (EDC) was signed. According to the agreement, it was planned to create a unified European army consisting of 14 French, 12 German, 11 Italian and 3 divisions from each Benelux country with a single control center. Simultaneously with the EDC, an attempt was made to create a European Political Community (EPC) with supranational governing bodies - the Executive Council and the People's Assembly ^[5]. As a result, the EDC was not ratified by the parliaments of Italy and France, which also put an end to the development of the EPC ^[6].

Another attempt to deepen political integration, also based on the French proposal, was made in 1960. At the initiative of Charles de Gaulle, negotiations were held with six members of the EEC on the creation of a European Political Union. The Special Committee under the leadership of C. Fouche was to consider the scheme of future diplomatic and political cooperation of the Member States. The result of these negotiations were two proposals of Fouche-I (1961) and Fouche-II (1962), which were based mainly on foreign policy cooperation, but other areas that were not previously within the competence of the European Community, such as science or culture, were also to become part of the European integration process. The projects for the creation of the union were not implemented. The French Government was inclined to intergovernmental cooperation, while the Benelux countries, in particular, considered the federal nature of cooperation to be the most acceptable. Nevertheless, the goals stated in Fouche's plans became the basis for European political cooperation established in the 1970s.

European political cooperation in the 1970s and 80s. International political events in the global arena and the positive development of the three European Communities in the 1960s led to renewed discussions on the inclusion of political aspects in the integration agenda. After Pompidou came to power, in the very first months, France actively began to advocate for the development of the European integration process and proposed to convene a summit of heads of state to discuss issues of deepening and expanding integration.

The increasing role of the political direction of integration corresponded to the economic development of European countries. The Member States realized that with their growing economic importance, they would also have to take on greater political responsibility. Another reason for the intensification of discussions on political integration was the discussion of the expansion of the European Communities at the expense of Great Britain, Norway, Denmark and Ireland.

Davignon's 1970 report on the expansion of political cooperation among the member States of the European Communities in the field of international politics reflected this change of course from economic to political union. On the one hand, the member States declared their commitment to assume responsibility within the international community on the basis of the previous economic success of the integration bloc: "Realizing its responsibility due to its economic development, industrial potential and standard of living, the united Europe intends to increase its efforts in favor of developing countries in order to establish trusting relations between peoples." On the other hand, they emphasized the value orientation of the coordinated Community policy: "A united Europe should be based on a common heritage of respect for human freedoms and rights and unite democratic states with freely elected parliaments" ^[7].

The main idea of Davignon's Report was to create a mechanism for meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EEC countries, during which consultations on international issues would be held and, if necessary, coordination and discussion of positions and joint actions. It was also supposed to create a political committee consisting of the heads of various political departments of the national Ministries of Foreign Affairs to prepare ministerial meetings and, if necessary, working groups to consider specific issues of coordinated foreign policy.

The call for a coordinated presence of the European Community in the international arena was further specified at the meeting of Heads of State and Government in Paris in 1972. In paragraph 14 of the final statement, it is proposed to increase the frequency of meetings of foreign ministers up to four times a year, formulate common approaches on current, short- and medium-term issues and interact with Community institutions on issues related to European integration ^[8]. The Copenhagen Report of 1973, a document on European identity, also emphasizes the value orientation: "Wishing to ensure the validity of the legal, political and spiritual values that they profess, trying to preserve the rich diversity of their national cultures, realizing the existence of a common worldview, at the center of which is the social order at the service of people, they intend to defend the principles of representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice, which is the goal of economic progress, and respect for human rights as the main elements of European identity" ^[9]. Thus, the value orientation and reliance on the principles of the UN Charter as the basis for the formation of European foreign policy were the foundation of European Political Cooperation (EPC) until the creation of the CFSP and, therefore, were the guiding principle for the latter.

The concept of guiding principles was an important step towards a coordinated foreign policy. From the very beginning, the EPC did not have a legal basis, but existed in the form of a set of principles that Member States could be guided by in matters of foreign policy. In the early 1970s, the desire to coordinate national foreign policy was supported by simultaneous measures to deepen integration in the field of institutional development of the European Community, such as the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament or the establishment of the European Council, and further enlargement of the EU.

