The policy of the Russian Federation and Georgia in the Black Sea region: international legal aspects

Abgaryan Dzhul'etta Rubenovna PhD in Law legal adviser 121205, Russia, g. Moskva, Skolkovo, Bol'shoi bul'var, 62 jetta.ab@mail.ru

The Black Sea region has been a unique zone of geopolitics since the collapse of the USSR. On the one hand, the interests of the Western and Eastern powers, intersecting in this region, should tend to integrate, unite efforts in order to increase the efficiency of using the geopolitical advantages of the territory. On the other hand, the personal interests of the countries that collide in the Black Sea region give rise to a number of difficulties and obstacles on the way to successful integration.  

With the formation of the Russian Federation, as well as other sovereign states on the territory of the former Soviet Union ^[21], despite the preservation of the total length of the state border of these countries, the former system of its protection was violated, relations with neighboring states changed.  The circumstance that gave rise to contradictions in the Black Sea region was the lack of stable political regulation here.   In modern conditions, the complexity of relations between Russia and Georgia is determined by destructive processes within the latter, as well as changes in the state borders of Ukraine and Georgia ^[16].

The situation in the region is also complicated by uncertainty about the GUAM regional organization, formed back in 1997 in the post-Soviet space, pursuing the goals of democracy and economic development.  It united Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, and from 1999 to 2005, Uzbekistan was also part of GUAM. In many ways, the creation of this association was aimed at forming a political counterweight to the Russian Federation. Up to now, the decisions taken within the community act mainly on paper and have no serious significance for the development of the Black Sea region ^[9]. Despite the fact that at the meetings of this organization there are reviews about its effectiveness in achieving political stability in the Black Sea region ^[11], in practice, GUAM's activities are not very effective. Despite the conclusion of the extraordinary meeting of the GUAM Council of Foreign Ministers regarding the progress in the development of transport communications, trade, cultural interaction and increasing the tourist flow between the member countries of the organization, one should agree with the opinion of V. Yanukovych, who in 2010 noticed "only conversations" with regard to GUAM in the absence of active actions ^[22]. The members of the organization have repeatedly and openly demonstrated the importance of developing foreign policy cooperation outside the Black Sea region. This, in particular, was expressed in the signing of Association Agreements with the European Union, including Agreements on the establishment of Free Trade Zones, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine ^{[1; 4; 5]}.

An additional circumstance complicating the relations between Georgia and Russia in the Black Sea region is the rapid development of interstate relations here: Georgia, like other countries in the region, seeks to become a member of various international projects and organizations. However, the desire to establish close relations with Western partners in Georgia's foreign policy course contradicts the interests of Russia, which is aware of the West's intention to strengthen itself on the Black Sea through Tbilisi.  As a result, the processes that are taking place in Georgia's foreign policy course cannot but have an impact on bilateral relations with Russia.

However, Russia's political position towards Georgia allowed us to count on the continued preservation of Moscow's influence in the Black Sea region and the protection of its interests. Today, in the context of interstate cooperation in the post-Soviet space, Russia has to take into account Georgia's intention to follow a new foreign policy vector focused on cooperation with Western countries.  This determines the transformation of the balance of political forces in the Black Sea region. At the same time, regional security depends on the result of the clash of interests of powers whose geopolitical claims overlap in this area.  Despite Russia's historically "strong" presence in the Black Sea basin, it has to build a foreign policy course, focusing on avoiding conflicts with states also seeking to benefit from the geographical location of this region.                  

The existing contradictions in the interaction between Russia and Georgia in the Black Sea region, which currently exist, were formed at the end of the twentieth century and further, during the first decades of the XXI century. It should be noted that diplomatic relations between the states were established as early as July 1, 1992 ^[3]. Their consequence was the conclusion of more than 90 agreements between the countries at both the interstate and intergovernmental levels, the purpose of which was to develop bilateral partnership relations in all spheres. Despite this, their positive development was hindered by the growing anti-Russian sentiment in Tbilisi, due to the desire to eliminate the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with the use of force. However, in 1997, the states of the Black Sea region, following the course of developing interstate cooperation in a number of areas, began to strengthen relations in the military sphere. In this regard, the meeting of the commanders-in-chief of six navies located in the Black Sea basin, namely Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine and Turkey, should be recognized as a significant fact.      

The prerequisites for contradictions between Russia and Georgia in the Black Sea region began to emerge as a result of the Russian Federation's desire to secure its national interests. Thus, our state has adopted a number of normative legal acts regulating the foreign policy sphere.  For example, in July 2017 The President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin by his Decree approved the "Fundamentals of the policy of the Russian Federation in the field of naval activities for the period up to 2030" ^[7].  This legal document developed not only the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, but also the provisions of the National Security Concept of the country. Despite the fact that the main content of the "Fundamentals" is built around the idea of Russia using the resources and spaces of the World Ocean in its geopolitical interests, this document emphasized the need for the Russian Federation to protect national security due to the restriction of the country's access to international main sea communications, primarily in the Black and Baltic Seas, the formation of foreign policy blocs, as well as the unresolved list of issues in the field of international law regarding, among other things, the status of the Black Sea and territorial claims against the Russian side emanating from states that have a common state border with it ^[7].                 