The events of international relations and crisis situations in the late 1970s, such as the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, outlined the boundaries of a common European foreign policy. However, the development of a unified approach to crisis situations was complicated by a long process of reaching consensus and agreeing on a common position, due to the intergovernmental nature of the EPC, and divergent national interests.

The institutional rapprochement of European political cooperation and the European Community became part of the discussion on further deepening of the European integration process, which resumed in the early 1980s. This was due to changes in the international system, such as the intensification of the conflict between East and West along the US–USSR line, the Malvinas/Falklands crisis between Argentina and Great Britain in 1982, and continuing problems in the Middle East and South Africa.

The first draft of the European Act, developed on the initiative of Germany and Italy in 1981, again contained a requirement to strengthen the role of the European Community in international relations. The 1981 Genscher-Colombo initiative for the first time pointed to the security component as part of a common European foreign policy, with which, however, not all Member States agreed. As a result, the conflict situations of the 1980s contributed to the intensification of efforts to change and institutional development of the European Community.

Only after the implementation of the Single European Act (SEA) signed in February 1986 and entered into force on July 1, 1987, the EPC received its first institutional consolidation in the provisions of the EU Treaty in accordance with Section III of the SEA "Regulations on European Cooperation in the Field of Foreign Policy" (Article 30) ^[10]. Until that time, the EPC was outside the institutional framework of the EU and was informal and non-binding.

While the EPC was an important and necessary step towards deeper political integration between the member States, its implementation remained outside the institutional framework of the EU, as it was not enshrined in the European founding treaties concluded in Rome and Paris. The consolidation of the foreign policy component in the European structure was implemented only with the Maastricht Treaty and the related institutional restructuring during the founding of the European Union.

The process of institutionalization of CFSP and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) from Maastricht to Lisbon. The period between the treaties signed in Maastricht (1992) and Lisbon (2009) should be considered crucial for the development of the EU OVP, since during this time the OVP has undergone significant changes. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the international bipolar order, the EPC system proved to be extremely ineffective: the result was uncoordinated diplomatic actions of individual member States, and a pan-European position or approach to foreign policy was impossible.

The issue of the international positioning of European States was one of the central issues of the future development of the European Community during this period of time. The upheavals in the international system were perceived as an opportunity that allowed the 12 countries of the European Community to expand their political function and adapt it to their role as an authoritative global economic center.

The Single European Act was the first serious attempt to expand the European Community from an economic to a political union - a project that repeatedly failed in previous years. It was France and Germany that supported efforts to further develop a political union at the European level, in which, in addition to a common economic and monetary policy, special importance was attached to a Common foreign and security Policy. The SEA also established a direct link between foreign policy issues and security programs, and thus it was supposed to contribute not only to the consolidation of the various positions of the member States of the European Community, but also, as a security aspect, to play a key role in the development of Europe's foreign policy identity. The events connected with the adoption of the SEA into the EU (within the framework of the Delors Commission) and the enormous changes in the international system eventually led to the reformatting of the European Community under a new name and in a new institutional form - the creation of the European Union in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.

The development of the political direction of European integration was presented as a logical transition from the European Communities to the creation of the European Union ^[11]. At the 1990 Rome Summit, it was decided to convene an intergovernmental conference to discuss the further institutional development of the Community: the expansion of the powers of the European Parliament, the definition of supranational and national competencies in the field of foreign policy and security, as well as the introduction of additional citizenship for citizens of the member states of the Community.

With the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the mechanism of European political cooperation, which was synonymous with foreign policy coordination, was replaced by a Common Foreign and Security Policy ^[12]. The purpose of the CFSP was "to promote the establishment of its individuality in the international arena, especially through the implementation of a common foreign policy and a common security policy, including the possible formulation of a common defense policy in the future, which could eventually lead to the creation of a common defense force"^[12]. From the wording of the objectives of the Treaty on the European Union, it followed that the common security policy previously excluded from the EPC sphere became part of the common foreign policy of the European Union. Previously, the cooperation of European countries in the field of security was carried out exclusively within the framework of the WEU and, more broadly, within the framework of NATO. The implementation of the Maastricht Treaty did not entail significant changes, but at the same time, the wording used implied the possibility of changes in order to develop the EU's own capabilities in the field of security and defense.

The Maastricht Treaty not only gave the union a new name - the European Union, it introduced a system of three "pillars" and a civil union, announced a plan to introduce a single currency, and in general, gave the common foreign policy of the European Union a new status within the framework of the modernized European system.

The system of the three "pillars" of the EU was as follows: 1) the first pillar included the European Communities, that is, the areas arising from the European constituent treaties (ECSC, EEC and Euratom); 2) the second pillar - the newly created CFSP; 3) the third pillar - police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

Further development of CFSP through contracts in Amsterdam and Nice. The Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2002) treaties have led to institutional changes in some areas of the EU.

The war in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s clearly demonstrated the weakness of the mechanisms of work of the CFSP. The EU had to admit accusations that the "declaration policy" used within the framework of the AFP in crisis situations is "too passive and has the opposite effect" ^[13]. It turned out that the European Union, with the help of limited tools of its foreign policy component, could not interfere either politically or militarily as a participant in events taking place in the immediate vicinity of its borders.

These failures and the further military and political destabilization in the immediate vicinity of the EU (the Balkans and Eastern Europe), as well as the sharp escalation of long-standing international conflicts (such as the ongoing conflict in the Middle East) determined the need for reform of the CFSP. It is the aspect of European foreign policy related to security issues that has become the driving force behind the changes implemented through the reform treaties adopted in Amsterdam in 1997 and in Nice in 2001.

The Amsterdam Treaty reformed the third pillar and incorporated the Schengen rules into EU law, expanded the powers of the European Parliament and, most importantly, developed the mechanisms of common policy and security policy ^[14].

The declaration adopted at the Cologne Summit in 1999 defined the range of tasks that the EU intended to solve independently by military means. It was also noted that the EU will consider the achievement of the ability to organize and carry out actions to resolve situations identified among the Petersbregian tasks ^[15], namely humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping missions, and limited combat tasks within the framework of crisis management, as the main guideline in the field of emergency response. Thus, the declaration emphasized the possibility of the European Union to take autonomous, independent actions using military force, and without limiting NATO's freedom of action ^[15].

At the meeting in Cologne, the concept of "European Security and Defense Policy" (EPBO) was fixed instead of the previously used combination of "European Identity in the field of security and defense" (EIBO). With the help of the new wording, European leaders sought to bring greater clarity to the understanding of the purpose of European military integration processes. The development of a common defense and security policy looks clearer, clearer and more ambitious than achieving some kind of identity in this area. On the other hand, the EIBO was considered as a NATO integration project- a "European pillar" within the alliance, and the EPBO was originally conceived as an organization of the European Union, autonomous from NATO.

The Nice Treaty actually created the prerequisites for the expansion of the EU to the east, introduced a new distribution of votes in the Council and Parliament, as well as simplified decision-making mechanisms and expanded the powers of Parliament ^[15].

Another innovation was the establishment of the post of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), who was to simultaneously hold the post of Chairman of the Council on Foreign Affairs. The importance of this innovation was the creation of a permanent position for the coordination and conduct of foreign policy, since previously the presidency changed every six months in accordance with the presidency of the EU Council. The post of High Representative of the EU on the issues of the AFP existed in this form until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009 ^[16]. According to the terms of which the official powers were expanded: the High Representative received the position of Deputy President of the European Commission and Chairman of the Council on Foreign Affairs.

Thus, at the initial stage of European integration, European economic policy played a central role. This is due to two main reasons: 1) after the Second World War, the main focus of cooperation was on the economic aspect, despite the fact that the most important idea of the European Community of States from the very beginning was a project aimed at creating a political union; 2) the readiness of the member States of the European Community to transfer foreign policy powers to the level of the integration bloc was either absent or seriously limited. Despite the active discussions about political integration and the notorious Davignon Report of 1970, which changed the course of the European Economic Community from an economic to a political union, it was only much later, with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, that the foreign policy component was fixed in the European structure and implemented in the form of a The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), replacing the ineffective European Political Cooperation (EPC).