In July 2001 The President of Russia approved the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, designed for the period up to 2020 ^[6]. The peculiarity of this legal act was its "long-term" vector in solving issues of the national policy of the Russian Federation in the Black Sea region. The Doctrine showed a desire to strengthen the country's defense, since a significant role in it was assigned to the Russian fleet on the Black Sea. The document emphasized the claims of the Russian Federation to strengthen its position as a leading state at sea, which, in turn, could become a prerequisite for the growth of discontent of neighboring states.                  

At the same time, the solution to the problem of the Black Sea region, according to the Russian Federation, consisted in the implementation of a policy of cooperation here, not confrontation. Russia reacted negatively to attempts by NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) to interfere in the problems of the Black Sea states, including in the field of security. According to the fair remark of A.S. Panarin, the Alliance's desire to intensify efforts in spreading its influence in the eastern direction could have dangerous consequences as it was "... not only a military-strategic fact", ... but also acted "... as a significant civilizational symptom" ^[15]. In turn, the EU's interest in the Black Sea is explained by its economic potential and the possibility of transporting energy resources.  There is a wide transnational interaction of states and international organizations, which is due to the globalization processes in the modern world ^{[8, p. 31]}. And, of course, access to new and fairly wide sales markets is dominant in the political interest of the region on the part of the European Union. 

The deterioration of relations between the Russian and Georgian sides over the Black Sea region, which has developed in recent decades, was a consequence, among other things, of the internal political processes taking place in Georgia. Focused on close rapprochement with the West, it could not become a full-fledged partner of the Russian Federation due to the fact that the European Union pursued a policy aimed at limiting Russian influence in the Black Sea region.

Among the specific measures that had an anti–Russian character, first of all, it is necessary to note the "Black Sea Synergy" - a project that was approved by the European Commission in May 2007.  The Russian Federation, considering the political line of Brussels as a renewal of the "European Neighborhood" policy, however, already within the framework of the Black Sea region, considered it unacceptable for the European Union to interfere in the process of resolving regional issues, bypassing the preliminary stage of their discussion with the Russian Federation.  Following this logic, the Russian side did not sign a joint statement according to which Synergy was recognized as a common initiative.     

The second EU measure was the establishment of the Eastern Partnership, the idea of which was put forward in May 2008 ^[8]. Despite the fact that Georgia, according to the EU plan, was not supposed to be part of this association (probably, according to Brussels, it was enough to extend this initiative to Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus to expand its influence), the EU continued to develop partnership relations with this country, especially in the trade and economic sphere.

In turn, relations between Russia and the EU did not tend to compromise as a result of the "gas confrontation" with Ukraine, moreover, as a result of the conflict in August 2008 in South Ossetia, also known as the "five–day war". The EU sought to influence the change in the balance of power on the Black Sea, due to the long-term nature of its plans related to the expansion of its zone of influence here and the achievement of leading positions.

As a result, Brussels' policy towards the Black Sea states, including Georgia, complicated their relations with Russia, since one of its components was the persuasion of the powers to implement anti–Russian policies.      With regard to Georgia, NATO relied on the country's implementation of a political course that contradicts Russia's interests in the Black Sea region due to Tbilisi's desire to become part of the Alliance. As a result, Georgia, according to NATO's plan, had to show readiness to act in line with the policy of the Western powers.      

At the present stage, relations between Georgia and Russia continue to be tense. On September 2, 2008, at the initiative of the Georgian side, diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation were severed. It should be noted that the initiator of the rupture was the Georgian side, which expressed its protest against the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The termination of diplomatic relations, however, did not lead to a complete rupture of interaction between Russia and Georgia: the dialogue was maintained within the framework of the Geneva discussions ^[12], as well as negotiations between the member of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation G. Karasin and the Special Representative of the Prime Minister of Georgia for Relations with the Russian Federation Z. Abashidze, which since 2012 were held in Prague. In 2012, the Georgian side unilaterally abolished the visa regime in relation to the Russian Federation, and three years later, in 2015. The Russian Federation has simplified the process of issuing visas for Georgian citizens ^[17]. Since 2013, regular bus service has been restored between the countries, and air travel has been resumed since 2014.

A new round of deterioration in bilateral relations occurred in 2019. On July 8, air traffic between the two countries stopped, while on the eve of the events in Tbilisi demonstrated a negative attitude towards Russia not only from the government, but also from ordinary Georgian citizens who participated in anti-Russian protests.  Despite the dispersal of the rallies by Georgian special forces, the protests continued, as a result of which Georgian President S. Zurabishvili called the Russian Federation an "enemy", noting at the same time that it is an interested party in the social split in Georgia ^[13]. Accusations were also made against the President of the Russian Federation and Russian citizens on local Georgian television (Gabunia on the evening of July 7, 2019, in the live broadcast of the author's program "P.S.", called the President of the Russian Federation an "occupier").                                                       

Despite insulting attacks and unwillingness to compromise on the part of Georgia, today the Russian side expresses its readiness to cooperate. Thus, according to the statement of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, bilateral relations need to be developed and done widely enough, as a result of which the citizens of both Georgia and Russia will experience positive effects ^[10]. At the same time, the Russian Foreign Minister stressed that it was not the Russian side that initiated the rupture of bilateral diplomatic relations, in this regard, expectations of changes were associated with hopes for a "warming" of relations between the countries, a softening of Georgia's policy ^[10].                   