Institutional development was influenced, first of all, by the restrictive behavior of individual Member States. Since the creation of the European Communities, the issue of a deeper political union has been considered. The first initiatives in this direction were taken in the early 1950s in the Pleven plan, as well as in the early 1960s in the Fouche plans. It was Fouche's plans that for the first time contained concrete formulations to expand the integration process in areas that were previously still within the competence of Member States. Among other things, these plans initially included the intention to coordinate foreign policy at the European level. But even if all the initiatives at that time still failed due to the resistance of the member states, the discussion paved the way for a more intensive discussion of the EU's common foreign policy. International events at the end of the 1970s and 1980s additionally influenced the development of the CFSP, as it became clear that the EU should develop the political direction of integration accordingly to the economic one.

Thus, as a first step, European political cooperation began in 1976, which was expanded by a Single European Act in the early 1980s. Both were the result of the community's desire to expand political cooperation in accordance with the global economic importance of the EU. Although foreign and security policy have been part of the European institutional structure since the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty, in terms of the distribution of powers, for the most part, it remains at the national level, i.e. The level of decision-making has not been raised to the all-Union level, but is formed on an intergovernmental platform, which means that the most important decision-makers in this area are the heads of State and Government of the member States.

Another key aspect of the formation of European foreign policy since the implementation of the EPC to the present is its strong value orientation and the adoption of common actions in foreign policy in accordance with the principles of international law and the UN Charter. In this regard, the commitment of the European Union to multilateralism and a multipolar international system is particularly noticeable. The value orientation can also be traced in the international assistance and crisis operations of the EU, especially in civil operations aimed at facilitating the process of state-building and guided by the principles of democracy, human rights and international law.

Features of modern integration processes in Eurasia

Integration processes in Eurasia proceed from the idea of Slavic brotherhood and the formation of a new state association based on Slavic unity. First of all, they imply the unification of three fraternal East Slavic states: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. However, the current contradictions between the elites of Russia and Ukraine do not allow us to talk about possible unity, so at the moment only the formation of a Russian-Belarusian union is possible. In a broader understanding of Slavic unity, they see the unification of post-Soviet states with the key cultural and civilizational role of Russia.

As 3. Brzezinski correctly noted, the orientation of Russian history depends on Ukraine's position: "An empire without Ukraine will ultimately mean that Russia will become a more "Asian" and more distant from Europe state" ^[17]. This is what happened when Ukraine did not join the most powerful integration association of our time.

There is one cardinal difference in the processes of forming the economic spaces of the EU and the EAEU. If in the EU we observe economic and political unification, the addition of forces of various states and various economies into one whole, then in the post-Soviet space there was a decomposition of a single whole, called the "national economic complex of the USSR", into different components, one of which is the EAEU.

Since the collapse of the USSR, there has been a rupture of the single economic space. Already in the late 80s, there was a breakdown of ties within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). The need for the Russian Federation to interact with the newly independent states formed after the destruction of the USSR in various fields of activity has become obvious. Such interaction can be effective only when their legal systems are combined, and priority attention should be paid to constitutional, civil, customs, financial, labor, and investment legislation. The practical realization of this necessity was the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union, which, in addition to the Russian Federation, included the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic. Thus, this integration association, deprived of the participation of Ukraine, has become more "Asian" ("Eurasian"). It is not for nothing that the EAEU positions itself as the core of continental integration.

I.N. Bartsits argues that Russia is less interested in unconditional full-scale integration in the short term than other former Soviet republics. However, based on its long-term interests, Russia cannot but play a unifying role in the post-Soviet space. "Reintegration is necessary for Russia, while the main burden for its implementation falls on Russia itself," emphasizes I.N. Bartsits.

Russian Russian Federation is the center of Eurasian integration because it has levers of positive influence on the countries of the former USSR: the dependence of the newly independent states on Russia for raw materials, economic ties, awareness of the commonality of military and strategic interests and the inevitability of the formation of a single defense space and, perhaps most importantly, the Russian language and Russian culture as instruments for the involvement of states in the global cultural process.

At the same time, the priority of integration processes in the territory of the former USSR is the inclusion of former member countries in the sphere of Russian interests and Russian influence to the extent that such inclusion becomes irreversible. In the absence of such a system, the destruction of ties in the post-Soviet space will be inevitable.

Integration processes in the post-Soviet space help to restore a sense of historical perspective for the countries of the region. However, the presence of organizations so different in their orientation on the territory of the former Soviet republics indicates a lack of unity in approaches to the development of the post-Soviet space, and confirms that along with centripetal (and in fact, Russian-centripetal) trends, centrifugal (Russian-based) forces retain significant strength ^{[4; p. 255]}.

Eurasian integration has a long history and as a result had many different forms: from the Scythian tribes and the Mongol Empire to the Russian Empire, the USSR, and now in a truncated form of the CIS and the EAEU. The Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union of May 29, 2014 laid the foundations for modern integration construction. It was preceded by the proposal of creation in 1994 (at that time by the President of Kazakhstan) Nursultan Nazarbayev of the Eurasian Union of States.

Over the next 25 years, until the signing of the EAEU Treaty on May 29, 2014, the stages of the free trade zone, the Eurasian Economic Community, the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space within the framework of the five states were completed. However, at that time, despite a large number of agreements, it was not possible to create either a customs union or a single economic space. Independent states were not ready to delegate part of their economic powers, and, as you know, without the creation of supranational structures, it is impossible to create an integration association.

In the economic crisis of 2008, the Eurasian states saw an opportunity to change the world architecture. It was in 2008 that substantive work began on the creation of a Single Economic Space, and in 2010 the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan was launched. Since 2012, a Single Economic Space has been created and the Eurasian Economic Commission has been functioning as a supranational body. On May 29, 2014, the treaty on the establishment of the EAEU was signed, and from January 1, 2015 The Union started functioning and was expanded by the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Armenia.

There are various scientific schools of integration processes, four of them are suitable for the characteristics of modern Eurasian integration: binding integration (holding-together integration, E.Y. Vinokurov, A. Liebman), cooperative hegemony (T. Pendersen), liberal intergovernmental approach (liberal intergovermentalism, A. Moravchik) and geo-economic determinism (Ya.D. Lisovolik) ^[18].

Binding integration is the regional integration of countries that were previously part of a single state or a colonial empire with a high level of economic, political and cultural ties. Binding integration can give impetus to reintegration: de-integration after the collapse of a once unified State can be replaced by subsequent re-integration based on new principles, new interstate cooperation, various new mechanisms, and, possibly, a new membership. During periods of economic growth, countries can take symbolic steps towards the formation of national identity. In general, regionalism that binds together can be an integration project caused by a crisis: an economic downturn can stimulate new cooperation between countries. In the context of an unfavorable economic situation, it is more likely that economic ties between the newly independent states will deepen than the ties of these states with third countries.

"Cooperative hegemony is a type of regional order in which a Power exercises a 'soft' form of control through cooperation agreements based on a long-term strategy. This is only one of the four possible strategies of the great powers, and the choice can also be made in favor of: unilateral hegemony, empire building or a 'concert'" ^[18]. Cooperative hegemony can be understood as a "deal" between the regional center, i.e. Russia, and the periphery, i.e. by other EAEU member states: the former gives certain preferences and follows a policy of certain self-restraint, self-control in exchange for the loyalty of the latter.

In confirmation of this point of view on the integration processes in Eurasia, foreign researchers consider the formation of the EAEU exclusively as a Russian project to strengthen its superiority in the post-Soviet space and keep peripheral states in its zone of influence ^[19-21]: “The original sin of the EAEU was that the Kremlin designed it more as a vehicle to institutionalize Russia's geopolitical preeminence in the post-Soviet region rather than to foster horizontal economic integration” ^[21]. Also, anticipating the imminent collapse of the Eurasian Union, they describe a scenario when, after street protests following Russian parliamentary elections in 2021, Minsk and Astana will want to leave the EAEU as they consider the union “as a creeping attempt to swallow them economically, disguised as ’mutually beneficial' integration” ^[21].

In addition to this, the problem in creating deeper ties between the EAEU and China is that China may lie not only in Russia's development challenges, but both governments' obsessions with maintaining control ^[22,23].

The liberal intergovernmental approach is explained by the nature of newly independent States that highly value their sovereignty and national identity. Because of this, within the framework of this theory, the integration process is a constantly updated set of transactions and side payments between the parties.