It should be noted that  As part of the development of the scenario for the resumption of diplomatic relations, Russia expressed its readiness to consider proposals for the opening of trade missions on the territory of Georgia due to the fact that its presence will open prospects for further development of cooperation and the conclusion of agreements in other areas.                        

In 2020, the possibility of opening a Russian trade representative office was perceived negatively by the Georgian side, and, according to Georgian experts, represented the establishment of an office of the special services of the Russian Federation operating under the guise of trade purposes in Tbilisi. The accusations against Russia were partly based on the belief that with the loss of diplomatic ties between the countries, the Russian Federation could no longer carry out intelligence activities against the Georgian side. Thus, the opening of a trade representative office in the territory where the Russian Federation did not have a diplomatic corps was an opportunity for Russia to fill this gap in the Georgian direction of policy.

Also in January 2020, Georgia, together with Ukraine, accused the Russian side of allegedly committing illegal actions on the Black Sea, as well as on the Azov and Kerch Straits. These claims against the Russian Federation were made in the form of a complaint filed with the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The substantive side of the claim consisted in the negative consequences allegedly created by the Russian side for conducting search and rescue operations. However, in the document submitted to the International Maritime Organization, neither the Georgian nor the Ukrainian side indicated specific examples of negative consequences generated by the Russian Federation ^[20]. Despite this circumstance, the United States and the European Union recognized the need to satisfy this claim.                                                                       

To date, Georgia does not seek to restore diplomatic relations with Russia, which, in turn, further delays the "Black Sea knot" of problems.                                                 

In addition, the Ukrainian side seeks to use Georgia in order to incite contradictions around the borders between the countries that run along the Black Sea. According to Ukraine, the answer to the question of the establishment of maritime borders should be sought in the text of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, in other words, it again suggests focusing on the West in solving eastern issues. According to Article 122 of this document, the Black Sea should be recognized as a closed maritime region ^[2]. In turn, the concept of closed or semi-closed seas determines the almost complete environment of such a sea by several countries and, due to its geographical location, it cannot be used as a transit one, i.e. for crossing to another sea. As a consequence, the main difference between the legal regime of the Black Sea and other seas of a closed or semi-closed type is the presence of straits of a special legal regime, thanks to which the sea is connected with the World Ocean ^{[19, p. 42-44]}. Their legal regime, in turn, is based on two leading principles, namely: freedom of commercial navigation and ensuring the security of the Black Sea States.

In this regard, the Ukrainian side saw the possibility of applying to the Russian Federation the mechanism of "forced negotiations", which was implemented by East Timor against Australia in 2016-2018. The result was forcing the latter to sign a delimitation agreement. Despite the fact that in legal science, up to the present time, no single concept of delimitation has been developed in relation to the state border, of the existing definitions, the definition of delimitation as the establishment and description of the border and its mapping, description of border signs, etc. should be recognized as the clearest ^{[14, p. 294]}. As a result, according to Ukraine, the signing of such an agreement between Georgia and Russia will allow the world community to focus on the alleged gross violations of the rights of neighboring states in the Black Sea basin.

Naturally, an additional consequence of Russia's coercion will be the success of the Georgian side in international instances, in particular, in the UN, or, at least, drawing the attention of the Western public to the infringement of Georgia's "maritime" rights.                                                           

Summing up, it should be noted that the deterioration of relations between the countries is probably rooted in Tbilisi's desire to break with the Soviet past and reorient itself towards the West. Georgia's intention to become a member of the European Union in the future will contribute to the intensification of contacts with European countries and, as a result, the deepening of contradictions with Russia.                      

Currently, thanks to the initiative of Ukraine, it is planned to "revive" GUAM as one of the means of regulating relations between countries in the Black Sea region.     Since 2020, the Ukrainian authorities have proposed a kind of "restart" of this association. Despite the existing contradictions between Ukraine and Georgia, they share a common enemy – Russia, from which, according to the leaders of the states, there is a threat to national security. In this regard, the revival of GUAM, especially in the case of a change in the vector of unification in favor of active actions, may also negatively affect relations between the Russian Federation and the Georgian side.      

Given the specifics of the geopolitical location of the Black Sea, the conflict-prone nature of the region, it is difficult to talk about the successful integration of Georgia and Russia. Probably, we should hope that economic problems, for example, in the field of regulating regional trade, will contribute to changing bilateral relations and consolidate the efforts of countries. Nevertheless, Tbilisi's desire to unite with European structures will remain a destabilizing factor in the development of the political dialogue between Russia and Georgia in the Black Sea region, both in the near and long term.