Proponents of this approach consider integration institutions as a reliable guarantor for ensuring obligations between the governments of the participating countries. The Integration Institute guarantees that the other member governments between which deals are concluded will adhere to their side of the deal. Moreover, the national governments of weak member states consider the Eurasian integration process as an additional way to implement socio-economic obligations to the population.

Geo-economic determinism is the result of the geography of the region. There is an unprecedented distance between the inner and central regions of Greater Eurasia, where most of the territory of the EAEU is located, from the global ocean and, accordingly, from international markets. Four of the five EAEU member states are landlocked: Kazakhstan is the world's largest landlocked country. Belarus is the largest landlocked country in Europe. Kyrgyzstan, in addition to its lack of access to the sea, is among the countries with one of the highest levels of altitude above sea level. Armenia is the only country in Western Asia that does not have access to a significant body of water.

Due to higher transport costs, landlocked countries are less competitive as imports and exports are more expensive. According to a World Bank study, landlocked countries have on average 30% less trade turnover than landlocked countries. Continentality reduces the country's growth rate by 1.5% compared to coastal countries. In this context, the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union can be considered as a response to this geographical problem, since the EAEU plays a crucial role in improving the access of its members to international markets by reducing customs duties and non-tariff barriers, as well as promoting transport "connectivity" by forming a common transport space.

Deliberating on the burning problems of the Eurasian integration it comes to mind that the problem of multi-speed development is common for the EU and the EAEU. Foreign researchers note that the EAEU has been hobbled by disagreements and mistrust between member states, as well as Moscow’s own reluctance to give up some of its sovereign decisionmaking over trade and economic policy to supranational EAEU political bodies” ^[24]. This is primarily due to the fact that under the EAEU Treaty Russia has one vote on a par with other members of the association, despite the fact that Russia accounts for the bulk of the total GDP of the EAEU.

It should be noted that due to the equal position of the members of the association, it can be difficult or even impossible to reach the necessary consensus as 2014 showed, when four members of the EAEU refused to follow Russia's example in introducing counter-sanctions on Western food products. Therefore, we can say that the EAEU is driven not by common goals, but by individual interests. Moreover, prior to the creation of the EAEU, bilateral preferential agreements with Moscow highlighted that member states’ joining the union was not entirely the result of acceptance of general rules laid out in the Astana Treaty ^[25].

Apart from this the monitoring of EU cohesion and the desire of the participants for deeper integration ^[26] revealed that the member states with low or declining levels of cohesion are at the same time problematic areas of Europe from the point of view of EU policy: Great Britain (which left the EU), three Visegrád countries - Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary - (that sharply deviate from the EU course and adopt laws contrary to European law), as well as Greece and Italy (which have not overcome structural crises in the economy and public sector). Moreover, the UK's exit from the EU added Ireland to this list, which faced the question of preserving its traditional relations with the UK or deeper integration into the EU (it is forced to choose between pursuing deeper EU integration and maintaining its traditional relationship with the UK). At the same time, EU funding as the main incentive for cohesion does not increase willingness to cooperate as soon as economic well-being grows, which proves the phenomenon of eastern central member states.

Therefore, if we apply these conclusions to the EAEU, it is necessary to shift the focus from financial transfers and other economic benefits to incentives that citizens can relate to more directly, i.e. focus on increasing individual cohesion - involving citizens of the Union member states in major pan-Eurasian political events, instilling collective values and changing self-perception from individual and national to allied.

Comparative analysis of macroeconomic indicators of the EU and the EAEU. Research results

In Table 1, we compared the integration groupings of the EU and the EAEU by socio-economic indicators and integration efficiency indicators. This table is the author's interpretation of the analyzed data on the selected comparison parameters. All the data were taken from the reports of the European Commission, the Eurasian Economic Commission and the World Bank.

Table 1

Comparison of the results of the integration of the EU and the EAEU

Explanation: green-green – both groups have a high indicator, yellow-yellow – average integration efficiency in terms of indicator, green-orange – one group significantly exceeds the other in terms of indicator, green-yellow - indicators are high, but one exceeds the other.

At first glance, the EU is significantly ahead of the EAEU in economic development, however, it should be borne in mind that 28 years have passed since the creation of the EU, and the EAEU exists only 6. Moreover, integration processes in Europe began as a reaction to the Second World War and the need to restore the economy. While similar processes in the EAEU began after the collapse of the USSR and the former republics that gained independence were not immediately ready for integration, however, most of them now deny themselves the prospect of entering the already formed economic union. In addition, there was no such urgent need for economic recovery in the Eurasian space as in Europe.

Thus, at the moment the EU is at the last stage of integration, the EAEU is at the fourth, penultimate. In terms of population, the EU exceeds the EAEU by almost 2.5 times. The EU's GDP exceeds the EAEU by almost 9 times, the volume of GDP per capita is 3.5 times, the turnover of the domestic market is also 5.5 times more, the export of goods to third countries is almost 5 times.

However, for comparison of integration groupings, economic characteristics in dynamics are more indicative, since the member states of economic unions enter into integration with different levels of economic development and therefore the bare numbers do not reveal the effectiveness of integration for specific associations. Therefore, we compared the EU and the EAEU on the following characteristics of integration efficiency: growth of mutual trade, growth of export earnings, growth in employment, reduction in unemployment, the level of well-being of the population, the trend of growth in the welfare of the population, the inflow of investments and, as an indicator of resilience to crises, the pace of economic recovery after the pandemic.

According to these parameters, the EU looks less successful than in absolute numbers, since there is no increase in the welfare of the population, and there is also an outflow of foreign direct investment to the EU countries, moreover, the growth of export earnings has slowed down significantly. The indicators for the growth of mutual trade within the EU, the growth of employment, and the reduction of unemployment remain positive. It is also worth noting the high level of well-being of the population and the high pace of economic recovery after the pandemic.

Integration processes in the EAEU are less economically efficient in comparison with the EU: there is no increase in the level of employment, the level of well-being remains low, although there is growth, the inflow of investments is negative. Nevertheless, there is a good growth in mutual trade within the Union, the unemployment rate is decreasing, export earnings were growing until 2019 before falling in 2020 due to restrictions on the movement of goods across borders, and the economic recovery after the pandemic is slower than in the EU.

Recommendations

Based on the results of the analysis of the effectiveness of the integration associations of the EU and the EAEU, as well as the literature studied ^[27-30], we have compiled a system of measures to solve the identified problems of the Eurasian Economic Union, the implementation of which would allow achieving a socio-economic breakthrough of both the integration association as a whole and its individual participants in order to improve the quality of life of the population:

I. Economic:
1. Restructuring the structure of the economy from the predominant export of resources to their processing and production.
2. To facilitate the transition to a knowledge-based economy by investing in research and development in the amount of 3% of the EAEU GDP.
3. Development of specialization of the EAEU countries in complementary production sectors. Elimination of the same type of structure of the EAEU export goods by creating their own value chains in non-resource, knowledge-intensive and high-tech sectors of the economy (A.V. Tsoi wrote about this in detail ^[27]).
4. Development of infrastructural interconnectedness of the states of "Greater Eurasia".
5. Expanding the use of the national currencies of the member states in mutual trade with the ultimate goal of creating a currency zone of the EAEU and trading this currency with third countries.
6. Due to the negative dynamics of mutual investments, it is necessary to improve the investment climate in non-resource sectors of the economy for the Union countries and create barriers to limit the expansion of foreign direct investment of third countries.
7. Digital integration: creation of an integrated information system of the EAEU for the interstate exchange of data and electronic documents.
8. Integration of science and education, exchange of advanced technologies.
9. Unification of tax rates on sensitive goods.
10. Simplification of procedures for crossing state borders in the EAEU space, taking into account the current epidemiological situation, including the mobility of citizens of the Union countries for the purpose of employment.

II. Structural:
1. Expansion of the supranational component: creation and development of supranational institutions, including through the expansion of the powers of the Eurasian Economic Commission.
2. Creation of the Central Bank of the EAEU.

III. Ideological and political:
1. Development of a unified foreign economic policy, including on the issue of counter-sanctions against the West.
2. Improving the coordination of domestic trade, economic and monetary policy.
3. Expansion of the common market due to the entry of new participants into the association, first of all, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Georgia, and later Moldova, Cuba, Vietnam, Iran and reunificated Korea.
4. Formation of a "large Eurasian partnership" (according to the initiative of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin).
5. Working out the issue of the EAEU countries' withdrawal from the WTO to accelerate industrialization.
6. Development of large-scale supranational integration projects.

Regarding the European Union, its today's key problem is deep internal differentiation, different rates of economic growth. The lag of countries within the EU remains not quantitative, but qualitative. The EU remained effective while expanding and capturing new markets, since the essence of capitalism is a "new colonialism", i.e. a market that is not viable within the framework. In this respect, we do not see prospects for further development of the EU and the solution of its systemic problems. Despite this, the EU, although it has stopped developing, has achieved economic successes that require to be equaled. Thus, the proposed recommendations for the development of the EAEU largely replicate the successful experience of the EU at the past stages of its development, but are updated taking into account the current situation and the differences of these associations.

Conclusions

Thus, we have revealed that regional integration is the main instrument of economic growth for developing countries and their "pulling up" to the level of more developed economies of the integration association. Integration corrects the Balkanized structure of markets and creates effective trading blocks with large markets sufficient to ensure economies of scale and competition.

The purpose of the creation of the EU was to stop the frequent and bloody wars between the neighbors, which culminated in the Second World War. Consequently, the peculiarity of the beginning of integration processes in Europe was the desire to stabilize the region and restore the economy after the war through close economic cooperation. In the EAEU, integration began as an awareness of the expediency of maintaining close economic ties and creating an economic union after the collapse of the unified economic system – the USSR, as well as for comprehensive modernization, increasing competitiveness and cooperation between national economies, promoting stable development in order to improve the standard of living of the population. These prerequisites determine the speed and efficiency of integration construction.

It is worth noting that the speed of Eurasian integration construction exceeds similar European processes. Although, despite the fact that today the creation of the legal architecture of the EAEU is almost complete, the association has not yet brought significant economic success. Therefore, there are no people willing to join the EAEU at the moment, unlike the EU. But in the European Union, the growth of the economy and the welfare of the population has slowed down, which is primarily due to its almost thirty years of existence. Researchers report that the EU has reached a short-term ceiling after the initial phase of rapid growth and it may take a long time to break through it. On the other hand, the EU has achieved a lot and is quite viable.

A comparison of the structure of internal trade in the EU and the EAEU gave an understanding of some of the current problems of the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia dominates the EAEU - it accounts for about 60% of the total trade turnover, which consists mainly of crude oil and natural gas, goods that can be sold anywhere (if the necessary infrastructure is available) and that do not require complex trade negotiations typical of industrial goods. At the same time, four fifths of the total exports of goods in the EU are manufactured goods.

Also a distinctive feature is the composition of the members of the associations. If a third of the countries in the EU are economically strong and equal among themselves, then there is a strong imbalance of economies in the EAEU.

Based on the above, we came to the conclusion that a direct comparison of the EU and the EAEU is not entirely correct, since the groupings are not comparable in a number of parameters. Therefore, the EAEU should be compared with other regional integration organizations, in particular customs unions or free trade zones - NAFTA (dominated by the United States), MERCOSUR (with a bias towards raw materials), the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Persian Gulf (with an emphasis on oil trade) or the Customs Union of South Africa (dominated by South Africa).

Nevertheless, both in the EU and in the EAEU, constituent agreements and institutions are working, a common labor market is functioning. Integration effects will grow in both associations due to the implementation of existing plans in the fields of infrastructure, industrial policy, agro-industrial complex, labor market, single pension space, cooperation in research and education.

Moreover, given the age of the associations, the EAEU has yet to go through many stages, primarily highlighted in the recommendations, but also including the conclusion of agreements on trade and economic cooperation with other states and associations, as well as policy coordination with China and the EU within the framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt project. This will require negotiations and the development of a common position on infrastructure megaprojects, a detailed discussion of the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the EAEU and China, as well as, after the settlement of the current political crisis, the establishment of ties with the EU.

Summing up, the EU remains an effective integration association, is the second largest economy in the world. The successful experience of the EU has become an example for the creation of the EAEU. However, only after 10-20 years it will be possible to talk about the achievements of the EAEU. Nevertheless, there is a trend of economic growth, an increase in the standard of living and employment of the population, and thanks to the future projects, it will only increase.